Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1981

Clinical Implications of Dispositional Self-Consciousness
John Smith Crandell
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Crandell, John Smith, "Clinical Implications of Dispositional Self-Consciousness" (1981). Dissertations.
2002.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2002

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1981 John Smith Crandell

CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
DISPOSITIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

by
John S. Crandell

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

January
1981

ACKOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my particular appreciation to Dr Nicolay, who has long supported my interest in this area of research.
He has truly served as a Director, not only shaping the research
process but guiding me safely through the many obstacles to completing my graduate work.

To Drs. DeWolfe and Shack go much of the

credit for the fact that this project was able to bridge the apparent
gaps between theory, research, and clinical application.
Field research requires unusual generosity and support from
already busy clinicians.

I am particularly indebted to Gerald Moz-

dzierz and Rulon Gibson for their advice and encouragement.

The

staff of the Mental Hygiene Clinic and the four units of Inpatient
Psychiatry at Hines Veterans Administration Medical Center were unfailingly cooperative.

They all have my deep gratitude.

iii

VITA

The author, John Smith Crandell, was born January 15, 1951 in
Ann Arbor, Michigan.
His elementary education was obtained at City and Country
School in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan.

He completed his public education

at Seaholm High School in Birmingham, Michigan.

Undergraduate work in

psychology and philosophy was done at Kalamazoo College in Kalamazoo,
Michigan and Fourah Bay College in Freetown, Sierra Leone, West Africa.
He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and graduated Cum Laude from Kalamazoo
in June, 1972.
He began his graduate work at Eastern Michigan University and
obtained the M.S. degree in experimental psychology in August, 1976.
While preparing his thesis on "the Impact of Differential Empathy on
Discrepant Trait Attribution to Self and Others", Mr. Crandell worked
as Director of Concord Counseling Service in Westerville, Ohio.

He re-

turned to graduate school at Loyola University in September, 1976,
working in clinical psychology and completing a clerkship and internship at Hines Veterans Administration Medical Center.

Since June, 1979

he has worked at Northwestern Community Mental Health Center in Chicago,
Illinois.

iv

Mr. Crandell has presented professional papers and workshops
at the 1976 Ohio Drug Studies Institute and the 1980 convention of the
American Psychological Association.
of Psychotherapy:

His publications include:

"Review

Theory, Research and Practice", 1980; "Designing a

Computer-Assisted Medical Record to Meet Quality Assurance Standards
in a Mental Health Setting", 1980;

and "Clinical Applications of a

Computer-Assisted Medical Record", 1981.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

iii

VITA • .

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

vi

LIST OF TABLES •

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

xii

CONTENTS FOR APPENDICES

x-iii

INTRODUCTION • • • • . • • •

1

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

7

Conceptual and Theoretical Overview
Self-Awareness Theory • . • • . • .
Demonstrations of Objective Self-Awareness ••
Importance of Standards During Objective
Self-Awareness . • • . • • . • • . • . • •
Clinical Implications of Research on Self-Awareness.
Avoidance of Objective Self-Awareness
Individual Differences in Self-Consciousness
Clinical Implications of Self-Consciousness
Ego Strength • • . • •
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Ego Strength Scale and Prediction of Improvement
in Psychotherapy • . • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • .
Ego Strength Scale Versus Ego Strength Concept •
Ego Strength Scale and Objective Self-Awareness
Premature Termination from Psychotherapy
Methodological Issues
• • • •
Psychological Tests • • • • • • • • • •
Social Class • • • . • . • • . •
Other Patient Characteristics
Therapist Characteristics
Expectancy Match .
Other Factors
Self-Consciousness and the Treatment Dropout
Phenomenon • • . •

vi

7
17
21

31
32
33
39
56
58
58

66
77
78
78
88
92

95
104
110
116
119

Personality Typology . . • . • • • . • • • . • . •
A Psychodynamic Personality Typology • • . •
Personality Type and Level of Self-Awareness
Summary of Hypotheses

123
123
133

138
142

METHOD
Subjects •
Materials
Reliability of Personality Type .
Procedures • • • •
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3

142
150
151
155
155
159
160
161

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Self-Consciousness Levels of Psychiatric Patients
Comparison of Patient Groups
. . . . .
Self-Consciousness Scores of Patients Compared
with Normal Samples • • • • • • . • . . . . . .
Factor Structure of the Self-Consciousness Scale
Self-Consciousness and Ego Strength • .
Self-Consciousness and Premature Termination from
Psychotherapy • • • • • • • . . • • • • . • . . .
Self-Consciousness and Continuation in Treatment
Indirect Effects of Self-Consciousness Scores on
Premature Termination • • • • . • . . . . . .
Discriminant Analyses . • . • • • • . . . . .
Other Hypotheses about Premature Termination
Personality Type and Self-Consciousness Levels
Methodological Issues • •
• • . . . .
Self-Consciousness Levels for Five Global
Personality Types . • • . . . • • • • . .
Comparisons Between Specific Personality Types
Subscale Item Averages and Personality Type
Discussion . . • . • . • . • • . . • • . • • . . . .
Implications for Self-Awareness Theory . . . .
Implications for Further Research and Clinical
Applications

161
161
167
171
175
180
181
187
189
196
199
199
200
209
213

218
218
222

SUMMARY

225

REFERENCE NOTES

228

vii

REFERENCES

229

....

APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B

260

....

APPENDIX C .
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX E .

249

263
265

....

267

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Page

Table
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

Response Latency Under High and Low Self-Awareness
Conditions • • • • . . •
• • • . . . . • . . .

23

Effect of Self-Awareness and Discrepancy from Standards on Minutes of Participation
. . . . .

35

Means and Intercorrelations of the Private (PR-SC),
Public (PU-SC), and Social Anxiety (SA-SC) Subscales

42

Correlations Between Social Desirability and Subscales
of the Self-Consciousness Scale • • . •

46

Correlations Between Test Anxiety and the SelfConsciousness Scale

47

Percent of Self-Attributed Responsibility with High
and Low Self-Awareness and Private Self-Consciousness

51

Percent of Self-Reference with High and Low SelfAwareness and Private Self-Consciousness • . •

52

Percent of Patients Terminating Prematurely in
Studies Reviewed . • . • . . • • .

79

Expected Rank Order of Personality Types on the
Self-Consciousness Scale • • • • .
• • • •

• . 135

10.

Demographic and Clinical Management Characteristics
of Research Participants
• . . • . • • • • • • • • • 148

11.

Agreement Between Clinicians in Classifying
Personality Types
• • • . • • • •

• • • 153

12.

Self-Consciousness Scale Scores when Administered
Before or After the Ego Strength Scale • • • • • • • • • 158

13.

Mean Self-Consciousness Scale Scores for Patient
Groups • • • • • • • . • . . • • . .
• • • • • • • • 162

14.

Standard Deviations of Self-Consciousness Scale
Scores for Patient Groups . . • • . • . • • • • • • • • 163
ix

Intercorrelations of Self-Consciousness Subscale
Scores for Patient Groups • . . • . • • • • • ••

164

Self-Consciousness Scale Means, Standard Deviations,
and Intercorrealtions for Patients and Normals

168

Communalities and Factor Matrix for the SelfConsciousness Scale
• . • .

174

Correlations of the Ego Strength Scale with the
Self-Consciousness Scale • • . • • • • • •

176

Intercorrelations of the Self-Consciousness Subscales
for Patients at Different Levels on the Ego Strength
Scale • • • . • • • . • •

178

Self-Consciousness Levels of Decliners, Terminators,
and Continuers

182

ANOVAs for Self-Consciousness Levels of Decliners,
Terminators, and Continuers .

183

Total Self-Consciousness Score Intervals by Length
of Stay . • . • • • . • • • • . . . • . • . .

185

Association of Self-Consciousness Scores with
Covariates of Premature Termination . • . . .

190

Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
for Continuers, Terminators, and Decliners

192

Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
for Continuers and Terminators

193

26.

Global Diagnosis and Personality Type •

201

27.

Self-Consciousness Scale Means (with ANOVAs) as a
Function of Diagnosis and Personality Type

202

Self-Consciousness Scale Means (with ANOVAs) as a
Function of Unmixed Personality Type . . . . .

205

Distribution of Social Anxiety Scores by Personality
Type • . . • • • . . • • • . • . • • . . . . . . . .

206

15.

16.
17.

18.
19.

20.
21.

22.

23.
24.
25.

28.

29.

X

30.
31.
32.

33.
34.

Distribution of Total Self-Consciousness Scores by
Personality Type • . • • . • . . • . • . • . • • .

207

Expected and Observed Rankings of Personality Types
on the Self-Consciousness Scale
. • • • . • •

211

Expected and Observed Subscale Ranks for Personality
Types
• • • . • .
. . • .

214

Self-Consciousness Subscale Item Means for Personality Types
• . • .
• . • •

215

Self-Consciousness Scale Factor Score Means for
Personality Types
. . • • • • • • • • . •

217

xi

LIST OF FIGURES
Page

Figure
1.

Reviewers' Responses to Variables Associated with
Premature Termination from Psychotherapy • .

96

Summary of Variables Associated with Premature
Termination from Psychotherapy . • •

120

3.

Characteristics of Different Personality Styles

127

4.

Personality Types and Descriptions • • .

129

5.

Number of Subjects Participating in Each of the
Component Studies
• . . •
• . . . . . . • 14 7

6.

Percent Continuing among Patients in Successive
Intervals of Total Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . • 186

2.

xii

CONTENTS FOR APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A Copies of Questionnaires and Forms Used

249

Self-Consciousness Scale

250

Ego Strength Scale

252

Intake Rating Scale •

256

Instructions for Completing the Intake Rating Scale

257

Consent Form

258

APPENDIX B Reliability Study Results •

260

Percent Agreement on Primary Type •

261

Percent Agreement on the Applicability of Each
Given Type
. • • • • . •

262

APPENDIX C

Factor Structure of the Self-Consciousness Scale

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix for All Factors with
an Eigenvalue Greater than One
APPENDIX D Diagnoses of Research Participants
DSM II Diagnoses of Research Subjects ••
APPENDIX E

263
264
265
266
267

Raw Data

Format of Raw Data

268

Raw Data

270

xiii

INTRODUCTION
The ability to reflect on oneself is an important human
capacity that has received considerable attention from philosophical
and psychological theorists (Bugenthal, 1965; Mead, 1934; Sartre,
1956).

In the last decade, self-awareness theory (Buss, 1980; Duval

& Wicklund, 1972; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Wicklund, 1975b)
has provided a basis for empirical research on self-consciousness.
Self-focused attention fosters a comparison between performance and
salient personal standards and feelings.

The usual result of such a

comparison - the experience of dissonance - leads to one of two
resolutions to this internal conflict:

either behavior or standards

are altered to minimize the discrepancy or attempts are made to avoid
focal self-awareness.

Performance in simple tasks is improved in

the presence of mirrors, audiences, and video recordings of the
subject (Wicklund & Duval, 1971/1972).

But there are negative

sequellae as well, since self-consciousness
to evaluative anxiety.

arouses a state similar

If the personal importance of the task

passes an optimal point, self-focused attention is associated with
decrements in performance (Liebling & Shaver, 1973) and in selfesteem (Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973).

Especially if the disso-

nance cannot be eliminated quickly, stimuli to self-focused attention
may cause escape behavior (Cummings, 1976; Duval, Wicklund & Fine,
1
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1971/1972; Wicklund, 1975b).
To date, the primary application of self-awareness theory
has been in social psychology.

Duval & Wicklund (1972) have used it

in discussions of such traditional topics as attribution, conformity,
social facilitation, and self-esteem.

There has been no systematic

attempt to generalize the theory to phenomena of interest in clinical
psychology, although Duval and Wicklund and subsequent researchers
(Fenigstein

et al., 1975) have suggested that such an application

would be fruitful.

This dissertation will attempt to extend self-

awareness theory to three issues of practical and theoretical importance in clinical psychology.
Of primary concern is the level and structure of selfconsciousness in a psychopathological sample.

Fenigstein

et al.

(1975) have administered a Self-Consciousness Scale to samples of
normal college students, validating it as a measure of the dispositional tendency to focus attention on oneself.
components:

They report three

attention to private aspects of the self, attention

to the self as social object, and social anxiety in anticipation of
negative evaluation.

It may be that a clinical sample deviates from

the norms in overall self-consciousness or in subscale scores.
Certainly, the generalized anxiety that typifies many diagnostic
groups might well be expressed in the Social Anxiety subscale.
Similarly, the disruptions in intra- and interpersonal functioning
found among those seeking psychotherapy may represent disturbances
in the ability to reflect on their internal feelings and motivation,
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or on their impact on others.

Recent theorizing about self-

consciousness has stressed the importance of the distinction between
awareness of public and private aspects of the self (Buss, 1980).
A more relevant distinction for a psychopathological sample may well
be between the evaluative and nonevaluative aspects of self-awareness.
For this reason the factor structure of the scale will be reexamined.
Lastly, since the clinical population is certainly not homogeneous,
self-consciousness will be examined as a function of ego strength
or degree of pathology.

The first goal of this research will be to

examine the responses of a psychopathological sample to evaluate the
degree to which self-awareness theory, as developed for a normal
population, can be generalized to clinical situations.
The second goal of this dissertation

will be to examine the

hypothesis that deviant levels of self-consciousness correspond with
Duval & Wicklund

a tendency to prematurely terminate psychotherapy.

(1972) indicate that escape behavior is especially likely when there
is a large discrepancy between behavior or attributes and relevant
personal standards, when discrepancy reducing behavior is difficult,
and stimuli to self-awareness are salient.

The early stages of

psychotherapy closely approximate this situation.

The presence of

an expert observer and the all but exclusive focus on the patient's
life guarantee sustained self-consciousness.

The topic of discussion

is generally on problems of such severity, duration, and intractability that the patient is in considerable distress.

The required

changes are usually characterological or otherwise involve

a major
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shift in lifestyle, changes that can take place only after extended
time or effort.

This situation is closely analogical to the one

Duval and Wicklund suggest will motivate avoidance behavior, in
this case, failing to continue in treatment.
Surveys show that up to 65% of those beginning psychotherapy
terminate unilaterally (Malzer, 1980).

A great deal of research

has investigated the reasons for this high rate of dropping out.
Relatively few patient characteristics have been identified as
related to premature termination (Garfield, Affleck, & Muffly,
1963).

Instead, research has increasingly shifted to situational

factors, and specifically to the interaction of patient and therapist
(Frank, Gliedman, Imber, Nash, & Stone, 1957).

Surveys of terminators

repeatedly find complaints about the quality of the relationship
(Hiler, 1958; Kamin & Coughlin, 1963; Saltzman, Luetgert, Roth,
Creaser, & Howard, 1976).

Therapists were accused of being cold

and aloof, lacking understanding or interest, and showing too little
respect.

These complaints less likely point to real shortcomings

in the therapist than to an interaction pattern that fails to assuage
the patient's initial doubts, anxieties, and self-criticism.

What

are perceived as therapist failures may instead be signs of excessive
self-consciousness.

Premature termination is, then, a major problem

for which the existing explanations are consistent with an account
based on the avoidance of excessive self-focused attention.

The

second study reported will evaluate the applicability of a specific
hypothesis from self-awareness theory to the clinically important

5

issue of therapy drop outs.
The third goal of the research will be to examine differences
in self-consciousness levels among distinct personality types.

While

the first two studies consider patients as a group, this experiment
pursues the difference among subgroups of the clinic sample.

Self-

consciousness may constitute an important treatment issue for particular types.

The self-preoccupation of obsessive or passive patients

may make them particularly vulnerable to paralyzing self-criticism
if the therapist fails to carefully limit the amount of self-focused
attention.

Conversely, the lack of insight displayed by sociopaths

or paranoid patients is likely attributable to a lack of selfmonitoring.

This research expands on the second goal.

Some types

may drop out of treatment because therapy exaccerbates a preexisting
excessive self-consciousness (e.g., passive types) while others may
lack the requisite ability to reflect on their internal motivation
that is necessary for insight oriented therapy (e.g., paranoid
patients).

If either of the first two experiments find self-

consciousness to have important clinical implications, this more
microscopic examination of differences between psychopathological
subgroups should help to clarify the results.
This dissertation is an initial attempt to extend selfawareness theory to a new area:

clinical psychology.

From this

point of view, it is an attempt to generalize a well established
body of findings to a new population.

Clinicians have, of course,

previously considered the importance of self-focused attention.
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Verbal therapies have historically considered insight to be a
critical element in treatment (Greenson, 1967; Yalom, 1975).

But

much of this data has been presented in terms of anecdotal case
studies, meta-psychological theorizing, or technical directives.
From the point of view of clinical psychology, this research attempts
to add an empirical perspective on the importance of self-consciousness to the understanding and treatment of psychopathology.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This research applies self-awareness theory to several areas
of clinical psychology.

The literature review will be extensive.

It will begin with a conceptual overview which samples the theoretical
perspectives on self-consciousness influencing current approaches
to human relations and psychotherapy.

This section provides the con-

text for the following one, which reviews self-awareness theory in
some detail.

Successive sections will cover the literature related

to each of the clinical issues hypothesized to be related to selfconsciousness levels.

In order, these include discussions of the

Ego Strength Scale (Barron, 1953) as an index of degree of pathology,
variables related to premature termination from psychotherapy, and
personality types in a psychopathological population.

The chapter

will conclude with a restatement of the central hypotheses tested in
this dissertation.
Conceptual and Theoretical Overview
Socrates dictum, "Know Thyself", is oft-cited and time honored.
It serves not only as an epistemological tool and ethical directive;
it also takes on the force of an ontological description of the human
condition.

The capacity to reflect on ones acts, attributes, and

thought processes is uniquely connected to what we think of as human.
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It is the defining feature conventionally used to distinguish man
from animal.

It is intimately connected to the capacity for abstract

thought and evolution through culture.
With this general cultural attitude as background, it is not
surprising that the social sciences have treated self-awareness
reverently.

Mead (1934) and Piaget (1954) make the ability to

"decenter" and examine oneself as an object a developmental hallmark.
For both, self-objectification is a necessary preliminary to effective
social relations.

Some self-understanding is requisite for the funda-

mental interpersonal skill of empathy, which in turn has been defined
as a basis of therapeutic interaction (Kohut, 1971, 1977; Rogers,
1961).

And self-awareness is just as important for the client as

for the helper in the therapeutic dyad.

Since Freud (Greenson, 1967)

a dominant thrust of dynamic theorizing has been on the importance
of insight to healing.
But there is a problematic side to self-awareness which is
best captured in the word "self-consciousness".

If the hyphen is

removed or exaggerated, the word shatters into two components, "self"
and "consciousness", which jointly represent the crucial capacity for
self-focused attention.

The connotation is positive.

But as a single

unit, "self-consciousness", the implication is very different.

The

associations are with anxiety, paralysis of action, exposure to harsh
scrutiny, and shame.

It is more than a semantic accident that the

word can be defined as either "the state of being intensely aware of
oneself" or "ill at ease" (Webster, 1977, p. 1048).

There is a
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fundamental ambivalence with which we approach the concept, belying
the esteem held by the previously mentioned theorists.
Various writers have described the potential problems associated with self-focused attention.

One perspective examines the

advantages of unselfconscious action (Csikszentmihalyi, 1979;
Ornstein, 1972).

The resulting "flow experience" (Furlong, 1976)

is described glowingly as characterized by heightened concentration,
merging of awareness with action, enhanced mastery, loss of doubts,
and an ecstatic joy in action for its own sake.

This description

provides a counterpoint to the overcontrolled and unnatural busyness
attributed to reflective states of consciousness (Bassos, 1976).
But the main critique of self-awareness is frontal and best
epitomized in the writings of Sartre (1956).

For him, the basic

ontological structure of human beings is tripartite.

First, as

being-for-itself, we are the freedom and limitless possibilities of
our consciousness.

Second, as being-in-itself, we are paradoxically

rooted in facticity by our bodies.

Lastly, as being-for-others, we

are objects and tools in other people's projects.

As such, being-

for-others represents the intolerable crystalization of the first
two states which gives rise to the famous phrase "Hell is other
people" (Sartre, 1946).

The look of "the Other" reminds us that our

freedom is limited:
I grasp the Other's look at the very center of my act as the
solidification and alienation of my own possibilities. In fear
or in anxious or prudent anticipation, I perceive that these
possibilities which I am and which are the condition of my
transcendence are given also to another, given as about to be
transcended in turn by his own possibilities. The Other as a
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look is only that -my transcendence transcended.
1965, p. 201)

(Cumming,

The presence of the Other is not only the occasion for fear, but
for shame:
Shame . • • is shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact
that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and
judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in
order to become a given object • • •
The world flows out of
the world and I flow outside myself. The Other's look makes me
be beyond my being in this world and puts me in the midst of
the world which is at once this world and beyond this world.
(p. 199)
The Other's ability to reconstitute the world from an alien perspective changes the relation of self to itself:
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I
have just glued my ear to the door and am looking through a
keyhole. I am alone and on the level of non-thetic selfconsciousness. This means first of all that there is no self
to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can
refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way
known; I am my acts and hence they carry in themselves their
whole justification • • • My consciousness clings to my acts,
it is my acts; and my acts are commanded only by the ends to
be attained and by the instruments to be employed . • . •
Jealousy, as the possibility which I am, organizes this instrumental complex by transcending the complex towards itself.
But I am this jealousy; I do not know it • • . Moreover, I
cannot truly define myself as being in a situation; first
because I am not a positional consciousness of myself; second
because I am my own nothingness • • • •
But suddenly I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking
at me. What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly
affected in my being and that essential modifications appear
in my structure - modifications which I can apprehand and fix
conceptually by means of the reflective cogito.
First of all, I now exist as myself for my unreflected consciousness • • • • I see myself because someone sees me • •
The unreflected consciousness does not apprehend the person
directly as an object; the person is presented to consciousness
insofar as the person is an object for the Other. (pp. 196-198)
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In apprehending oneself as an object, the possibility of
self-evaluation appears.

So, while the Other's presence may be

the occasion, the experience is internal and basic to a person who
is at once a being and a consciousness.
sal.

At a party, people are dancing.

self-consciousness.

This embarassment is univerLow lights buffer against

The music and the rhythm of the movement

totally occupy each dancer's awareness.

There is no self and so no

self-judgment, only the kinesthetic awareness of flexing muscles
and the sound of the music.

A dancer may even close his eyes or

defocus his gaze to enhance the awareness of these stimuli.
suddenly, the gaze takes in an attentive bystander.

Yet,

Eyes focus.

Just as instantly, the dancer transposes himself into the perspective of the observer.

Awareness of music and movement recede.

the dancer sees himself:

And

the silly step, the harsh asymmetry of

the movements, the awkwardness, the vacuous look.

With this outside

perspective, this "objective" and objectifying distance, opportunity
for self-criticism abounds.
"Other".

The stimulus need not even be Sartre's

The reflection from a strategically placed mirror or the

memory of other dances or occasions of criticism may be sufficient
to begin the avalanche of self-evaluative internal dialogue.

This is

the anxiety and disruption that makes self-awareness problematic.
Psychotherapy presents a prototypical environment in which
such harsh self-scrutiny is likely.
ever-attentive.

The Other is ever-present and

Even more than in typical social interaction, the

focus is kept on the patient.

The distractions and pleasantries
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that punctuate normal conversation are minimized.

The therapist,

to the extent that he or she approximates the analytic ideal of the
"blank screen", provides few clues as to course or satisfactory
progress of the relationship.

In the absense of clear signals from

the attentive expert, the patient is even more likely to obsess
about the adequacy of himself and his self-presentation.

All of

these conventional features of the therapy relationship compound
the tendency toward self-consciousness that follows naturally from
the discussion of sensitive and problematic areas in the patient's
life.

It is no wonder that patients demonstrate an amazingly crea-

tive and broad range of resistances to the therapeutic task, or
that-- with great frequency-- the therapy ends with the early and
unilateral termination of treatment by the patient.
This is, intentionally, a one-sided portrait of the therapy
relationship.

But its purpose is to highlight the likelihood that

shame and anxiety will be important issues in the early phases of
psychological treatment.

To the extent that insight is a basic

feature of verbal psychotherapy, self-consciousness, with attendant
self-criticism and shame, will be present.

Indeed, a wide range of

therapeutic manuevers may be interpreted as vehicles to manage
anxiety.

Yalom (1975) stresses the curative power of discovering

that a private pain is shared in common with other group members.
This experience of universality deflates shame by recasting a private
problem as common.

Likewise, an empathic response indicates that

an experience is understandable and acceptable.

There is the clear
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implication that the problem expressed is neither so repugnant nor
so important as the patient's fantasy had likely made it seem.

The

therapeutic use of humor and anecdotes distract the patient and
disrupt the chain of self-evaluation as much as they imply alternative perspectives for analyzing a problem.

Perhaps most directly,

paradox and reinterpretation suggest socially valued motivations
that can replace the patient's self-critical explanations of behavior.
Diverse techniques, even from incompatible approaches to personality
change, share in common their efficacy at disrupting self-scrutiny
or neutralizing its troublesome consequences.
While therapists seldom address the issue of self-consciousness, there is discussion of the ways in which focal self-awareness
changes over time.

Greenson (1967) pegs the development of a working

relationship between patient and analyst to the capacity of the
observing ego to split off from the experiencing ego.

As this split

develops, the observing function, called the reasonable ego, operates
as the analyst's ally in making and applying interpretations.

What

Greenson is describing is a gradual process by which the anxiety and
shame attending self-scrutiny are neutralized and self-observation
becomes a useful tool rather than a threat.

But the development of

the reasonable ego is not regarded as the culmination of successful
treatment.

Rogers (1958) notes that as client-centered therapy

proceeds there is movement on the part of the client from initial
avoidance of reference to the self, through a period of focal selfawareness, to a final stage in which reflective consciousness becomes
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less important as the organismic valuing process asserts itself
without requiring focal attention.
A similar conception is offered by Bugenthal (1965), who
posits a two-stage therapy process:
The analytic phase of our work is oriented to a conception of
the person in which he is assumed to have both subject and
object aspects. The ontologie phase calls for a recognition
that this composite conception of the person is itself a part
of the resistance to full authenticity of being. Instead, the
ontologie phase insists on the necessity of freeing the I from
its bondage to the Self in order to move toward true ontologie
freedom.
(P. 184)
Here the "I-process" is "pure subject" (p. 194) or "feelingful
awareness" (p. 204).

In contrast, "the Self is an object in the

awareness of the I-process.

Under the influence of cultural learnings,

we often regard the Self as synonomous with the I-process, but it is
not" (p. 203).

Rather the Self serves as a cognitive map permitting

consistency of behavior with minimal awareness.

Both excessive con-

sistency and minimization of awareness are threats to authentic
living.

In addition, the Self is constantly checked against an

idealized version, promoting a tyranny of the ideal over the actual.
Therapy then becomes a reworking of the Self which allows maximum
awareness and culminates in the liberation of the I-process from the
Self.

To Bugenthal, peak experiences occur at "moments in which the

I-process breaks free from the Self" (p. 252).
Bugenthal and Rogers agree that therapy must include a
phase in which the self-as-object is carefully examined, but that
such examination cannot be the end point of treatment.

Fully human

living requires a more spontaneous responsiveness than can be

15
possible with a self-scrutinizing posture toward life.

In adopting

this stance, they are in line with those who question the absolute
value of self-awareness.

Yet, they clearly reject the Sartrean

notion that self-apprehension, or the presence of other people which
stimulate it, is undesirable or intolerable.

There seem to be two

reasons for their lack of emphasis on the shame and anxiety accompanying self-consciousness.

One reason is legitimate, while the

other is nat.
Sartre is wrong in contending that social relationships are
inevitably fraught with shame and violated freedom.

As Mead and

others have demonstrated, all thought is fundamentally social
(Pfuetze, 1954).

The internal dialogue of thinking is modeled on

social dialogue.

Our freedom is not contravened by the Other, but

is made possible by him.

Shame, then, is not an ontologically pri-

mary experience, but one among a number of potential responses to the
presence of an observer.

Similarly, self-evaluation is but one of a

range of ways of responding to the objectified self.
a previous example, once again picture our dancer.

To return to
Instead of disrup-

tive shame, the awareness of an observer may motivate greater effort
and concentration on the dancer's part.

Whether for vanity or in

appreciation of imagined approbation, the dancer may excell himself.
Especially if he is experienced and competent, the dancer may be able
to use the other's reactions as a type of mirror to inform his efforts.
Here the Other becomes a source of information or support for the
enhancement of the dancer's project.

This capacity to productively
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use the presence of another, and the entire process of self-observation, is what makes psychotherapy possible.

Greenson (1967),

Bugenthal (1965), and Rogers (1958) are correct in stressing the
potentially beneficial consequences of self-examination.

What

becomes important is to discriminate the conditions or situations in
which self-consciousness will support insight and change, in contrast
to those times when it will erupt into paralyzing shame.
Where all three therapists underestimate the importance of
shame is in the first few sessions of psychotherapy.

Clearly with

Greenson, and to a lesser extent with Bugenthal and Rogers, the
emphasis is on the course of treatment once a therapeutic alliance
has developed.

It is then that interpretation is most useful, that

the I-process can be nurtured, or that the organismic valuing process
becomes evident.

But the working relationship develops slowly.

It

is during the beginning sessions, when the patient makes the first
tentative attempts at self-disclosure, that the vulnerability to
anxiety is greatest.

The developed transference, if positive, is a

bond which enables the patient to withstand periods of self-consciousness.

Before it has arisen the patient can tolerate considerably less

self-scrutiny and the therapist must sensitively administer corrective
doses from his or her anxiety-management techniques.

Premature

pressure for self-examination can easily result in the experience of
shame and coercion that Sartre so eloquently describes.

It is during

this early phase in treatment, a phase with varying duration for
different patients, that the Sartrean paradigm is most applicable.
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Self-focused attention is a double-edged sword.
cut for good has been amply demonstrated.
conscience and social cooperation.

That it can

It is the vehicle for

It is a necessary condition for

the crucial internal dialogue between the "I" and the "me" (Mead,
1934).

It is one--if not the--critical ingredient in verbal psycho-

therapy.

It is this role that has received most attention by psycho-

logical theorists.
well.

But self-consciousness can have ill effects as

Influential observers like Bugenthal and Rogers stress that

treatment is not finished so long as the self-as-object is the primary
focus.

Perhaps even more important, according to the argument in this

section, are the potentially disruptive effects of self-consciousness
in the early stages of treatment before the therapeutic alliance is
robust.

Research bearing on these affects, both positive and negative,

will be presented next.
Self-Awareness Theory

Duval and Wicklund's (1972) theory of objective self-awareness
purports to have general application across the field of social psychology.

The authors treat such classic subjects as conformity, social

facilitation, attribution and self-esteem.

This range is achieved

because the authors conceptually link motivational consequences to
the cognitive processes controlling direction of attention.
Their contention is that consciousness is intrinsically bidirectional.

During periods of action or sensory stimulation the person

will be subjectively self-aware (SSA):

attention will be directed
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toward the external environment and there will be only a minimal,
nonfocal self-awareness.

However, any stimuli reminding the person

of himself will prompt the uniquely human self-consciousness in which
the person treats himself as an object.
is called objective self-awareness (OSA).
oscillate between these two points.

This latter state is what
Consciousness is held to

While there are undoubtedly

individual differences in the proportion of time spent in OSA, Duval
and Wicklund contend that the direction of attention is primarily
determined by environmental stimuli.

They use such stimuli as mirrors,

videotapes, and voice recordings in their experiments to manipulate
attention toward the self.
It is the motivational consequences of attentional direction
that gives the theory its wide range of application.

Duval and

Wicklund theorize that people use internalized standards of action
to regulate their behavior.

It is while in the objective state, and

only then, that actual behavior is compared with personal standards.
Typically there is an awareness of discrepancy between behavior and
ideal.

Although Wicklund (1975b) notes that a success may lead to a

pleasurable discrepancy when behavior supersedes the relevant standard, the usual experience is one of failing to live up to the
standard.
derogation.

In such cases objective self-awareness would lead to selfThe drop in self-esteem can be handled in various ways:

attempts to avoid OSA may include withdrawal or distraction through
involvement in other activities, or dissonance may be reduced by
altering standards or changing behavior to bring it in line with ideals.

19
Whichever of the options is chosen, the motivational consequences of objective self-awareness are clearly based on the desire
to avoid the experience of discrepancy between behavior and standards.
Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggest that redirection of attention away
from the self will be the initial response; it is the fastest means
of avoiding awareness of discrepancy.

So the embarrassed partygoer

will try to escape from the social setting.

Or, failing that, he

will become engrossed in other activities (any other) such as mixing
a drink or admiring the host's preparations.

Anything that shifts

the attentional focus away from the self restores OSA and provides
immediate relief from self-derogation.

Only when such escape is

impossible would behavior or attitude change be expected.

So persis-

tent confrontation from a friend may well prove effective, since the
subject of the discrepancy cannot be avoided and the valued friendship
will prevent fleeing the situation.
Such a formulation implies a preference for subjective selfawareness, with its freedom from self-evaluation.
crucial questions.

This raises two

First, what is to prevent a constant attentional

focus on external events?
to OSA are unavoidable.

Duval and Wicklund respond the stimuli
Anything that reminds the person of himself

will elicit self-focused attention.

Environmental stimuli such as

mirrors, monitors, or personal writings raise the self to consciousness.
The very actions sought to avoid OSA may require the focus on one's
hands or kinesthetic cues that trigger self-consciousness.
most obvious and unavoidable stimuli to OSA are social.

But, the

Awareness
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of self as a separate object arises in interaction with other people
(Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1966; Smith, 1979).

The experience or anticipa-

tion of evaluation by others remains the most common and surefire way
to elicit OSA.

Given our constant exposure to a social network, and

our dependence on it to meet so many of our goals, OSA is unavoidable.
The second crucial question might be:
why do people seem to seek it?
performing before audiences.

if OSA is unpleasant,

People are constantly and voluntarily
They decorate their dwellings with

mirrors and their offices with certificates enblazened with their
names.

They seek introspective activities, even to the extreme of

paying for interminable courses of psychoanalysis.
is vaguer.

Here the answer

Wicklund (1975b) suggests that the motivation for self-

improvement may overcome the tendency to avoid OSA.

The research to

be discussed below also suggests that people may rapidly habituate
to the experience of self-focused attention and thus sustain it
without adverse reactions.
There is a further explanation of why OSA is not always
avoided.

While Duval and Wicklund (1972) never explicitly discuss

the possibility, it is clear that self-evaluation need not be the
inevitable result of self-focused attention.

The dancer described

above may very attentively consider how he appears to his audience,
and use this awareness to enhance his performance without engaging
in self-criticism.

Self-consciousness may be necessary for self-

evaluation without inevitably causing it.
Having attempted to outline the scope and central tenants of
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Duval and Wicklund's theory of objective self-awareness, and having
just suggested a qualification to it, we will review a cross-section
of the research cited in its support.

Because of the realization that

OSA need not be inevitably or constantly aversive, we will monitor
the magnitude and duration of the OSA effect whenever possible.
Demonstrations of objective self-awareness.

Self-awareness

research manipulates the salience of stimuli reminding the subject
of the self.

Most often the manipulation uses a mirror, a video

camera, or an audience.

Davis and Brock (1975) demonstrated the

validity of the camera in stimulating objective self-awareness (OSA).
The 48 subjects were told to translate pronouns from a passage in
a foreign language, with the expectation that self-awareness would be
evident in increased use of first person pronouns.

Some subjects

were given spurious feedback about their level of creativity to induce
either positive or negative discrepancy from standards.

But even

when there was no feedback and no induction of self-evaluative posture,
exposure to the camera led to a significant increase in the use of
first person pronouns.

Of a total of 49 pronouns, the control group

translated 9.5 to the first person compared to the 14.2 used with
exposure to the camera.

Gellerand Shaver (1976) used a more projec-

tive approach, the Stroop color-naming technique.

Previous research

indicates a reliable tendency for it to take longer to name the color
of a stimulus card if a word printed on the card has important personal
meaning.

Any OSA induction should increase the self-relevance of

stimulus words, making the procedure a good indirect test of the
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presence of OSA.

Half of the 57 female undergraduates were admin-

istered the procedure in the presence of a mirror and camera.

Ad-

ditionally, half the group was exposed to neutral words while the
other half saw self-evaluative and self-referrent words on the
stimulus cards.
colors.

Table 1 shows the seconds required to name the

There were significant main effects for type of word and

for OSA stimuli, with exposure to either causing greater latencies
in naming colors.

In line with self-awareness theory, the results

validate the OSA-inducing properties of mirrors and cameras, specifically, and of self-referrent stimuli in general.
Carver and Scheier (1978) validated the OSA-inducing properties of a mirror or an observer.

Female subjects filled out Exner's

(1970) Self-Focus Sentence Completion blank, which can be scored for
reference to self, to the environment, to both, or to neither.

For

each subject a ratio was created with references to self or self
plus environment divided by total responses.

With exposure to a

mirror, 41 undergraduates generated a ratio of .57, significnatly
higher than the .50 for 38 students not exposed to the mirror.
Similar results were obtained when OSA was manipulated by the presence
of an observer:

a ratio of .58 for the 41 observed subjects differing

to a statistically significant degree from the .51 obtained by students who had no audience.

In summary, a variety of approaches have

shown that the self becomes more salient with exposure to any of the
most commonly used stimuli to OSA:

the camera, mirror, or observer.

Duval and Wicklund (1972) demonstrate that the responses to
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Table 1
Response Latencies Under
High and Low Self-Awareness Conditions
Word type

Mirror and camera

Neutral
Self-referrent
Note.

From Geller and Shaver, 1976.

No mirror or camera

8.91

6.25

13.36

8.57
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their manipulations of self-awareness have implications in a number
of important areas.

Examples will be drawn from studies on attribu-

tion of responsibility, social facilitation, and self-esteem change.
Duval and Wicklund (1973) had female undergraduates read
five short passages in which a positive outcome could be plausibly
attributed to oneself or to another.
apportion responsibility.

The subjects were asked to

The self-awareness manipulation consisted

of exposure to the reflecting (OSA) or nonreflecting surface of the
mirror.

As hypothesized, the OSA condition lead to greater self-

attribution.

With exposure to the mirror, the subjects ascribed

60% of the responsibility to self, while only 49.9% was selfattributed by subjects not exposed to the mirror.

These results

cannot be explained as simple self-aggrandizement.
was equally potent when outcomes were negative.

Focus of attention

Objective self-

awareness again increased self-attribution, with an average of 60.2%
of the culpability assigned to the self by OSA subjects, as compared
to 51.1% for the no-mirror subjects.
Responsibility attributed to self can be diminished by stimuli
directing attention away from the self.
used physical activity as a distraction.

Duval and Wicklund (1973)
Under the guise of warming

up for a manual dexterity task, 14 undergraduate subjects operated a
pursuit-rotor device while apportioning responsibility for negative
outcomes in 10 situations.

Self-attribution was lower than that

obtained from 16 control subjects in 8 of the 10 situations.

Overall,

distraction lead to a significant decrease in assigning responsibility
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to self, from 57.63% for the controls to 48.65% for the OSA group.
Duval and Hensey (1976) and Duval and Wicklund (1972) detail similar
results in experiments using other types of competing activities to
increase subjective self-awareness.
These experiments indicate a consistent and statistically
significant effect in which manipulations of self-awareness alter the
degree of self-attribution.

The fact that ratings of personal respon-

sibility were alternately increased and decreased in keeping with
theoretical expectations and that these changes occurred for both
positive and negative outcomes, suggest that the effect is pervasive.
A second application of self-awareness theory is in the
explanation of social facilitation effects.

Zajonc (1965) and Cottrell

(1968) observed that the presence of an audience could lead to greater
efforts and increased productivity in certain types of activities.
The effect was attributed to a nonspecific drive aroused in the social
context.

Duval and Wicklund (1972) reinterpreted these experiments

as evidence of self-awareness effects.

They argued that an audience,

particularly if it is attentive and expert in the area of performance,
serves to elicit OSA.

Attempts to approximate standards of excellence

in turn lead to improved performance.

By this analysis, "social

facilitation" effects should be found even with nonsocial stimuli, so
long as they lead to self-focused attention.

Wicklund and Duval

(1971/1972) told 34 female undergraduates that they were participating
in a study of the ease of copying unfamiliar passages.

The OSA stim-

uli, a mirror, was justified with the explanation that a second phase
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of the session involved mirror-writing.

All subjects then copied

selections of German prose for successive, 5 minute sessions, with
the experimental group being exposed to the mirror during the second
interval.

As predicted, the OSA group showed more improvement in num-

ber of letters copied (43.33 letters more than during the first session)
than did the control group (17.65).
tically significant at the .05 level.

The group difference was statisAgain, self-awareness theory dem-

onstrates its explanatory value in another area of social psychological
inquiry.
Further research on social facilitation qualifies the OSA explanation.

In a partial replication of Wicklund and Duval's (1971)

study, Pasternak (1978) had 80 undergraduates copy constant-vowel-constant syllables with low association value.

Half of the subjects were

aware of being videotaped during the experiment.
ences were found.
cially robust.

Yet no group differ-

The performance facilitation effect may not be espe-

Others question the range of application of the self-

awareness account.

Citing Wine's (1971) argument that test anxiety

causes performance decrements because it interferes with attending to
the task, Liebling and Shaver (1973) hypothesized that OSA may interfere
with performance if it raises evaluative apprehension beyond an optimal
point.

They replicated Wicklund and Duval's (1971) experiment closely

(having subjects copy passages in Swedish) but added an additional
group exposed to OSA under conditions intended to heighten evaluation.
This group of subjects were told that the task reflected reaction time,
verbal fluency and language ability and therefore "might reflect their
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intelligence."

A significant interaction was found as predicted.

The replication condition resulted in more improvement with exposure
to the mirror, but the high evaluation condition lead to less improvement (7.26%) with the mirror than without it (13.69%).

Such findings

caused Wicklund (1975b) to revise self-awareness theory to say that:
the relationship between self-focused attention and task performance almost has to be curvilinear, and, further, the simpler
the task • • . the more that attention can be turned to the self
before reaching the point at which that attention comes to interfere with performance. (p. 265)
Self-awareness theory has demonstrated its utility in predicting
facilitation with simple and nonstressful activities.

With more com-

plex and self-evaluative tasks (self-exploration in psychotherapy for
example), excessive OSA may prove counterproductive.
One last area in which self-awareness effects have been demonstrated is in the crucial area of self-esteem.

Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris

(1973) reported two similar experiments in which subjects rated themselves as they ideally and as they actually were on continuums between
pairs of traits.

Half of the subjects completed one of the scales

while OSA was created through the use of audio tape recordings of the
subject's voice.

In both studies, OSA lead to nonsignificantly greater

discrepancies overall and to significantly greater self-ideal differences over the first block of five items.

For the first block in

study I, the mean discrepancy on the 20 point Lickert-type scale was
4.0 for the OSA condition as compared to 2.6 for the group listening
to another student's voice.

The differences were attributable to

real-self ratings, as the ideals remained consistent across groups
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despite exposure to OSA.

So subjects appear to respond to OSA by

becoming temporarily more self-critical.

The authors hypothesized

that the diminution of the initial effect can be attributed to habituation or to self-distraction from the stimulus to OSA.
Crandell (Note 1) performed a study which partially replicated
Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris' (1973) research on self-ideal discrepancies.
Subjects selected by 26 student experimenters were told they were
participating in a study of nonverbal behavior and nervous habits.
With this rationale, 51 subjects were observed closely while they
indicated their actual and ideal standing on one set of 48 items drawn
from the Gough Adjective Checklist (Gough & Heilbrum, 1965).

A second

set was completed with no observation, thus permitting each subject to
serve as his or her own control.

The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory

(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was also administered before
debriefing.

The manipulation had no effect on the discrepancies, which

averaged 1.73 per item with OSA and 1.76 without it (on a 9-point scale).
Even in the first block of 12 items, the OSA group was only minimally
and nonsignificantly more discrepant, averaging 1.82 instead of 1.80
per item.

This study offered no support for self-awareness effects

on self-ideal congruence.
anxiety.

However, OSA did affect ratings of state

If the subject was observed while completing the first self-

concept scale, and accordingly had an intervening and unobserved questionnaire to complete before rating their anxiety, A-State averaged
34.90.

When anxiety ratings were immediately preceded by observation,

A-State averaged 40.03.

The difference is marginally significant,
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!

(1, 48) =

3.7~~<

.10.

There appears to have been OSA effects in

this experiment, although they were not evident in the self-ratings.
Perhaps the stimulus items (e.g., practical, adaptable, sociable) are
too consistent in the subject's life to be greatly affected by OSA.
In other words, trait ratings are less responsive than are state
ratings (such as the anxiety measure).
The link between OSA and self-concept or emotional states has
been found only occasionally.

Collins (1976) found no relationship

between OSA and self-esteem among high school students.

Brehm (1974)

failed to elicit self-derogation among 9th graders with self-focused
attention.

Carver and Scheier (1978) found no increase in negative

affect in sentence completion tests administered in the presence of
a mirror.

And Wolfe (1975) failed to find any link between OSA and

ratings of mood among 120 female college students.
However, Scheier and Carver (1977), alternately using mirrormanipulated OSA and a measure of dispositional self-consciousness,
reported consistent results across several experiments showing that
OSA heightens awareness of emotions.
tive.
nudes.

It need not be inevitably nega-

OSA led to greater appreciation and responsiveness to slides of
But it also caused significantly greater response to statements

eliciting depression.

Scheier and Carver's conclusion reasserted the

relationship of OSA and emotions, suggesting that attention may shift
to emotions as easily as to standards during periods of self-focused
attention.
Studies that fail to replicate or discover expected results
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suggest that OSA effects are elusive and seldom robust.

Wicklund

(1975b) explains that such effects are temporary and may be easily
missed if the dependent measure is not properly timed.

The theory

predicts the discomfort of self-consciousness will motivate attempts
at discrepancy reduction or distraction, resulting in rapid disappearance of the usual sequelae to OSA.
on the self-esteem findings.

There is a further comment needed

In the self-ratings on the dependent

variables, subjects were typically asked to rate central traits:
enduring and often important aspects of themselves.
prising that they show little change.

It is not sur-

Crandell's (Note 1) research

provided a comparison between state and trait variables and found
little change in Trait Anxiety (40.90 immediately after OSA as compared with 38.15 when there was an intervening task, a finding with a
chance probability of .36) despite a marginally significant increase in
state anxiety.

Trait ratings are a stern test.

That they show any

change in response to attentional state indicates that OSA causes
powerful, if temporary, alterations in self-concept.
The results obtained by Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris (1973) and
Crandell (Note 1) confirm that OSA has its maximum effect at the time
of initial stimulation and that its potency dissipates rapidly.
While OSA effects are of moderate magnitude and transient,
they have been demonstrated in a wide range of circumstances.

The

studies reviewed suggest that self-awareness theory is broadly applicable within personality psychology.

Selected research has shown its

contribution to the understanding of self-attribution, social
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facilitation, and the self-concept.

Further discussion could docu-

ment its applicability to such central areas of social psychology as
conformity
sonance

~uval,

~nsko,

1972; Wicklund & Duval, 1971/1972), cognitive dis-

Worchel, Songer, & Arnold, 1973; Wicklund & Duval, 1971/

1972), and accuracy of self-reports (Carver, 1975; Pryor, Gibbons,
Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977; Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978; Turner,
1978).
Importance of standards during objective self-awareness.

It

is the awareness of discrepancy from pre-existing standards which is
assumed to cause the self-derogation, with the resulting attempts
to escape objective self-awareness (OSA) or change.

So it is worth

digressing to examine our understanding of these standards.

While

they may be modeled on social norms, it is the individual's standards
that are assumed to be the central referent for behavior during periods
of OSA.

Research by Carver (1975) supports this account.

He selected

subjects representing extremes in their belief in their use of punishment to influence behavior.

When instructed to use punishment in a

"pseudo-teaching" task, the two groups varied in the intensity of
shock delivered to the erring "student", with the punitive subjects
delivering significantly more, as expected.

However, this occurred

only when the subjects observed themselves in a mirror.

When there

was no stimulus to OSA, the groups delivered punishment of very
similar intensity.

This research suggests that it is, indeed, the

personal standards that are activated by OSA.
Other researchers (Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977)
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indicate that behavior may be guided by other aspects of the self than
internal standards.

They argue that most research highlights the sa-

lience of the standard through feedback on the dimension in question
or demand characteristics of the experiment itself.
manipulation may be the crucial element.

The salience

They have reported experi-

ments in which the salient dimension was the subjects' emotional
state.

Scheier (1976) examined aggression, in this case monitoring

the intensity of shock administered to a "confederate-student" who
first had taunted half of the subjects.

There were no significant

differences between the angered and not angered groups except when
a mirror was introduced.

With OSA, the angered subjects significantly

increased the intensity of shock, while other subjects decreased it
slightly.

Scheier concluded:

"when affect is strong, awareness is

directed to the affect, not the standard, and discrepancy reduction
does not occur" (pp. 637-638).

Scheier and Carver (1977) showed that

OSA can heighten responsiveness to a variety of emotions, including
attraction, elation, and depression.

In keeping with their findings,

a revision in self-awareness theory is warranted.

Objective self-

awareness appears to heighten consciousness of whatever dimension of
the self is salient.

Neither self-evaluation, nor self-derogation

have been shown to be certain concommitants of OSA.

So escape behavior

or discrepancy reduction are to be expected only when the ideal is more
salient than affective reactions.
Clinical implications of research on self-awareness.

Some of

the effects suggest an important link with research areas and concepts

33
important to clinical psychology.

The findings of the curvilinear

relationship of OSA and self-evaluation with performance is highly
similar to that found in research on Manifest Anxiety (Byrne, 1974).
Indeed, the disruptive effects accompanying OSA are reminiscent of
those accompanying high evaluative apprehension (Mandler & Sarason,
1952; Wine, 1971).

Objective self-awareness is a source of anxiety,

and may prove a necessary condition for anxiety of high levels or
long duration.
Self-ideal discrepancies, such as those elicited by Ickes
et al. (1973) have been accepted in clinical research as an operationalization of self-esteem and emotional adjustment (Block & Thomas,
1955; Chase, 1957; Dymond, 1954).

Self-ideal discrepancy reduction

has been considered the primary criteria for improvement in clientcentered psychotherapy (Butler & Haigh, 1954; Rogers & Dymond, 1954).
Now OSA has been shown to cause temporary increases in the self-ideal
discrepancy.

The implication of these lines of research are clear:

self-focused attention may be a source of disruption in psychological
functioning.
Psychotherapy aims to decrease self-ideal discrepancy.

Yet,

the process entails the type of intensive and extended self-scrutiny
on the part of the client that assures considerable OSA.

Temporary

sequelae of self-focused attention, such as anxiety and a drop in
self-esteem, may well interfere with therapy.
Avoidance of objective self-awareness.

Another feature of

self-awareness theory with important implications for psychotherapy

,

!

~
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is the specification of responses expected after exposure to stimuli
heightening objective self-awareness (OSA).
goal of psychotherapy.

Behavior change is the

Yet, Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggest that

this response is less likely than attempts at OSA avoidance.
does show attempts to escape self-focused attention.

Research

Cummings (1976)

found that exposure to an observer and a video camera was a noxious
stimulus which could be used as a punisher to delay a contingent
behavior or condition an escape response.

Duval, Wicklund, and Fine

(1971/1972) directly measured avoidance as a function of OSA versus
non-OSA and high or low discrepancy from standards.

Students were

administered a personality test, which they were told was correlated
with creativity and intelligence.

The degree of discrepancy was

manipulated by telling subjects their test results indicated they were
in the top or bottom 10% on the dimensions.

Then, under the guise of

participating in a second experiment, they were led to another room.
For subjects in the OSA condition, the room contained a mirror and a
camera.

Subjects were asked to wait for about 5 minutes and then seek

the second researcher if he had not yet returned to administer the
experiment.
the room.

Table 2 shows the length of time before the subject left
Two findings are clear.

First, OSA was tolerable for a

shorter time if there was high rather than low intraself discrepancy,

£< .05.

Second, subjects made a quicker exit when exposed to GSA-

inducing stimuli (significantly so for the high discrepancy condition).
Gibbons and Wicklund (reported in Wicklund, 1975b) observe the same
pattern of results (with a significant overall interaction) when the
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Table 2
Effect of Self-Awareness and Discrepancy
from Standards on Minutes of Participation
Discrepancy level
Self-awareness stimuli

High

Low

Mirror

6.39 (_g_=13)

7.80 (_g_=12)

No mirror

8.12 (_g_=12)

8. 20 (_g_=15)

Note.

From Duval, Wicklund, and Fine (1971/1972).
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dependent measure is the proportion of time spent listening to one's
own versus anothers voice during a 12 minute period following OSA and
discrepancy manipulation.

These experiments indicate OSA will lead to

avoidance or escape behaviors.
There is less evidence on the relative priority given to
discrepancy reduction versus GSA-avoidance when both options are
available.
(1977).

Indirect evidence is provided in a report by McDonald

Subjects were asked to write responses to a visual cue after

having been given positive or negative feedback on their performance
on a "creativity test."

Half of the 96 female undergraduates were told

their response was related to creativity.
OSA for half of the subjects.

A mirror was used to create

Avoidance of objective self-awareness

might appear in shorter responses, while discrepancy reduction would
be expected to be evident in longer responses.

In examining writing

time, there was no main effect related to self-awareness, and so no
support for an avoidance account.

The author reported that among the

OSA subjects, however, those with negative feedback wrote more than
those given a high rating on creativity.

While no significance testing

was reported for this interaction, the implication is that discrepancy
reduction is the prepotent response.
A different result was obtained in a study by Liebling, Seiler
and Shaver (1974).

Sixteen subjects were observed during each of two

30 minute sessions of listening to music.

During one period, OSA was

induced through the presence of a mirror.

All subjects were smokers,

including 14 who had indicated an ideal would be to decrease the
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frequency of cigarettes smoked.

Despite this goal, the stimulus to

osA led to significant increases in the number of cigarettes lit,
number of puffs, amount of time holding a cigarette, and the number
of flicks.

The authors discussed their findings as evidence of the

drive inducing effects of OSA.

But Wicklund (1975a) pointed out that

behaviors also served as a distraction, and hence a means of avoiding
OSA.
The two experiments reviewed offer apparently conflicting
results when discrepancy reduction and OSA-avoidance lead to opposing
behavior.

However, the studies differed in the salience attached to

the discrepancy in question.

In one, the dimension (creativity) was

directly manipulated while the other downplayed it (by embedding the
query about ideal smoking among a number of questions about attitudes).
It may well be that the likelihood that OSA will be avoided is inversely
related to the salience of the discrepancy.

Avoidance may be more

likely if the self versus ideal self dissonance is not focal.
Duval and Wicklund (1972) outline three conditions that increase
the likelihood that an individual will attempt to escape from a situation.

First, there must be discrepancies between behavior and rele-

vant standards.

Second, there must be OSA.

behavior must be difficult or impossible.

Third, discrepancy reducing
This last condition was met

in the Duval, Wicklund and Fine (1971/1972) experiment by focusing on
enduring abilities and restricting the environment so that there were
no discrepancy-reducing options available.
The proposed experiment on premature termination from psycho-
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therapy closely follows this outline, not because of experimental
manipulation, but because the client's phenomenal situation at the
beginning of therapy closely corresponds to that described above.
There is a real, important, and painful discrepancy between the clients
actual and ideal level of emotional adjustment.
problem of chronic duration.

It is usually a

Should the patient opt for a discrepancy-

reducing tact--such as denying the severity of the problem, attributing
it to a temporary situation, or projecting responsibility ("if only my
wife • • • ")--the therapist firmly confronts the patient with his
central and continuing involvement with the problem.
intense and continuing self-focused attention.

Lastly, there is

There is the expert

observer, closely monitoring the patient's self-report and continuously
redirecting the patient's focus to his own statements.

All of these

features of the beginning therapy relationship increase the likelihood
that OSA will prove intolerably painful, and that the would be client
will flee therapy.
Clearly, not all clients terminate prematurely.
awareness theory lead to such a blanket prediction.

Nor would self-

Implicit in

Wicklund's (1975a) comments on the salience of intra-self discrepancy,
is the expectation that clear identification of an area of dissonance
will lead to corrective action rather than flight.

The research on

performance facilitation effects of OSA suggests that some OSA (like
some evaluation apprehension) may be productive rather than disruptive.
The literature reviewed also indicates that the disruptive effects of
OSA are likely moderate and transient.

Clinicians have certainly
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developed tactics for gradual exposure to OSA and for anxiety management, all of which aid the novice patient in adjusting to a stressful
role.
The current extrapolations from the social psychology of selfawareness theory to hypotheses about behavior in therapy is possible
because of similarity between the experimental design used to study
OSA avoidance and the situation facing the new client.

Just as Duval,

Wicklund, and Fine's (1971/1972) subjects were able to tolerate discrepancy and OSA for some time, although it was less than the other group
withstood, so the effects of OSA are less disruptive to some new
patients than to others.
dropout.

Self-awareness theory does not predict 100%

But it does offer a testable explanation of much of the

early termination that is found:

if the beginning of psychotherapy

fosters excessive self-consciousness and if discrepancies addressed
are not easily resolved, flight from therapy is likely to occur.
Individual differences in self-consciousness.

Duval and

Wicklund (1972) examined situational variables effecting OSA levels.
This choice was based, in part, on their belief that direction of
attention is potently determined by environmental stimuli.

It is

also advantageous that these stimuli are easy to manipulate, allowing
for the true experimentation so necessary for theory building.

But

the focus on situational variables also results from a hesitancy to
tackle the problems associated with examining individual differences.
To request a self-report on self-consciousness level would almost
inevitably alter the variable of interest, confounding the answer.
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And there are other "potential ambiguities":
it is difficult to know whether the measures are relevant to
actual differences in self-focused attention, differences in
types of personal standards or styles of discrepancy reduction,
differences in ability to avoid self-focusing stimuli, or even
theoretically irrelevant differences. (Wicklund, 1975b, p. 268)
These are impediments to the precise research needed to develop a
comprehensive theory.

But none of this implies that individual dif-

ferences in direction of consciousness are nonexistent or unimportant.
Indeed, when the focus shifts from theory to application, the molar
level of self-consciousness is more critical than which of the options
suggested above accounts for it.
Fenigstein et al. (1975) have developed a scale to measure
dispositional self-awareness.

In contrast to the situationally

determined focus of attention, they investigated the trait of selfconsciousness and found it to be composed of three distinct, though
related, factors.
ness (PR-SC):
(p. 523).

The first subscale measures private self-conscious-

"attending to one's inner thoughts and feelings"

The conceptually and factorially distinct second scale

measures public self-consciousness (PU-SC):

"a general awareness of

the self as a social object that has an effect on others" (p. 523).
A third subscale captures social anxiety (SA-SC), or "discomfort in
the presence of others" (p. 523).

The Self-Consciousness scale, with

subscales identified, is found in Appendix A.
Fenigstein et al. (1975) report that the subscales are reliable
and consistent in internal structure when replicated with varying groups
of normal undergraduates.

There are significant, but low, correlations
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between PR-SC and PU-SC, and between PU-SC and SA-SC, while private
self-consciousness and social anxiety are unrelated.

Table 3 sum-

marizes the subscale means and intercorrelates reported in the published literature.

They generally confirm the initial findings.

Other research also replicates the absence of sex differences noted
by Fenigstein et al. (1975).

Findings are interpreted to indicate

that self-consciousness is dichotomous, with private and public aspects.

Social anxiety is a possible, but not inevitable, consequence

of awareness of the self as social object.

It is possible, then, that

a mirror may elicit a different type of self-awareness than an audience,
and that the latter may more readily lead to the negative consequences
associated with the colloquial usage of "self-consciousness."
Fenigstein et al. (1975) suggests two principle uses for the
scale.

Self-consciousness, as a dispositional expression of self-

awareness, can be expected to mediate accuracy of self-description;
inaccurate self-reports may reflect a lack of attention to self as
object.

Second, the Self-Consciousness scale (SC) can supplement or

replace the reactive manipulations used to create OSA.

Rather than

inducing OSA, among other types of arousal, by exposing subjects to
cameras or audio feedback of their voices, it is possible to select
subjects whose high score on PR-SC or PU-SC indicates a preexisting
tendency to be attentive to themselves.

The growing body of research

on self-consciousness has tended to combine attempts to validate the
scale with research in these two areas.
Dispositional self-consciousness has been shown to effect

Table 3
Means ::md Jnter:corrclations of the Priv:.te (PR-SC), Public (PU-SC), and Social Anxiety (SA-SC) Subscales

----------

-----------------------
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accuracy of self-report.

Turner (1977) had subjects, preselected

for extreme scores on PU-SC, write stories about their typical and
maximal experiences of elation and anger.

He then exposed them to

laboratory experiences designed to elicit these feelings.

Ratings

of these sessions were correlated with the previously obtained selfreports.

Low scorers in PU-SC, presumably because they are less sub-

ject to social desirability effects, had higher correlations.

With

somewhat less consistency the high PR-SC subjects were found to match
report with action better than subjects low on PR.

This experiment

was flawed by the difficulty in operationalizing the emotions studied.
In a follow-up study, Turner (1978) examined the correlations between
observed and reported dominance of 62 undergraduates.

Subjects were

observed for 10 minutes of interaction with a male and female confederate during which they had to engage in a problem solving discussion,
respond to a period of silence, handle a tangential monologue, and
intervene in a disagreement.

Their dominance was then rated by the

confederates and two judges, whose highly consistent ratings were
combined and correlated with the subjects' previous self-ratings.
Again, the correlations were higher for subjects above the mean in
PR-SC (.47 versus .24) or below the mean in PU-SC (.46, as opposed
to the correlation of .28 found among subjects high in public selfconsciousness).

Self-reports were comparably accurate for all groups

except those low in PR-SC and high in PU-SC.

Scheier, Buss, and Buss

(1978) compared validity of self-reports obtained from those representing the upper and lower thirds of the PR-SC distribution.

All 63
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undergraduates completed the overt aggression subscale of the BussDurkee Hostility Inventory.

Several weeks later,measures of the

intensity of shock delivered to a "learner-confederate" were obtained
for each subject.

Overall, the self-report correlated only .34 with

observed aggression.

Those scoring high in private self-consciousness

averaged .66, reporting with significantly more accuracy than low
PR-SC subjects, whose correlation was only .09.

There was no comparable

effect when accuracy was tabulated for those above (.38) and below (.31)
the mean in PU-SC.

This last finding may have resulted because the

lack of social interaction involved in the aggression experiment minimized awareness of the self as social object.
The three experiments reported indicates a clear relationship
between self-consciousness and accuracy of self-report.

Whenever

groups representing the extremes on PR-SC are compared, significant
differences are found.

Scheier, Buss, and Buss (1978) reported that

those high in PR-SC give significantly more statements than low PR-SC
subjects when asked to describe themselves.

"These data, taken together

with Turner's findings argue strongly for the use of private selfconsciousness as a moderator variable in the relationship between selfreports and observed behavior" (p. 139).

These experiments indicate

that the Self-Consciousness scale is a valid instrument in tapping
the degree to which normal subjects are aware of their feelings and
response tendencies.
Other research correlates SC subscale scores with measures of
related characteristics in an attempt to determine the convergent and
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discriminant validity of the instrument (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).
Among the scales that should not correlate is social desirability
(Marlowe and Crowne, 1964).

Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes

(1978) report low to nonsignificant correlations for two undergraduate
groups as indicated in Table 4.

Self-consciousness is also relatively

independent of intelligence, as measured by the Otis Quick-scoring
Mental Ability Test (Otis, 1954).

Carver and Glass (1976) find an

overall correlation of -.06 in a study of 105 male undergraduates.
Only SA-SC, for which£= -.21,

~

(.05, is related.

The authors

suggest that lower intelligence may lead to a lack of social competence
and resulting anxiety.

Alternatively, anxiety may have interfered

with performance in the evaluative context of test-taking.
Surprisingly, self-consciousness is minimally related to test
anxiety (Mandler and Sarasen, 1952).

Table 5 shows the low inter-

correlations reported in two published studies.

The previous discus-

sion shows that the effects of OSA approximate those of evaluative
apprehension.

Yet, the lack of substantial covariation with test

anxiety "suggests the scale is specific to social anxiety" (Carver
and Glass, 1976, p. 172).
Self-esteem and OSA are related (Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris,

1973), so the Self-Consciousness scale would be expected to correlate
with the Self-Esteem scale (Morse & Gergen, 1970).

Turner et al.

(1978) report significant relationships of -.26, -.26, and -.35
between self-esteem and PR-SC, PU-SC, and SA-SC respectively.

For

the 505 subjects involved, self-consciousness was associated with
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Table 4
Correlations between Social Desirability
and Subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale
Sample 1

Scale

Sample 2

Private Self-Consciousness

.02

-.15

Public Self-Consciousness

.06

.01

Social Anxiety
N
Note.

*.E. (.05

-.03

-.23*

146

122

From Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978).
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Table 5
correlations between Test Anxiety and the Self-Consciousness Scale
Source
Carver and Glass

Turner et al.

(1976)

(1978)

Private Self-Consciousness

-.11

-.02

Public Self-Consciousness

-.01

Scale

Social Anxiety

.14

Self-Consciousness Scale

.00

N

105

*p<.01

.20*

258
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lower self-esteem, again suggesting that self-awareness is a doubleedge sword.

Fenigstein (1979) failed to find a relationship between

PU-SC and three global self-esteem items.
assume an inevitable covariation.

So it is inappropriate to

But a drop in self-esteem is a

likely consequence of self-awareness induction, particularly if social
anxiety is elicited.
Other personality measures have been tested against the SelfConsciousness scale.

Turner et al. (1978) report PU-SC and SA-SC

are moderately correlated with low masculinity and high femininity as
measured on Berns' (1974) Sex Role Inventory.

Despite this, other

research (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1977; Turner et
al., 1978) reports no significant sex differences in scores on the SC
subscales.

Achievement motivation might be hypothesized to underlie

self-awareness, particularly sensitivity to one's social impact.
no substantial relationship appears (Carver & Glass, 1976).

Yet,

Snyder's

(1974) Self-Monitoring Scale also assesses sensitivity to cues of
personal expressive behavior for social ends.

Turner et al. (1978)

report results on a substantial sample that indicate significant but
low amounts of covariance.

For 1094 undergraduates, self-monitoring

correlates .15 with PR-SC, .24 with PU-SC, and -.20 with SA-SC.
Fenigstein (1979) also reports a correlation of .24 for self-monitoring with PU-SC.

While expected correlations with these partially

related measures are obtained, the Self-Consciousness scale (SC)
proves to be distinct.

The efforts at discriminant validation, reported

above, indicate the SC cannot be readily reinterpretted to be a sub-
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category of any of the other concepts investigated.
Convergence with related concepts also suggests the validity
of the SC subscales.

Those high in private self-consciousness (PR-SC)

should create and use mental imagery and should be temperamentally
inclined toward reflectiveness and philosophical interests.

Turner

et al. (1978) report that PR-SC correlated .30 with the Pavio (1971)
Imagery Scale and .48 with Guilford and Zimmerman's (1949) measure of
Thoughtfulness.

Public self-consciousness (PU-SC) also correlates

with Thoughtfulness (.22), but with more emphasis on social selfawareness.

Carver and Glass (1976) report low but significant cor-

relations with Buss and Plomin's (1975) measures of emotionality (.20)
and sociability (.22).

Turner et al. (1978) were unable to replicate

the relationship with sociability; it was positive but nonsignificant.
Support for the validity of PU-SC is, accordingly, more tenuous.

Of

the subscales, Social Anxiety (SA-SC) is most strongly related to
self-esteem (-.35) and test anxiety (.14 and .23).
associated with avoidance of social settings
inactivity (-.27).

(~39

It is consistently
and -.46) and with

Such findings suggest an avoidant stance toward

interaction in which anxiety interferes with optimal functioning (e.g.,
for IQ,

£ = -.21).

In sum, correlations with related measures offer

at least moderate support for the validity of the subscales.
Stronger support for the distinctiveness and validity of each
of the subscales is reported when they are used in the course of selfawareness studies.
Of the subscales, PR-SC has been used most frequently.

Buss
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and Scheier (1976) replicated Duval and Wicklund's (1973) experiment
in which the degree of self-attributed responsibility was assessed
for scenarios with positive and negative outcomes.

Subjects were

selected from the highest and lowest thirds of the PR-SC continuum and
randomly assigned to complete their ratings with a mirror either present
or averted.

The percent of self-attributed responsibility is presented

in Table 6.

A significant main effect was found for level of PR-SC

and a marginally significant difference resulted from exposure to the
mirror.

The PR-SC performs in a manner similar to and yet more effec-

tive than GSA-induction.

The PU-SC, which correlated .23 is PR-SC, did

not prove significantly related to self-attribution, nor did its covariance contribute to the power of PR-SC.

Tangentially, it is worth not-

ing that the negativity bias reported with OSA also is evident in
the ratings of high scorers on PR-SC.
Carver and Scheier (1978), in their study of OSA and the proportion of sentence completion items referring to the self, also examined the effects of PR-SC.

They found a significant correlation

between SC and the ratio of self-referent to total statements,

= .29, £ <.05.

For PU-SC, the correlation was .07.

~

(35)

Table 7, again,

indicates the power of dispositional relative to situational selfawareness.

It appears that PR-SC provides a ceiling such that OSA

induction is effective only among those lacking the trait of selfconsciousness.

Scheier and his associates (Scheier, 1976; Scheier

and Carver, 1977; Scheier, Carver, Schutz, Glass, & Katz, 1978) also
found that PR-SC can be used as an index of sensitivity to affect.

Table 6
Percent of Self-Attributed Responsibility with
High and Low Self-Awareness and Private Self-Consciousness
Level of private self-consciousness
High

Low

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Mirror

53

66

50

54

No mirror

56

55

46

53

Self-awareness stimuli

Note.

From Buss and Sceier (1976).
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Table 7
Percent of Self-Reference with High and Low
Self-Awareness and Self-Consciousness
Stimuli to self-awareness
Private self-consciousness level

Mirror

No mirror

High

.60

.61

Low

.55

.44

Note.

From Carver and Scheier (1978).
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In parallel experiments, OSA induction or high private self-consciousness proved effective in heightening ratings of anger, attraction, repulsion, and depression.

They summarize the validity of

PR-SC as a measure of self-awareness:
The parallel between the mirror manipulation and private selfconsciousness is not limited to the present research. For
example, it has been shown that exposure to a mirror increases
the proportion of self-focused responses given on a projective
test; private self-consciousness does the same. The mirror
increases attributions to self; so does private self-consciousness. The mirror facilitates angry aggression; private selfconsciousness does the same. And the mirror enhances the validity
of self-reports, and likewise for private self-consciousness.
(Scheier & Carver, 1977, p. 634)
There has been less research on Public Self-Consciousness
(PU-SC).

Fenigstein (1979) notes that most experiments, even those

ostensibly involving interpersonal behaviors such as aggression, are
structured so as to be impersonal.

Accordingly, the absence of

effects attributable to PU-SC is not surprising.

Fenigstein's research

directly exposed subjects to a group setting in which their comments
were either responded to or ignored.

Subjects then rated their attrac-

tion to the group, their desire to continue working with it, and the
amount of self-attributed responsibility for the group's reaction to
them.

As expected, 40 female undergraduates scoring in the top third

of the PU-SC continuum denigrated the group and personalized its
behavior significantly more than 40 subjects in the lower third of the
distribution.

Private self-consciousness had a negligible effect on

this pattern in an analysis of covariance, providing "further evidence
of the discriminant validity of the two self-consciousness dimensions"
(p. 80).

Fenigstein also included a direct query as to the amount of
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time spent attending to oneself during the group session.

There

were small (18.5% versus 15%) differences attributable to the acceptance versus rejection condition.

But high PU-SC subjects reported

significantly more self-focused attention (24% of the time) than did
low scorers (9%).

So the experiment validates the subscale leading

to the conclusion:
When we attend to ourselves in social situations, it is the
social self that is focused • • . • In this respect, it has
been shown that public self-consciousness (awareness of ourselves
as social objects), rather than private self-consciousness
(awareness of our internal selves) is the crucial determinant
of how much the evaluation of others affect us. (Fenigstein,
1979, p. 85)
Results also paralleled simultaneously reported findings that mirrorstimulated OSA lead to heightened reactiveness to positive or negative
evaluation in an interview.
Turner (1977) examined the contribution of self-consciousness
differences to the finding that subjects will shift their attitudes in
the direction of an announced but not delivered persuasive communication by another.

High PR-SC should limit the shift, because the subject

focuses on personal standards.

But anticipatory belief changes were

expected for subjects high in PU-SC, out of a desire to maintain a
socially correct appearance, and SA-SC, to avoid attracting attention.
Those above and below the mean in PR-SC and PU-SC failed to differ
significantly.

The PU-SC dimension appears unrelated to experiencing

social attention as aversive.

In contrast, those high in SA-SC showed

the greatest change in the direction of the other's expected position.
This experiment represents a preliminary step toward validation of
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SA-SC as an index of fear of social attention.
The preceding review leads to two clear conclusions.

The

subscales of the Self-Consciousness scale are valid measures of distinct components of self-awareness.

While all are related to a cogni-

zance of self, they represent distinct features of personality.
Using them, populations can be identified which are responsive in
different situations and have characteristic expressions of their
self-awareness.

Secondly, many of the phenomena surfaced using the

situational tact of stimulating OSA can be reproduced successfully
by selecting individuals dispositionally inclined to particular types
of self-consciousness.

Those high in PR-SC parallel those exposed

to mirrors or cameras in becoming attentive to internal affective
states and cognitions.

Those high in PU-SC appear to respond similarly

to those in whom OSA is aroused by exposure to audiences or reflective
stimuli in social situations.

The explanation of results of research

on SA-SC is similar to that offered for Duval and Wicklund's (1972)
research on conformity.

The theoretical explanation of this OSA

research suggested that cognizance of discrepant views increased the
likelihood of focal self-awareness and a desire to minimize disagreement as a means of escaping aversive OSA.

Similarly, those high in

SA-SC will alter their expressed views, at least temporarily, in an
apparent response to anxiety aroused by social attention.

The Self-

Consciousness scale can be used as a relatively nonreactive alternative to situational manipulations of OSA in research on normal populations.
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Clinical implications of self-consciousness.

There has been

inadequate research using clinical populations to understand the
meaning of self-consciousness with these groups.

The one published

study (Turner & Keyson, 1978) does not provide information on norms
for either the neurotic or schizophrenic groups sampled.
indicate the relationship of the subscales.

Nor does it

It may well be that psycho-

pathological groups unite self-focus with anxiety.

One purpose of

the following research will be to examine the performance of the SelfConsciousness scale with a clinical population.
Turner and Keyson (1978) found that therapists could successfully predict the self-ratings of their patients for PR-SC and SA-SC,
but not for PU-SC.

The implication is that the first two subscales

tap more clinically relevant phenomena that are therefore more focal
in the course of therapy.

This is consistent with the commonsense

analysis which indicates that anxiety and awareness of internal experiencing are core considerations in psychotherapy.

Social anxiety, in

particular, would be of concern to a therapist because of its disruptive impact on the client's functioning.
tant measure.

Yet, PU-SC may be an impor-

The early stages of therapy represent the point at

which self-consciousness before the therapist is at a maximum.

It is

at this time that some clients will experience the Sartrean entrapment in the presence of the other that may cause them to flee therapy.
So, levels of PU-SC and SA-SC may both be important in determining
length of stay.
All three subscales, and the total score on the Self-Conscious-
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ness scale are hypothesized to be clinically relevant.

All will be

considered as predictors of premature termination from psychotherapy.
Additionally, different diagnostic groups are characterized by differences in their propensity for and reaction to self-focused attention
(Kennedy, 1977; MacKinnon & Michels, 1971).
may vary across diagnostic groups.

The SC subscale profile

Paranoid patients, whose defenses

externalize responsibility, would be expected to be low scorers on
all subscales.

Obsessives and passive character types are hypothe-

sized to be generally high in self-consciousness.

Obsessives should

peak on PR-SC, but their SA-SC scores may be attentuated by the reliance on intellectualization.

High PU-SC may be characteristic of

hysterics and sociopathies, since the self-esteem of both groups is
tied to their success in managing other's impressions of them.
Hypothesizing about the relationship between diagnosis and selfconsciousness remains speculative in the absence of additional research on clinical groups using the SC scale.

An additional goal of

this dissertation project will be to provide empirical evidence on
this subject.
But a preliminary step is clearly required.

In the absence

of previous published research on SC scores among psychopathological
groups, norms and intercorrelations for the subscales need to be
obtained.

Specific hypotheses derived from self-awareness theory can

be applied to clinical situations.

But they will be useful only to the

extent that the theory generalizes to a clinical population.

The next

section reviews the Ego Strength scale, which will be used in this
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study of external validity.
~o

Strength
In the previous section, the application of self-awareness

theory to clinical psychology was based on analogy.

For example,

the situation that caused subjects to leave the experimental setting
in Duval, Wicklund, and Fine's (1971/1972) research is similar to
the situation faced by a patient at the beginning of psychotherapy.

An empirical test of the generalizability of self-awareness theory is
also possible.

The central issue is the degree to which patients

seeking treatment respond to the Self-Consciousness scale in a manner
similar to that found for college students.
Barron's Ego Strength (ES) scale will be correlated with the
Self-Consciousness measure to examine the impact of degree of pathology
or, conversely, the availability of ego resources, on the handling
of self-focused attention.

The Ego Strength scale (Barron, 1953)

will be used as a global measure of the degree of ego impairment.
The following review argues that the scale, which has been used for
multiple purposes over the last three decades, functions most adequately for this specific purpose.
Ego Stregth scale and prediction of improvement in psychotherapy.

Barron (1953) developed the ES scale to predict response to

treatment with brief, psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy.

From

the MMPI item pool he selected the 68 items most highly correlated with
rated improvement of 33 neurotic outpatients.

On cross-validation
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samples, the scale correlated .42, .38, and .54 with ratings of improvement.

But recent reviewers have questioned the adequacy of the scale

for this purpose (Clayton & Graham, 1979; Clopton, 1979; Graham, 1977a,
1977b).

Graham (1977b) concludes:

While the ES scale predicts response to psychotherapy when
neurotic patients and individual, psychoanalytically oriented
therapy are involved, it probably is not very useful for predicting responses to other kinds of treatment or for other kinds
of patients. (pp. 35-36)
He apparently relies heavily on Barron's work as other research is
inconsistent for all diagnostic types.
reported, but among inpatients.

There are some successes

Dahlstrom, Welsh, and Dahlstrom (1975)

report that ES has predicted clinical improvement of VA patients in
one sample.

Holmes (1967) reports modest correlations between the ES

and speed of therapeutic response of 38 inpatients as rated by the
treating psychiatrist.

And Wirt (1955) reports significant but un-

specified differences in ES between three groups of VA inpatients
rated by therapists and supervisors as showing degrees of clinical
movement.

Other results are less clearcut.

Distler, May, and Tuma

(1964) found, among male schizophrenics in their first inpatient
treatment episode, that high ES scores related to greater improvement
in symptom checklists but lower ratings by judges on overall health.
The relationships were reversed for females.

Kidd (1968) reported a

trend for female outpatients with ES scores above 30 to be rated in
better condition at discharge.

No such pattern was found for males.

The absence of expected correlations with improvement has been reported
for students in personal counseling (Gallagher, 1954), for alcoholics
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(Fowler, Teal, & Coyle, 1967), for chronic state hospital patients
(Hawkinsen, 1962), for VA inpatients (Levine & Cohen, 1962), and
for several samples of outpatients (Endicott & Endicott, 1964; Fiske,
cartwright, & Kirtner, 1964; Getter & Sundland, 1962).
For some samples, high ES indicates a poor prognosis.

Gottesman

(1959) notes that delinquents are as consistently high on ES as they
are low in therapeutic change.

Clayton and Graham (1979) indicate that

low scorers among a sample of 92 inpatients showed more improvement as
measured by pre and post testing with the MMPI.

Crumpton, Cantor, and

Batiste (1960) found that psychiatrist ratings of neurotic outpatients
correlated with ES scores to a significant degree, but inversely,
-.41.

~

These latter results may be confounded by regression effects

and patient defensiveness, respectively.

But they illustrate the

unreliability of the Ego Strength scale as a predictor of improvement
with therapy.
The ES scale is consistently poor in predicting perseverance
in therapy.

Watson (1968) found it unrelated to hospital stay.

It

fails to correlate with length of treatment for alcoholics (Fowler et
al., 1967; Gertler, Raynes, & Harris, 1973; Trice & Roman, 1970).
And ES fails repeatedly in predicting outpatient stay (Getler &
Sundland, 1962; Lorr, McNair, Michaux, & Raskin, 1962; Rosenzweig &
Folman, 1973; Sullivan, Miller, & Smelser, 1958).
If Barron's measure fails to predict change in therapy, there
is evidence that therapy leads to changes on the Ego Strength scale.
The ES scale increases as a patient's mental status clears (Dahlstrom
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et al., 1975) and during the course of inpatient treatment (Lewinsohn,

1965), though not after electroconvulsive therapy (Dana, 1957).

Higher

ES scores follow outpatient treatment for VA patients (Lorr et al.,

1962; McNair, Callahan, & Lorr, 1962), for obese women, rehabilitation
patients, AA members, and narcotic addicts (Hollon & Mandell, 1979).
Barron & Leary (1955) found that eight months of treatment lead to
comparable and significant increases for outpatients in individual
and group therapy.

Interestingly, similar increases were found for

27 untreated therapy candidates from the waiting list.

It may be

argued that ES changes mirror improvement in the clinical condition,
whether or not therapy is the source of enhanced functioning.
To this point the review has cited studies which are, on the
whole, critical of the performance of the ES scale in predicting outcome of psychotherapy.

Dahlstrom et al. remark that "as a predictor

of response to relatively brief, psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy, the ES scale has received little cross-validation beyond the
original efforts of Barron" (1975, p. 169).

They are technically

accurate, if the scale is restricted to this very specific use.

But

the expansive tone of the original article, epitomized in the name given
the scale, indicates a broader application.

It fails empirically, in

application to other populations and schools of therapy, as a predictor
of outcome.

Yet, the consistent relationship with therapy, evident in

ES changes over treatment, suggest the scale has valid meaning and
satisfactory reliability (Barron, 1953; Gaines & Fretz, 1969; Silverman,

1963).
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There are two basic and interacting features of the measure
which likely account for its failure in predicting therapy outcome.
First, there is a dilemma posed by the definition of improvement.
Change is relative to a baseline.

A person entering therapy with a

high baseline level of functioning will have less room for improvement
than a patient with more initial impairment.

If the key element in

predicting improvement is level of premorbid functioning, then a
ceiling effect is likely.

One conclusion of the critical literature

is that the ES is more accurately construed as a measure of functioning
and underlying personality resources than as a measure of change.
Second, the ES is a self-report scale subject to defensive distortion.
A person may achieve a high score because he denies problems.
that same defensiveness will limit change in treatment.

Yet,

To anticipate

the future argument, it is noteworthy that defensiveness need not imply
greater pathology or, therefore, invalidate the measure as an index of
ego strength.
Ends and Page (1957) correlated the ES of 63 hospitalized, male
alcoholics with the change over treatment in MMPI clinical scales and
a Q-sort measure.

The expectation was ES would correlate significantly,

as it did with decreases in the MAS, D, and Pt scales.
related to the Q-sort measure.

It proved un-

But, rather than accept the null hypo-

thesis, that the two measures are unrelated, the authors offer an
alternative account:

"If ES is measuring ego strength, one of course

would not expect it to be closely related to personality change associated with short term therapy" (p. 150).

The irony of this statement
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is that it interprets the use of the scale in a manner totally opposite
to that offered by Barron in first introducing the scale as a predictor
of success (presumably personality change) in brief treatment.

This

quote illustrates the lack of conceptual clarity which has complicated
the interpretation of the ES.

Clayton and Graham (1979) found that in-

patients low on ES showed greater improvement, as measured by change
in average T-score of the MMPI clinical scales, than did those high on
ES.

It would be plausible to conclude:
1)

that low ES scores are the better therapy candidates, in
contrast to Barron's contention, or,

2)

that the results are an artifactual consequence of regression effects.

Knowing that low ES is related to high T-

scores on the clinical scales, one would expect more improvement for the low ES group based simply on regression
to the mean.

Or, conversely, if high ES patients show

relatively little elevation in their composite MMPI profile,
there is little room for change.
Future research should distinguish carefully between condition on discharge, with which ES should be positively correlated, and change during
treatment, with which ES may be inversely related.
A second reason often cited in explanation of inconsistent results is defensive test-taking attitudes on the part of some patients.
King and Schiller (1958) note that a maximum score requires 43 false
to only 25 true responses.

An acquiescent set leads to low scores,

while a set to deny the symptoms listed leads to high ratings.

For
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one sample, King and Schiller report a higher correlation (.67) with
the response set than withES scoring (.34).

Block (1965) counters

with evidence that an acquiescence controlled version of the scale
is highly correlated with the original, and that acquiescence, therefore, is not an adequate explanation of the scale.

This may be true

in general, but certain defensive subjects are likely to distort their
responses and present an artificially favorable picture of themselves.
Significant correlations are reported for ES with K (Gottesman, 1959;
Kleinmuntz, 1960; Von Evra & Rosenberg, 1963) and with the K-F ratio
(Distler et al., 1964).

Crumpton et al. (1960) report that defensive

patients achieve scores similar to normal students, with both groups
higher on the ES than nondefensive patients.

This interaction of

defensiveness with ES leads Dahlstrom et al. to qualify the conventional interpretation of the prognostic utility of the scale:
If extremely high ES scorers in fact have standard MMPI profiles
clear of any important elevation, yet are patients in a clinic
or hospital, they are probably massively denying their personal
or emotional difficulties. This extreme elevation on ES, then,
is probably a poor prognostic sign for almost any psychological
intervention. If, however, there is evidence from the rest of
the record that they have some significant problem, and they
also have scores on ES at or above the general mean, their difficulties may be of recent origin, their symptoms may be circumscribed, and the total interference in their life adjustment from
these troubles is likely to be only moderate. For such cases, the
prognosis for some form of psychotherapy is understandably favorable. (1975, pp. 169-170)
Along the same lines, Gottesman (1959) found that delinquents were
significantly higher than a normal comparison group, and so suggested
that ES be interpreted

in conjunction with K and Pd.

The Ego Strength

scale, he concluded, "may be a sign of psychic energy per se, whether
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it be thought of as coming from the ego or the id" (p. 345).

Von Evra

and Rosenberg (1963) examined the ES scores of two groups of psychopaths, 1ifferentiated into primary and neurotic subtypes according to
the MAS scores.

Aa predicted, the nonanxious, primary psychopaths

were significantly higher in ES (48.84 as opposed to 40.88) as well as
1 and K, reinforcing the interpretation of ES as a measure of defen-

siveness and the ability to supply socially desirable answers.

Primary

psychopaths were found to have lower scores on the neurotic triad and
on an EPPS measure of conflict, which serves as a reminder that defensiveness need not imply greater ego weakness.

King and Schiller (1960)

failed to find a significant association between ES and defensiveness
among subjects whose driving licenses had been revoked.

But those with

higher ES scores were likely to use the relatively mature defense of
rationalization and less reliant on the more primitive mechanisms of
denial and projection.

Among normal students, however, it was the

lowest ES scorers that used rationalization, as part of a pattern of
responding to a task with more defensiveness and less logical analysis.
The literature suggests that defensive subjects, at least among
patient groups, tend to achieve higher ES scores.

To the extent that

defensiveness limits change in therapy, this further invalidates the
use of the ES scale for its intended purpose of predicting progress in
treatment.

Yet, more refined analysis suggests that high ES scorers use

more mature defenses and suffer less neurotic conflict.
fenses enhance ego functioning.

Intact de-

So the failure of the ES as a prog-

nostic instrument need not limit its utility as an index of available
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personality resources.
Ego Strength scale versus ego strength concept.

While exten-

sive use of the ES scale casts doubt on its utility in predicting
response to therapy, an accumulation of data supports its validity
as a measure of the somewhat nebulous concept, ego strength.

The rela-

tionship was suggested initially by Barron (1953) on the basis of the
content of the scale items.

High scores result from endorsing items

indicative of satisfactory physical functioning and stability; freedom
from

psychastheni~seclusiveness,

phobias, various immature anxieties,

religious dogmatism, and excessive moral rigidity; a secure sense of
reality; and confidence in personal adequacy and ability to cope.

To

Barron, this represents a "capacity for personal integration, or ego
strength" (p. 329).

Crumpton et al. (1960) obtained 14 factors from

a sample of inpatients and medical students, prominently including
absense of symptoms, religious dogmatism, psychopathic tendencies,
and lack of anxiety and obsessions.

A cluster analysis reported by

Stein and Chu (1967) substantially confirms these accounts.

Three

interrelated clusters tap physical, cognitive, and emotional aspects
of well being.

They involve freedom from symptoms of physical distress,

intruding primary process thoughts, and anxiety and depression.

Addi-

tional clusters include items tapping a "religious attitude of nonbelief
and nonparticipation" (p. 155)--or denial of items with religious content--and "seeking heterosexual stimulation and escape from boredom"
(p. 155).

Comparisons among various normal and clinical groups found

lower cluster scores among the more pathological with the exception of
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the religion items, on which normals obtained lower scaled scores than
either anxious or schizophrenic subjects.

The failure of the religion

factor is in keeping with Crumpton, et al.'s (1960) finding that medical
students were more religiously dogmatic than patients.

This subscale

of the ES detracts from the overall validity of the scale, which otherwise has adequate construct validity.
Further attempts to validate the scale have included correlational studies in which the ES is related to test scores and behavioral
indices of effective functioning and empirical comparisons between
groups presumably differing in ego strength.

Results have been dis-

sappointing only with regard to the relationship of ES and ego strength
measures obtained from projective tests.

Otherwise there has been

consistent support drawn from sufficiently diverse criteria and a large
enough sampling of populations that the ES scale can be considered a
valid index of ego strength.
Crumpton et al. (1960) summarize published results prior to
1960 when they write that:
Correlates of high ES scores are such variables as low MMPI
clinical symptom scales, intelligence, and lack of ethnic prejudice; ratings of poise, drive, etc.; Q-sort items descriptive
of personality functioning; independence of judgment in a group
situational test {Asch-type]; ability to orient oneself correctly
to the vertical plane in darkness [Witkin's field independencel;
favorable aspects of functioning such as W and M on the Rorschach;
denial of need for help; improvement in hospitalized patients.
(pp. 283-384)
A diverse network of interrelationships link ES to effective ego functioning.

It is consistently related to intelligence.

Although Tamkin

(1957) found a nonsignificant relationship for one small sample, most
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reports show correlations with the Wechsler scales ranging from .32
to .44 (Adams & Cooper, 1962; Barron, 1953; Tamkin & Klett, 1957;
Williams & Lawrence, 1954; Wirt, 1956).

Other significant correlates

include the Otis (Fowler et al., 1967), the Shipley-Hartford (Roos,
1962) and a measure of conceptual ability (Grace, 1960).

Correlations

with the CPI index of intellectual efficiency are even higher, ranging
from .47 to .52 (Adams & Cooper, 1962; Barron, 1953).

Not surprisingly,

ES is also related to education level (Clopton, 1979; Fowler et al.,
1967; Tamkin & Klett, 1957) and to social status (Fowler et al., 1967).
Modest and inverse correlations are typically obtained for age
(Getter & Sundland, 1962; Roos, 1962; Tamkin & Klett, 1957), although
Graham (1977b) indicates some inconsistencies have been reported.
Barron (1953) found that ES and ethnocentrism correlated -.47 for patients, -.46 for graduate students, and -.23 for air force officers.
Not only is it related to tolerance of others, but also toward oneself.
David (1968) factor analyzed patient's self and ideal-self descriptions and found ES loading on a factor with lenient self-evaluation,
large self-ideal discrepencies, an ideal distinct from that of the
parents, and low psychopathic tendencies.

The composite suggests a

more individuated and self-accepting person.

Similarly, Fiske et al.

(1964) found that ES loaded highly on a self-evaluation factor which
included Q-sort adjustment.
The validity of ES as an ego strength measure is supported
not only by its relationship to self-acceptance, but by its association with constructive response to stress.

Grace (1960), using the
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McKinney Test, found inpatients high in ES more able to tolerate
stress and to recover from it.

Dahlstrom et al. (1975) reviewed

studies using a psychogalvanometer which show that high ES subjects
are less responsive at rest and more responsive during stress.

The

interpretation made was that high ES scorers spend less energy on
homeostasis and so have more reserves available in crisis.

This

research is particularly compelling because it is not subject to the
same distortions attending self-report measures.
Studies correlating the ES with other derived and clinical
scales from the MMPI routinely show less anxiety and symptoms among
high scorers.

Distler et al. (1964) obtained a correlation of -.71

with MAS for schizophrenic patients, while Ends and Page (1957) found
ES inversely related to pre and post hospitalization MAS for alcoholics.
Factor analyzing responses to a mental status examination from female
schizophrenics, Spitzer, Fleiss, Endicott, and Cohen (1967) obtained
a main anxiety factor, to which ES correlated -.52.

Similarly, Levine

and Cohen (1962) found ES associated with absense of anxiety and psychotic symptoms for a sample of VA schizophrenics.

The Ego Strength scale

correlates -.66 with the MMPI critical items (Tamkin, 1957; Tamkin &
Klett,

1957) and is similarly related to the other clinical scales

(Barron, 1953; Dahlstrom et al., 1975).

While the degree of associa-

tion may be exaggerated by the inclusion of overlapping items, it is
clearly considerable.

Barron (1953) concludes that the ES "is picking

up a general factor of psychopathology in the MMPI" (p. 330).

It

also correlates .47 with Meeker's LH-4 Scale, an independent MMPI-
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derived ego strength scale (Greenfield, Roessler, & Crosley, 1959).
Factor analyses of MMPI scales typically generate a main
factor often labelled ego strength.

The ES scale is usually found to

have a high and negative loading, again showing the denial of symptoms
(Adams & Cooper, 1962; Corotto & Cornut, 1962; Kassebaum, Couch, &
Slater, 1959).

Lewinsohn (1965) found a similar structure when

examining residual change scores (discharge less predictions from
admission) of treated psychiatric inpatients.
with the main anxiety/ego weakness factor.

The ES correlated -.84

Williams and Lawrence

(1954) also found ES highly loaded on their ego strength factor which
included verbal IQ and the Rorschach W, CF, and K scores.

The Ego

Strength scale is clearly a good index of degree of pathology as
measured by the MMPI.
Despite the naming of the above-mentioned factors, it would
be premature to call ES a measure of ego strength inasmuch as it
shares only the most minimal common variance with similarly intended
scales derived from other instruments.

Intercorrelations include:

.09 with the Rorschach Genetic Level (Levine & Cohen, 1962); .08
with the Goldberg Scale (Kidd, 1968); .02 and -.12, respectively,
with the Bender Gestalt Z-score (Corotto & Cornutt, 1962; Roos, 1962);
.12 with Cartwright's revision of the Rorschach Prognostic Rating Scale
(Adams & Cooper, 1962); and .13, .22, .12, and .13 for different
samples using Klopfer's Rorschach Prognostic Rating Scale (Adams &
Cooper, 1962; Endicott & Endicott, 1964; Herron, Gvedo, & Kanter,
1965).

After finding only 2 of 36 significant intercorrelations
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among different ego strength measures, Herron et al. (1965) thoroughly understated the situation when they concluded "there seems to be
little evidence for the construct of objectively measurable ego
strength" (p. 404).

The low correlations may be attributed to dif-

ferences between verbal-cognitive and visual-motor tests (Corotto

& Cornutt, 1962), but it is clear that ego strength is not a unitary
concept.

In the absense of convergent validation on this point, the

ES must be evaluated in terms of its correlation with other measures.
The literature surveyed has been remarkably consistent in showing
high ES scorers to have more cognitive resources, greater selfacceptance, greater resilience, and relative freedom from anxiety and
other pathological symptoms.
Further validation is available when comparisons are made
between high and low ES scorers on a variety of dimensions.

Most

globally, Hunter and Goodstein (1967) found that ES scores matched
judge's ratings of ego strength as rated on the basis of defensiveness expressed in transcripts obtained from undergraduates explaining
their poor performance on a symbolic reasoning task.

In his original

validation study on 40 graduate students, Barron (1953) found that
high scorers were rated as functioning better, directing their energy
more effectively, having broader cultural backgrounds, being more
physically adequate, and more at ease socially.

For students above,

but not for those below, 21, Crites (1960) reported more developed
career interests among those higher in ES, even when intelligence differences were partialed out.

Teter and Dana (1964) found no difference
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in adjustment, as questionably operationalized as persistence at an
unsolvable maze.

Yet, Kormun (1960) found psychiatric inpatients with

high ES scores outperformed lower scorers in a sensory discrimination
task.

Students self-referred for therapy were found to have higher

ES scores than those referred by others (Himelstein, 1964).

But

student counselees were lower in ES than those not requesting counseling (Reschke, 1967).

Welkowitz (1960) used the Bales rating

system to evaluate the behavior of neurotic and psychotic patients
in group therapy.

Those higher in ES showed a more positive attitude

toward therapy, were more sociable, and interacted more during the
session.

Jones (1969) studied the ES profiles of physically handi-

capped adults in a rehabilitation program.

Those who were unsuccess-

ful were equally represented at all ES levels.

But, for those who

improved, ES was related to degree of success.

Another interesting

nonpsychiatric application is reported by Greenfield and his associates (1959).

Reasoning that ego strength should be expressed in

the speed of recovery from illness, he compared ES scores of 18 undergraduates with rapid recuperation and those of 20 students who took
longer than average to recover from mononeucleosis.

The quick

recovery group was, as expected, significantly higher in ES.

Though

the difference in means was small, 50.39 versus 48.00, it was felt
to be meaningful in an otherwise homogeneous group.

To summarize this

disparate group of studies, it is again apparent that hypothesized
relationships between ES and ego strength are generally supported despite a variety of perspectives, multiple methods, and diverse criteria.
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consistent results in the face of such varied applications is powerful support for the general application of ES as an index of ego resources.
The greatest research effort assessing the adequacy of ES as a
measure of ego strength has been directed at the comparison of groups
varying in degree of psychopathology.

The general conclusion of re-

viewers, supported here, is that the scale functions well in making
gross distinctions--as between normal and psychopathological groups-but is inconsistent with more refined discriminations (Dahlstrom et
al., 1975; Graham, 1977b).

In comparisons between normals and patients,

only one of nine studies failed to report significant differences.
Winters and Stortroen (1963) examined ES scores from 25 normals, 25
general medical patients, and 25 schizophrenics.

The top third of

the distribution of ES scorers was found to contain 47% schizophrenics,
when only 33% would have been expected by chance and even less were
hypothesized.
ceiling effect.
inating.

While unexpected, these results may be demonstrating a
The lower part of the ES range may be more discrim-

Normals were found to be significantly higher than a

variety of psychopathological groups in other studies (Crumpton et
al., 1960; Gottesman, 1959; Himelstein, 1964; Quay, 1955; Silverman,
1963; Spiegel, 1969; Stein & Chu, 1967; Taft, 1957).

Among these,

Silverman (1963) repeated the comparison between general medical
patients (in this case, those with tuberculosis) and schizophrenics.
He found in two separate administrations, once with ES embedded in
the full MMPI and once alone, that the normals achieved significantly
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higher ES scores.

Spiegel (1969), for males and females separately,

not only found significant differences between normal and pathological
individuals, but subdivided each population into subgroups according
to rated health and found consistent and progressively increasing
ES scores as healthiness increased.

Similarly, Gottesman (1959),

found educationally and occupationally superior adults significantly
higher than normals, who were, in turn, higher than most disturbed
samples.

The ES, then, can dichotomize normal from abnormal samples,

and may be able to differentiate those with exceptional resources.
Barron's scale is less effective, although not totally unsatisfactory, for discrin1inating between diagnostic groups.

(1959) study showed mixed results.

Gottesman's

Delinquents were higher than

emotionally disturbed adolescents, indeed, they were higher than
normal adults.

But no significant differences were found between

psychotics and two groups of neurotics, those with peak MMPI scores
on Hs and Hy or D and Pt.

In his research, Tamkin reports no dif-

ferences between mixed neurotic groups and psychotics (Tamkin & Klett,

1957) or neurotics and character disorders (Tamkin, 1957).
(1962) was unable to discriminate
schizophrenics with the ES.

neurotic~

Hawkinson

from manic-depressives, from

He questioned the utility of the scale

noting that self-esteem, sense of reality, and ability to delay gratification are separate ego functions with differing implications for
each of the diagnostic groups sampled.

Others have extended this argu-

ment, which is the most compelling against the utility of the ES.
is not a unitary scale.

It

Crumpton et al. (1960) extracted 14 factors,
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of which 13 significantly discriminated medical students from VA inpatients.

But patients obtained the higher score on four of these.

Significant differences on one subscale were offset by opposing differences on another.

Stein and Chu (1967) found that only the core

subscale tapping sense of well being satisfactorily discriminated
normals from neurotics, who, in turn, had higher scores than schizophrenics.

But within this factor, the cluster of items relating to

physical symptoms failed to differentiate.

And on the separate

religiosity factor, schizophrenics achieved higher ES subscale scores
than either normals or anxiety neurotics.
bind in using the ES:

There is an apparent double

it must contain separate subscales to have ade-

quate construct validity as a measure of such a global construct as
ego strength.

Yet, this internal complexity tends to obscure dif-

ferences between diagnostic groups.
There have been successes, even when fine discriminations have
been made.

As previously discussed, Von Evra and Rosenberg (1963)

found that primary psychopaths have higher ES scores than neurotic
psychopaths.

Roos (1962) reported groups with character disorders

or neurotic diagnoses exceeded schizophrenics.

Rosen (1963) com-

pared five internally homogeneous diagnostic groups.
individual

~-tests

While some

were nonsignificant, the ES scores did success-

fully distinguish neurotics from psychotics.

More specifically,

neurotics with physical symptoms were significantly higher than
neurotics with anxiety or depressive features, who were higher than
paranoid schizophrenics.

In his discussion. Roos criticized Tamkin
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and Klett (1957) for attributing nonsignificant differences to the ES
when the problem may well have been in failing to create homogeneous
comparison groups.

In support of such an account, Figetakis (1964)

was able to demonstrate that reactive schizophrenics achieve higher
ES scores than do process schizophrenics.
Graham's (1977b) review concludes that the ES scale generally
works as a measure of adjustment.

Valid discriminations can usually

be made between normals and psychiatric patients, and between neurotics and psychotics.
tions.

This review concurs with two specific qualifica-

As previously discussed, the scale is multidimensional.

So

the general accuracy of the scale in measuring adjustment will be disrupted when one of the dimensions is particularly pertinent to a
specific comparison group, as with religiosity among schizophrenics
(Stein & Chu, 1967) or students from a fundamentalist medical school
(Crumpton et al., 1960).

Second, as a self-report instrument, it will

underestimate the pathology of those who deny or ignore their pathology.
People with ego syntonic disorders will score higher on ES than those
whose symptoms are ego-alien, as is demonstrated in the case of sociopathic types (Gottesman, 1959; Roos, 1962; Von Evra & Rosenberg, 1963).
Apart from these limitations, the ES is often capable of fine discriminations among diagnostic groups and certainly adequate at the
molar level as an index of maladjustment.
The ES scale, in summary, has been validated with a wide range
of designs and measurement techniques, for a wide cross-section of
the population.

It has been shown to be a multidimensional index of
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ego strength related to cognitive and emotional resources, to selfacceptance, and to freedom from symptoms.

While it is unreliable as

a vehicle for predicting change with psychotherapy, it is an adequate
measure of the general degree of adjustment demonstrated by the individual at a given point in time.
Ego Strength scale and objective self-awareness.

One thrust

of this research project will be to assess the validity of the SelfConsciousness scale, and the whole concept of the handling of reflective self-awareness, among clinical populations.

The ES provides a

means of relating SC to the level of psychopathology.
be presented as an independent 68-item scale.

The ES will

While most of the

research presented abstracts ES from the total MMPI, evidence suggests
the separately administered scale performs similarly (Gravits, 1970).
While it has been previously argued that different diagnostic groups
will present with discrepant patterns and overall levels of SC, no
major common variance is expected when the ES and SC are correlated.
Individual subscales may well be linked.

Private self-consciousness,

because of the cognitive abilities required for the reflective process,
may be positively related to ES.

Social anxiety, in contrast, would

be expected to peak among the less functional, and so to vary inversely
with ES.

But the validity of the SC with a clinical population will

be optimized if the common variance with ES is limited.

To the extent

that the scales are independent, the SC should function for patient
groups in a manner comparable to that found with college students.
Should the scales prove to be correlated, the different pattern in
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the use of the SC by disturbed groups may undermine the hypothesized
link between Self-Consciousness and behavior in therapy to be discussed in the next section.
Premature Termination From Psychotherapy
Premature termination from psychotherapy has been the subject
of a great deal of study over the past three decades.
main reasons for this interest.

There are two

First, it was quickly recognized that

a high percent of patients leave treatment early on and without concurrence from their therapist.

Brandt (1965) indicates that up to 35%

fail to begin agreed upon treatment.

Baekeland and Lundwall (1975)

estimate 20 to 57% leave after one session, and that a minimum of 31%
have dropped out by the fourth session.

Malzer (1980) suggests 65%

ultimately end treatment unilaterally.

(Table 8 summarizes the per-

cent of termination and the criteria used for the populations sampled
in this review).

Premature termination is a major problem in the alloca-

tion of limited professional resources.

Second, length of treatment is

typically assumed to be related to improvement.

As a conveniently

available and quantitative index, it is often used as an outcome measure
in therapy research.
Methodological issues.

The generally shared assumption that

length of therapy is an index of successful outcome (Lorr, McNair,
Michaux, & Raskin, 1962; Rosenthal & Frank, 1958; Saltzmen et al.,
1975; Strickland & Crowne, 1962; Tolman & Meyer, 1957) has received
at least some support.

Table 8
Pe;:cent of Patients Terminating Prematurely in Stt!dies Reviewed

Percent
Reference

Affle<:k & Hednick (1959)
Auld & Eron (1953)
Brown & Kosterlit:;: (19611)
Carncena (1965)
Cartwr:!.t:ht ( 1955)
Conr acl (19 Sl1)
Dcl.oac:l (l '177)
D<'dd (l 970)
Fi,.,;~<>r

et "'. (1974}

Population or center type

Comparison group cri.teri.:t

VA, non-OBS
CHile, mixed
Uuiversity cl !nil',, mixed
University cmmseling center, mixed
University counseling center, mixed
VA, mixed
University clinie, neurotic students
Hospltal clinic, mixed
CMIIC, mix::.d

5- vs. 20+ sessions

r'ralll<. et ai.. (i.957)
FreeJman "t al. (!958)
GatfidJ et aJ.. (1963)
Garfield & Kn~z (1952)
f!0rtlcr et al. (1973)
Gihbey et al. (1953)

llni•;ersity clinic, nonpsychotic
schizophrenic
0•Jtpatient clinic, nonpsychotic
VA, mixed
Outpatient clinic. alcohol!~
VA, e1ixed

Gibbey et al. (1954)
Gandlach & Gelle::- (1958)
Hei!hrun (1961)
!leine & T>:osman (1960)
H!Jer (1958}, UJler (1959)
Horenstein (J 975), llormtstein
& Houston 0976)
!lorton [, Kri.mtcf.unas (1970)

VA, mixed
An:tlyt:h: training center, mixed
University counseli.ng center, mixed
Outpatient clink, mixed
VA, mb:cd
Unlversity cllnic, mixed students

Imber et al. (1955)
Imber ct al. (l956)
Katz & Solomon (1958)
l~olkov (195R)
Kotkov & "c~dow (1953)

n·mc,

Chl.ld 1\Uidllnre cl 'nf.c, mixed
adolescents
lhi.verslty c! i.nic, nonpsychot i.e
llnivcn~ity clinic, nonpsyrhotic
!~spital clinic, mixed
VA, neurotjc
VA, neurotic

50
33
76
60
78

9- vs. 10+ sessions
4- vs. 5+ sessions
5- vs. 6+ sessions
5- vs.
6- vs.
1- vs.
3- vs.
2-, 2+

6+ sessions
7+ sessions
1+ month
4+ sessions
but not ~m,

N terminating

100

vs,
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.

5+ sessions

4+ sessions
6+ sessiuns
8+ sessions
9+ sessions

59
35
20
47

62
~IB

169
391

3- vs. 4+ sessions
91
9- vs. 10+ sessions
54
6- vs. 7+ sessions
24
5- vs. 6+ sessions
560
12- vs. 12+ mont.hs
97
q9
0, 1 to 5 sessions,
6+ months
5-, 6 to 19, 20+ sessions 269
5- vs. 6+ sessions
5- vs. 6+ sessions
73
46
5- vs. 6+ sessions
216
5- vs. 20+ sessions
J r,t,
3- vs. 4+ orientation
sessions
60
MR- vs. HI\
43573-

36

60
57
351

52
52

47
J6 (2-)
35 (2+)
30

'•6
50
'• 3
79

40 (5-)
6
55
48
1!

)3

37
'•'•

Note. Use of "-" indicates less than or eq,.utl to the crltP.rion indicated. ThE" or.ly C'xception is for "Nil-",
t!esiP,twte'l l0ss lhnn JI"lxb'"'" benifit. Use of "+'' represents p,reater th3n or equal to the crttPrion.
Unreported d~ta is represented with a dash.

l,h!t~h

Table 8 (Continued)

Reference
Lorr at al (1958}
torr et al (1962)
McNair et al. (1963)
Mc·ndelr.::.hn (1%6)
Hensh & Golden (!951)
r;ash et :tl
(1957}
'N'?t·aJ l f., Aron,cn (1963)

R:1porort ( 1976)
RogC'rS ct :tL (l'iSi)
ltn:W•tl hal & !'ra.lk {195!1)
Huhe•ISt::!iu & l.orr ( 1956)
Saltzn,:ln et :tl. (l'H6)

Population or center type

Comparison group criteria

VA, m:l.xed
VI\, ncn-OBS
VA, non-em;
University coun3elin::; center, student
VA, !l'ixed
University clinic, non;lsychot:!.c
llonpital cU.nic,, nonpsychoti.c
VA, mixed
VA, mixed
llonpitvl clinic, mJ,:ed

7- sessions, 26+ weeks

230

15- vs. 16+ sessions

133
282

University counseling center,
nonpsy~f1of:~.c

S•nF.:ler ( l'J7))
ShC'Phan & Surman (197!1)
Sherry (1977)
Str.,kcr

·~t

al..

(1967)

Strickland & Growne (196~)
Sullivan et al. (1958)
Tnul be-~ (!'J5S)
WC'Iss & Schale (1958)
w:..nd(,r s~ a;.. (1967)
Ynlo•~ 1!066)

38

4- vs. 5+ sesd.ons
J- vs. 13+ sessions

638
48

t,o

1- vs. 2+ sessiom;
0, 1 to 6, 7+ session~
t, ·- vs. 5+ ~essi0ns

90
IO<J

0, I to 5, 6+ senstons

JH/1

sessions, 6+ months
10- vs. ll+ sessions

65
14 2

'•3
20

JO (0)
31 (l-'i)

128
91

22

stutic11ts

hehavtor therapy clinic,
mi. xed
VA, mixed
Hospital clinie, mi.xed
Ou~p3tient clinic, mixed
VA, mixed
VA, neuro~ic
Outp~tient clinic, rnix~d
Child guidance cente-r, pArents
Outpatient clinic, nonlJS)'ehot i.e,
group therapy
!~spital

Percent
terminating

111

s-

VA, nonpsychotic

N

HB- vs. HB
6- liS. 7+ sessions
HB
10- vs. 11+ sessions
9- vs. l.O+ SPS'3ions
lJ- vs. 14+ sessions
i1!1- vs. Mil
10- vs. 20+ sessions
i2- vs. 13+ sessions

Mil- vs.

15

71
2?0
85

39

12

2b8
85

J ,,
7l
~~ 7

603

38

23
97

16

00
0
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Cartwright (1955),in her examination of length of stay and
outcome for 75 cases seen at the University of Chicago Counseling
Center, found a generally positive and linear relationship that was
interrupted between the 13th and 21st sessions.

Cases terminating in

this "failure zone", were rated no more improved than those dropping
out after three sessions.

Taylor (1956) replicated this pattern of

a disrupted linear relationship, with outcomes rated poorer during
the teens.

A plausible interpretation is that this is the stage in

therapy at which relationship factors become paramount.

Dropouts

leave therapy unimproved because they are unable to tolerate a dependent relationship with the therapist (Fulkerson & Barry, 1961).
Cartwright (1955) suggests that two different functions, both essentially linear, may be superimposed in her study.

Short-term therapy,

with a goal of symptom relief, may achieve maximum benefit and end
by the 12th session.

Long term therapy, with its focus on personality

change, begins to show results, once the relationship is developed,
after 20 sessions.

The implications are two-fold.

First, number of

sessions are related to therapy outcome, justifying an underlying premise of dropout research.

But second, the relationship is not simple

and so the criterion number of sessions should be selected carefully.
Either the criterion number of interviews should be kept low (about
five), or the terminator should be compared with long term remainers
having more than 20 sessions.

A split comparing patients above and

below, say, nine sessions runs the risk of comparing short term and
long term patients and failing to make the assumed comparison between
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terminators and remainers.
Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) add that:
patients with acute situational problems will derive little benefit
from extended treatment and may resist it by dropping out after
they have gotten from it what they wanted in the first place • • • •
Having realized their goals, which are not the same as those of
their therapist, they may nonetheless get considerable benefit from
treatment. (p. 744)
Meltzoff and Komreich (1970) concur.

Fiester and Rudestam (1975) found

four factors characterizing treatment dropouts from a state hospital
clinic (none replicable for a community mental health center crossvalidation sample).

Two of the four factors (patient seeking and

getting direct advice, and achieving some problem resolution with a
close and well-adjusted therapist) suggest the patient achieved desired
objectives before termination.

Rosenthal and Frank (1958) reported

32.5% of their improved patients had only five sessions.

To set a

higher number of sessions as criteria increases the risk that people
who accomplished their treatment objectives, and so should be thought
of as remainers, will be mistakenly considered dropouts.

For these

reasons, the present research will use five sessions as its criteria.
Those having five or less sessions will be designated as terminators,
unless the chart indicates a mutually agreed upon ending or a referral
on discharge, while those continuing for six or more sessions will be
defined to be remainers.
Despite the volume of research, there is a considerable lack of
clarity about the determinants of premature termination.

A considera-

tiou of the possible domain of relevant variables would minimally
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include patient traits, therapist dispositions and techniques, state
variables resulting from their interaction, clinic policy and setting,
and the family and cultural context in which treatment takes place.
Research began with client characteristics and has paid less attention
to each successive level.

As a result, there is inadequate data of

clinic and contextual features.
The lack of clarity also results from methodological complexities peculiar to the research area.

In the following paragraphs,

some of the most important will be briefly reviewed.
1)

Among them:

lack of agreement in the definition of premature termination

leads to differing and contradictory criteria of

dropping out,
2)

even when premature termination is defined in terms of a
set number of sessions, the number chosen to delimit the
terminator group varies widely,

3)

there is concern that aggregate data may obscure different
profiles if, as is likely, there is more than one type of
dropout, and

4)

there is some disagreement whether or not those who fail
to begin treatment are sufficiently similar to those who
begin therapy and then quit unilaterally that the two
groups can be combined for comparison with those who
remain in treatment.

These issues will be considered before this review proceeds to consider the results of the research literature.
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There have been three approaches to the operationalization of
premature termination.

Some have suggested that time in therapy is

more relevant to outcome than is the number of sessions (Lorr et al.,
1962).
ment.

Comparison groups are constructed based on duration of treatThere are obvious practical problems with such an approach,

such as how to handle the patient who delays therapy because of a
vacation or illness.

A second approach, equally quantifiable, uses a

set number of sessions as the criteria for remaining in treatment.
"Since the number of visits directly measures the patient's exposure
to treatment, it is to be preferred to time in treatment as a measure
of dropping out" (Baekeland & Lundwall, 1975, p. 741).

Perhaps the

conceptually purest measure is one which defines premature termination as any unilateral move by the patient to end treatment (Fiester,
Mahrer, Giambra, & Ormiston, 1974).

With this definition, a patient

could still be considered a terminator after hundreds of hours of
treatment.

It is questionable whether this individual should be

defined as belonging in the same group as the patient quitting after
a single interview.

Since, as noted above, unilateral termination

may express either dissatisfaction with therapy or the attainment of
desired goals, Fiester's approach is misguided.

Moreover, the quality

of the archives used in most of these studies is inadequate to reliably
differentiate unilateral from mutual decisions to end treatment.

This

study will use the second approach, setting six sessions as the minimal criteria for being considered a "continuer".

This means that the

results will not be directly comparable to studies using either alter-

85

native approach to operationalizing premature termination.
Although most studies use the number of sessions for the
criterion, there is still considerable disagreement about where to
set the cutting point.

As indicated in Table 8, McNair, Lorr, and

Callahan (1963) called all of those terminating before the 16th
session dropouts, even though the typical course of treatment is only
eight sessions in the majority of clinics studied (Garfield, 1978).
Again, a much lower number of sessions is used to minimize the inclusion of patients leaving with major treatment goals satisfied.
Inconsistent results can be expected since the evidence suggests that premature termination is a complex and overdetermined
phenomenon.

Aggregate data may obscure as well as elucidate contri-

buting factors if too many distinct subgroups are pooled in composing
the terminator sample.
this argument.

Yalom (1966) is the most clear in presenting

Citing nine different factors leading to defection

from group therapy, he stressed that few would have proven significant
in any analysis of aggregate data.

A variable might be applicable to

only one or two respondents, yet its importance could be so paramount
in these cases that it is the determining element.
subgroup differences appears repeatedly.

Evidence of such

Saltzman et al. (1976)

sampled patient and therapist reactions after the first, third, and
fifth sessions.

In analyzing the results from subsequent dropouts,

termination after one session was attributed to low anxiety while
dissatisfaction with the relationship was evident for those leaving
later.

So there is some indication that there are subgroups based on
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length of stay even when the criterion number of sessions is very
limited.

Heilburn (1961) compared terminators and remainers on eight

subscales of the Gough Adjective Checklist.

For six of them there

were significant interactions by sex indicating that different criteria
are needed for males and females.

But later research on the Counseling

Readiness subscale (Heilbrun, 1962) failed to replicate sex differences.
A more consistent observation is that dropouts can be discriminated into subgroups according to whether they later seek help or
not.

Tolman and Meyer (1957) examined records of 354 VA patients and

found that only 6% of those terminating within four sessions return,
while 12% of the continuers have subsequent contact with the Mental
Hygiene Clinic.
health resources.

No information was provided on use of other mental
Chameides and Yamanoto (1973) observed that 78% of

their failed referrals got help elsewhere, as did 63% of the sample
studied by Brandt (1964).

Fiester et al. (1974) found that their

sample of community mental health center patients who remained until
mutually agreed upon termination were more likely than dropouts to have
had previous clinic contact.

Some portion of the terminators return

for successful treatment later while others reject mental health interventions entirely.

Although no differences are reported, presumably

these two groups are distinct.

The usual practice of combining them

is likely to obscure distinctive patterns characterizing the subtypes.
However, in the absense of specified and empirically validated predictive variables, it is impossible to separate subgroups.

Aggregate

data must continue to be used while clinical impressions and followup
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research attempt to clarify the means of discriminating distinct
subsamples within the larger population of terminators.

At the same

time, retrospective interviews with dropouts are suggested as useful
in attempts to more fully appreciate the multidimensional determinants of premature termination from psychotherapy.
There has been some discussion of differences between those
who dropout of treatment after one or more sessions and those who
refuse treatment or fail before it begins.
easily objectifiable:

Here the distinction is

no treatment versus one or more sessions.

Several studies compare these groups.

Garfield and Kurz (1952)

report that for a VA sample of 768 men found suitable for treatment,
27% refused treatment (compared to 31% dropping out through the
fifth session).

Garfield (1978) described rejectors as having low

income and socioeconomic status, vague problems, and poor motivation.
Such descriptions are typical for dropouts as well, as will be seen
below.

Gibby, Stotsky, Miller, and Hiler (1953) found rejectors and

terminators similar in their constricted Rorschach records and somatic
complaints, features that distinguish them from remainers.

Williams

and Pollack (1964) found no demographic distinction between families
of refusers and terminators at a child guidance clinic.

Brandt's (1965)

review suggests that differences that have been reported are not consistent, have not been replicated, and are not clinically useful for
prediction.

His conclusion, consonant with the evidence from this re-

view, is that reported differences are sample specific and artifactual.
However, the sample used in this study will be examined on a post hoc
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basis, on the assumption that anxiety related to objective self-awareness will be aroused more among those who begin treatment.
One final source of inconsistency, and one most typically
encountered in literature reviews, is the reality that studies examine
different populations armed with a wide variety of measurement devices.
Even a strong and consistent effect would likely be missed as often as
found.

Conflicting results are seen as evidence of multiple perspec-

tives being taken on a complex phenomenon.

Fortunately, enough con-

sistency emerges that crucial determinants can be identified.
Psychological tests.

The first research used psychological

tests to measure patient characteristics related to premature termination.

The results have been generally discouraging.

Initial suc-

cesses have failed on replication or have been reinterpretted as evidence of the impact of confounding variables.

This pattern holds for

the course of research on the Rorschach, the MMPI, and the specially
designed Terminator-Remainer Battery.

The studies to be reviewed

below indicate that standard psychological tests have little to contribute to the prediction of psychotherapy dropouts.
Research with the Rorschach began inauspiciously when Rogers,
Knaus, and Hammond (1951) found that none of 99 selected formal elements significantly discriminated VA patients terminating before the
fifth session.

Taulbee (1958) found significant differences for R, C,

V, An, A%, and number of rejections.

But his use of 13 interviews as

the criterion for remainers makes his results suspect, for the reasons
described above.

When Kotkov and Meadow (1953) attempted to replicate
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a formula based on R, FC-CF, and D%, they found a nonsignificant
trend for D% to be higher for continuers, which contradicted their
earlier results with group therapy patients.
significantly more R and FC-CF responses.

Continuers offered

Auld and Eron (1953)

w2re able to replicate differences only for R.

When they partialed

out the effects of verbal IQ, the correlation of R with the number of
sessions dropped from .55 to .07.

Affleck and Mednick (1959) found

significant differences in R, M, and marginally in H when 25 veterans
dropping out in 4 or less sessions were compared with 25 continuing 20
or more interviews.

The importance of IQ was challenged since re-

mainers, although higher, didn't differ significantly from terminators.
Gibby et al. (1953) characterized terminators as producing constricted
records, with few movement and color responses, and reliance on easy
shapes (F+%).

The same researchers (Gibby, Stotsky, Hiler, & Miller,

1954) later developed a formula using R, K, and M which was 67% accurate on cross validation.

However, R alone correctly predicted 69%.

With IQ partialed out, its correlation with continuation dropped from
.38 to .32.

Much of this was probably related to social class stand-

ing, which itself predicted perseverance in psychotherapy with 63%
accuracy.
This discussion leads to the same conclusion reported by other
reviewers (Fulkerson & Barry, 1961; Garfield, 1978):

R is the only

Rorschach variable that reliably discriminates between those persevering in therapy from early terminators.

Continuers are not only

more intelligent, but also more ego-involved and cooperative.

The
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lower productivity of the terminator is equated with depression, passivity, and incapacitating anxiety (Hiler, 1958; Meltzoff & Kornreich,
1970).

Interestingly, Hiler (1958) and his associates (Gibby et al.,

1954) found that some therapists are able to retain patients with low
R.

So patient productivity interacts with therapist characteristics

instead of being a main effect in some research.

In all, the Rorschach

is a rather cumbersome screening device for predicting continuation in
therapy.
Results with the MMPI have been inconclusive.

Taulbee (1958)

found continuers (13 or more sessions) higher on D, Pa, Pt, and Sc.
Sullivan et al. (1958) dichotomized his veterans' sample at nine sessions and found terminators higher on Pa and lower on K.

Their first

cross-validation sample showed remainers higher on Pt, but no differences on other MMPI scales, including initially significant derived
measures of social status, intellectual efficiency, ego strength,
anxiety, and repression.

All MMPI scales failed to discriminate on

a second cross-validation sample.

Dodd's (1970) study of outpatients

at a university hospital clinic also failed to find MMPI differences
in average T-score or number of elevated clinical scales.

Horton

and Kriavciunas (1970) found adolescent continuers compliant, as
indicated by lower F, Pa, Sc, and Ma.

And students continuing at a

counseling center were typified by moderate Hy and Pd scores (DeLoach,
1977).

Their Ego Strength scale scores were no different from termina-

tors, as was the case with the veterans studied by McNair, Callahan, and
Lorr (1962).

Lastly, McAdoo and Roeske (1973) found no differences in
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the MMPI profiles of continuers versus terminators among parents at
a child guidance center.

In summary, neither clinical or derived

scales from the MMPI have yet proven effective predictors of perseverance in therapy.
Lorr and his associates (Lorr, Katz, & Rubenstein, 1958;
Rubenstein & Lorr, 1956) derived a Terminator-Remainer battery (TR)
from the most discriminating items of a self-ideal discrepancy rating
scale, the F-scale, Taylor's Manifest Anxiety scale, and a behavior
disturbance scale (Applezweig, Dibner, & Osbourne, 1958).

The TR

Battery outperformed the parent scales and significantly discriminated dropouts from continuers, with predictive accuracy above 60%.
McNair et al. (1963) cross-validated the derived formula and was
able to exceed base rate accuracy.

But Garfield (1978) reports that

the multiple R obtained was only .44.

The implications of McNair's

study are further confused by considering all patients with 15 or
less sessions to be terminators.

Despite this, terminators were

described as impulsive psychopaths or as authoritarians who deny
anxiety or self-dissatisfaction.

Stern, Moore, and Gross (1975)

begin their critique by noting that such a description has often
been applied to lower class clients.

In a completely crossed design,

with 17 nonpsychotic outpatient clinic clients per cell, middle and
lower class terminators and remainers were compared.

The TR battery

did predict premature termination (with five or fewer sessions),
but only across social class.

Within class the TR accuracy was only

50%, identical to chance expectancy.

The failure of the TR to
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reappear in the literature since Stern's report suggests that it was
persuasively rejected by this study.
P'~rsonality

The TR battery is like other

tests in having failed to demonstrate patient personality

characteristics that are related to premature termination from psychotherapy.
Social class.

The variable that has most consistently pre-

dicted therapy dropouts is social class.

Whether measured by a compo-

site index or component elements such as income, education, occupational
status, or housing type, length of stay in psychotherapy is shorter and
dropout percent higher for the lower class client (Auld & Myers, 1954;
Frank et al., 1957; Imber, Nash, & Stone, 1955; Imber, Frank, Gliedman,
Nash, & Stone, 1956; Karmin & Coughlin, 1963; Katz & Solomon, 1958;
McNair et al., 1963; Myers & Schaffer, 1954; Rosenthal & Frank, 1958;
Rubenstein & Lorr, 1956; Sandler, 1975; Schaffer & Myers, 1954; Stern
et al., 1975; Weiss & Schaie, 1958; Winder & Hersko, 1955).
This finding is not universal, since some studies find no
relationship (Brill & Storrow, 1960; Brown & Kosterlitz, 1964; Lorr
et al., 1962; Strickland & Crowne, 1963; Taulbee, 1958) or mixed
results across cross-validation samples (Dodd, 1970; Fiester et al.,
1974; Lorr et al., 1958; Sullivan et al., 1958).

But the supportive

evidence is great enough that lower class patients must be considered
likely to terminate prematurely.
In part, this may be attributed to referral and selection procedures.

Clinics routinely put patients through a "creaming" process

so that the most desirable patients are retained.

Middle class patients
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are among the selected (Brill & Storrow, 1960; Brown & Kosterlitz, 1964;
Rosenthal & Frank, 1958).

Those with a lower class background are more

likely to request help with somatic problems and be judged as unsuitable for insight oriented therapy (Schaffer & Myers, 1954).

When they

are retained on the client roles, lower class clients get group, custodial, or organic therapies instead of analytically-oriented psychotherapy (Bailey, Warshaw, & Eichler, 1959; Kamin & Coughline, 1963;
Robinson, Redlich, & Myers, 1954; Winder & Hersko, 1955).

They may

be assigned to less experienced and less competent therapists (Brill

& Storrow, 1960; Myers & Schaffer, 1954).

So clinics may complicate

preexisting difficulties in retaining lower class clients by offering
them the least preferable services.

But the preexisting difficulties

are exemplified by one clinic's finding that 48% of lower class, compared with 12% of middle class, drop out before therapy begins (Myers

& Schaffer, 1954).

Selection practices reflect rather than create the

communication obstacles that prevent the retention of the socioeconomically deprived.
Other variables, including the psychological test indices reviewed above, have been reinterpretted in terms of social class.
Auld and Myers (1954) argue that requisite therapy skills (psychological mindedness), rewards (such as empathy and insight), and punishments (fees) are all mediated by socio-economic status.

Noting the

.403 correlation of class and number of therapy sessions, they suggest
that what are called personality factors are really socio-demographic
ones.

But the syllogism can be reversed.

Freeman (1961) found that
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the relatives of patients with higher amounts of education used psychogenic explanations of illness, responded favorably to hospital treatment, expected recovery, and were less likely to blame the patient.

He

suggested that social class is a screen for the more crucial education
and intelligence differences that determine attitudes.
to concur.

Reviewers seem

Garfield (1978) believes that "educational level may be

only one component of a larger factor or complex of factors that may
include verbal ability, sophistication about psychotherapy, income,
interest in receiving psychotherapy, and similar components" (p. 198).
Meltzoff and Kornreich continue:

"socioeconomic variables do not

seem to be of great importance by themselves.

What would seem to be

significant are the psychological implications of the social position
of the patient:

his learned behaviors, roles, attitudes, expectancies,

and traits" (1970, p. 362).

Lower class patients modally are less

inclined to monitor or express thoughts and feelings, to interpret
anxiety of behavior disturbance psychologically, to accept prolonged
treatment from a relatively passive therapist, or to find acceptance
for his status as a psychotherapy patient.

Note how this early comment

by Myers and Schaffer (1954) anticipates the current interest in
client/therapist similarity and expectancy match:
psychotherapy involves intimate communicative interaction
between the patient and therapist. Therefore, it may be facilitated if a certain similarity in culturally determined symbols
and learned drives exist in both patient and therapist. Differences in value systems and patterns of communication on the
other hand may hamper the establishment of the therapeutic relationship. At present, it appears possible that lower-class
patients need to acquire new symbols and values to participate
in expressive psychotherapy. Since this is a difficult process,
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many of them may be considered unpromising candidates for successful treatment. (p. 310)
Other patient characteristics.

Therapist and expectancy

variables will be discussed in detail below.

But first to be con-

sidered are personal characteristics of the patient that have been
linked to premature termination from psychotherapy.

As a starting

point, Figure 1 summarizes the findings of previous reviews.

The

constellation of personality characteristics related to social class
typically includes lower intelligence, referral from social agency or
courts, low TR scores, somatic or situational presenting problems,
lack of psychological mindedness, and poor motivation for treatment
(items 2, 5, 9, 10, 11, 18, and 19, respectively).

While the results

are not entirely consistent, the bulk of the evidence suggest patients
compelled to seek treatment drop out (Frank et al., 1957), while
continuers are self-referred or coming from a psychiatric source
(Rosenthal & Frank, 1958; Straker, Davanloo, & Moll, 1967; Weiss &
Schaie, 1958).

Four of the six studies reviewed concur that initial

complaints that are somatic or nonpsychological are more frequent
from patients who drop out early in treatment (Gibbey et al., 1953;
Hiler, 1959; Katz & Solomon, 1958; Kotkov, 1958).

Complaints empha-

sizing depression, anxiety or other neurotic features not only typified
those who continue in treatment, but those with a middle class background.

Both psychological mindedness and motivation for therapy are

the types of global and abstract concepts that are seldom objectively
measured but appear in summary statements, particularly after projec-
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tive testing (Gibby et al., 1954; McNair et al., 1963).

Frank et al.

(1957) rated motivation from patients' retrospective self-reports.
They found the variable significant only for comparisons with those
who failed to come for even a single session.
initiated other factors assumed preeminence.

Once contact was
Whether psychological

mindedness or motivation adds anything beyond that explained by concepts such as expectancy match remains to be proven.
Suggestibility (item 3) has been investigated by the Johns
Hopkins group.

It has been measured using the sway test, in which the

patient is blindfolded and given the repeated suggestion that he or
she is falling backwards.

When degree of motion is coded, the "swayer"

can be identified with 67% accuracy as a continuer (more than three
sessions) and the nonswayer is likely to drop out in a similar percentage of cases (Imber et al., 1956).

A replication found marginally

significant differences in the expected direction (Frank et al., 1957).
Presumably the treatment is enhanced by the suggestible subject's
dependence on the therapist.

Yet, judges' ratings of patient depen-

dence were not significantly related to perseverance (Garfield et al.,
1963) and therapist reaction to dependent verbalizations by the patient
was found to be unrelated to continuing (Caracena, 1965).

Baekeland

and Lundwall (1975) indicate that extremes of dependence or counterdependence are bad signs, and counterdependence is a hallmark of
dropouts from alcoholism treatment (Mozdzierz, Macchitelli, Conway,

& Krauss, 1973).
outpatients.

Yet, the verdict is still out on general psychiatric

It is likely that the importance of suggestibility and

99
dependence are found in interaction with specific situations rather
than on a trait level.

Winder, Ahmad, Bandura, and Roo (1962) com-

pared therapists responses to dependent verbalizations (item 24) by
patients leaving by the lOth session or remaining past the 20th.
While there were no significant differences in overall dependent
behavior or its acceptance, almost 100% accurate discrimination was
achieved for this small sample when therapist's response to patient's
verbalization of dependence on the therapist was measured.

Dis-

couraging responses led to premature termination in each case.

More

research is clearly needed, although existing data is promising.
Cartwright's (1955) explanation of the "failure zone" in terms of
difficulties in negotiating a satisfactory relationship offers a convergent theoretical perspective that could be used in research.
The relationship of diagnosis (item 4) to duration in therapy
is controversial, as indicated by differences among the major reviews.
In part, this is a function of the way in which the term is used:
the wider the scope, the more likely that some element will be shown
to differentiate.

In the literature reviewed, the weight of the nega-

tive evidence is heavy.

No differences among diagnostic groupings

were reported by Brown and Kosterlitz (1964), Fiester et al. (1974),
Katz and Solomon (1958), Lorr et al. (1958), or Mensh and Golden
(1951).

Number of symptoms, (Lorr et al., 1958), degree of pathology

(Conrad, 1954), and severity and duration of illness (Katz & Solomon,
1958) were also unrelated.

However, Frank et al. (1957) found pa-

tients stayed in treatment if they had been ill longer or if symptoms
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fluctuated.

These researchers also found those complaining of anxiety

or depression remained.

Other experiments indicate that specific symp-

toms correlate with premature termination:

absense of anxiety

(Freedman, Englehardt, Hankoff, Glick, Kaye, Buckwald, & Stark, 1958;
Kotkov, 1958); absence of depression (Straker et al., 1967); or
alcoholic, sociopathic, or paranoid features (Sherry, 1977; Straker et
al., 1967).

But conflicting results appear when individual symptoms

are assessed.

In contrast with Sherry's results, Freedman and his

associates found less suspiciousness or hostility among the ambulatory schizophrenics leaving treatment early.

Apparently they were

functioning well enough that treatment was discretionary.

Similarly,

Heilbrun's (1962) dropouts describe themselves as better adjusted
then did continuers.

People seek therapy for various reasons:

because they want to change or because their pathology is so evident
that they are pressured to seek help.

Any of a variety of symptoms

(including items 12, 13, 14 & 16 from Figure 1) may lead a person to
treatment.

Because of this diversity, it is unlikely that diagnosis,

severity of impairment, or presence of specific target symptoms will
consistently discriminate terminators from remainers.

Kotkov (1958)

found neurotics and personality disorders overrepresented among continuers.

Dodd (1970) found more psychotic reactions or neurotics.

To summarize these observations in the context of earlier reviews,
little more specificity can be expected than that remainers are likely
to be in more acute distress, and therefore, to be experiencing more
problems with anxiety or depression than will terminators.
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Previous psychotherapy (item 6) characterizes those who remain
in therapy.

Since Brandt (1965) noted this finding in three of five

studies reviewed, similar results have been reported by Fiester et
al. (1974) and Sherry (1977).

In part, this may represent the develop-

ment of a chronic population who depend on clinics but never attain
maximum benefit.

More optimistically, initial therapy experiences

may educate the consumer as to process of treatment so that later therapy is begun with more realistic expectations.
Demographic variables have generally failed to differentiate
dropouts from continuers.

Race (item 7) is the most problematic.

Three studies reviewed (Fiester et al., 1974; Mensh & Golden, 1951;
Overall & Aronson, 1963) find no differences, while three others report whites are likely to stay longer (Dodd, 1970; Lorr et al., 1958;
Rosenthal & Frank, 1958).

Garfield (1978) argues that race differences

are usually an indirect expression of social class.

But two of the

experiments finding differences evaluated socioeconomic status and
found minimal effects.

Further studies in which race is assessed

with class controlled are needed to resolve the issue.

Males are

found to remain in treatment longer than women in three studies
reviewed (Brown & Kosterlitz, 1964; Rosenthal & Frank, 1958; Weiss

& Schaie, 1958).

Heilbrun (1973) suggests that traditionally femin-

ine clients will have difficulties with a male therapist's passive or
detached role.

Five other studies found no sex differences (item 8).

Nine experiments reported no age differences (item 21).

When age

proved important, Katz and Solomon (1958) found old terminators, Sherry
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(1977) lost young patients, and Brown and Kosterlitz (1964) found
disproportionate termination at both ends of the age spectrum.

The

inconsistency suggests an artifactual or sample specific basis for
significant differences.
eight studies.

Marital status discriminated in only two of

Weiss & Schaie (1958) found single patients to be con-

tinuers, while Katz and Solomon (1958) found both single and married
clients remained longer than those with broken relationships.

On

balance, the evidence from this review leads to the same conclusions
reached by Dodd (1970) and Garfield (1978) in denying the importance
of age, sex, and marital status.
Dodd found differences based on religion in two of four
studies.

This review also found two samples with differences.

et al. (1958) had relatively few Jewish terminators.

Lorr

Dodd (1970)

had Protestant continuers, although this pattern failed on crossvalidation.

A lack of significant effects attributable to religion

characterized four other reports (Fiester et al., 1974; Katz &
Solomon, 1958; Rubenstein & Lorr, 1956; Weiss & Schaie, 1958).

Demo-

graphic variables have generated conflicting results, but no clinically
significant pattern has emerged and no theoretical basis has been
developed to justify their continued inclusion.

Most likely demo-

graphic variables are reported so frequently because they are easily
quantifiable and readily available in archival sources.
A cluster of variables relating to the patients social skills
has appeared in the literature.

Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) listed

both an unstable, nomadic lifestyle and social isolation (items 15 and
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17) among the correlates of premature termination from therapy.

Both

characteristics indicate a lack of enduring interpersonal attachments
that should be reflected in a shallow or unstable relationship in
therapy.

But experimental studies are contradictory.

The Johns

Hopkins group found more social ineffectiveness among dropouts in one
study (Nash et al., 1957) but no difference in another (Frank et al.,
1957).

Dropouts in this latter study, however, presented a history of

fewer group memberships or relationships.

McNair and his associates

(1963) found that it was the continuers who were more retiring, as
rated on the Gilford-Zimmerman Sociability Scale.

But a previous

study by the same group (Lorr et al., 1962) had failed to find differences on the Sociability or Friendliness scales or on the Leary
Interpersonal Checklist.

Freedman et al. (1958) found, in keeping with

their expectation that dropouts were healthier, that these patients
were more active and involved with others.

Once again, the inconsis-

tency of the evidence makes it impossible to endorse Baekeland and
Lundwall's enumeration of patient characteristics discriminating dropouts from therapy continuers.
No other patient characteristic reviewed, including the percent of disability compensation in studies of veterans (Lorr et al.,
1958; Mensh & Golden, 1951; Rubenstein & Lorr, 1956), was found to
be significant in one study and replicated in another.

Such results

have led some researchers (Fiester & Rudestam, 1975; Frank et al.,
1957; Garfield et al., 1963) to comment on their surprise at the lack
of potency of patient differences and to turn their scrutiny to state
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variables or therapist character traits.
confirmed the importance of some factors.

However, this review has
The terminator is likely

to be characterized by some combination of the following:

low socio-

economic status, with associated impoverishment in intelligence, verbal skills, cooperation, or productivity in therapy (Rorschach R);
somatic concerns; low distress, with less anxiety or depression in
evidence; less experience with psychotherapy; and difficulties entering
a dependent relationship.

One other abstract characteristic deserves

consideration because it recurs in the work of several different researchers.

Usually this comment appears in the summary of discussion

almost as an intuitive footnote.

Those who persevere in therapy seem

to bring all projects begun to closure.

Rubenstein and Lorr (1956)

talk about the combination of impulse-control and frustration tolerance
which results in a certain stick-to-it-iveness.
call them achievers.

Garfield et al. (1963)

Frank et al. (1957) find evidence of this per-

severance in continuing group activities, and in finishing a stage of
education (at whatever level) rather than quitting midway.

These

authors felt this to be the only true personality trait represented
among several related to the interaction of different features of the
therapeutic situation, predicting continuation in therapy.
not been measured in a standard or specific way.

It has

But perhaps there

is some cogency in calling such patients the ones who persevere in
treatment.
Therapist characteristics.

In an interpersonal activity such

as therapy, it is clear that characteristics of the therapist also
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contribute significantly to the patient's experience.

Confirmation

of this notion is found in the long training of mental health professionals and in the frequent discussion in the applied literature
of how the therapist uses his self to further the treatment.

Some

studies have examined the early dropout phenomenon with an eye to the
therapist's contribution, and, in a few cases, to the interaction or
match of the patient and counselor.

This review will begin with gen-

eral/demographic characteristics, move on to more treatment-specific
qualities, and end by discussing interacting features.

Because it has

generated such a volume of studies, expectancy match, a special case
of interaction, will be considered in a separate section of this review.
Despite Baekeland and Lundwall's (1975) contention to the contrary, there is no direct relationship between therapist sex and
treatment dropouts (Lorr et al., 1958; McNair et al., 1963; Sullivan
et al., 1958).

Nor is there an interaction between sex of therapist

and sex of patient (Mendelsohn, 1966; Saltzman et al., 1976).

Hiler

(1958) did find differences attributable to therapist sex in studying
the interaction with patient productivity.

It will be recalled that

patients producing few responses on the Rorschach are likely to terminate in the first sessions.

Hiler found that female therapists

lose fewer of their nonproductive patients.

But this was offset across

all clients because they tended to lose more of the patients with high
R.

For the predominantly male samples in the studies reviewed, thera-

pist sex (item 26 on Figure 1) does not seem to be a relevant variable
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in dropout rate.

Studies on the overlapping variables of race and

socioeconomic background of the therapist similarly find little direct
Yamamoto, James, Bloombaun, and Hatten (1967) found that

effect·

therapists scoring high on ethnocentrism lost proportionally more
blacks than whites by the sixth ses'sion than did their less ethnocentric counterparts.

This finding leads reviewers to conclude:

"Research does suggest that the attitudes and biases of the therapist for example, in regard to blacks, lower-class people, and women may
be more important than the demographic issues themselves" (Parloff,
Waskow, & Wolfe, 1978).

In session behavior is more predictive than

the therapist's demographic background.
There is clearly a therapist contribution to the dropout
question.

Gibby et al. (1954) found that some therapists were able

to retain the unproductive patient.

Hiler (1958) found the same

pattern and suggested that therapist warmth and sex were critical
mediator variables.

McNair et al. (1963) also found a group of

therapists who seemed to select and retain a disproportionate number
of predicted quitters.

But they were unable to discriminate this

group by sex, profession, experience, amount of personal therapy, A-B
type, judged competence, or liking for the patient.
The source of these therapist effects remain elusive.

Studies

report failure to discriminate based on professional discipline (Lorr
et al., 1958; McNair et al., 1963; Sullivan et al., 1958).

Reviewers

see experience as important (Dodd, 1970; Meltzoff & Kornreich, 1970),
with Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) finding six of seven articles
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indicating that experience is important.

Of the studies reviewed

here, only two considered experience significant, and no comparisons
were presented in one (Fiester & Rudestam, 1975) while the other
compared medical students to residents (Dodd, 1976).

No difference

was found in length of stay as a function of therapist experience in
a number of standard studies from the literature (Caracena, 1965; Lorr
et al., 1958; McNair et al., 1963; Saltzman et al., 1976; Sullivan et
al., 1958) which were available to the reviewers.

This review con-

cludes that faith in the central importance of experience has blinded
others to the conflicting evidence on the subject.

Further research,

including this study, must evaluate this variable.

There is more

support for the related concept of therapist competence.

McNair et

al. (1963) found no differences and Garfield et al. (1963) found only
a trend for the competent to retain more clients.

But Hiler (1958)

found productive patients remained for those rated most competent by
judges (55% as compared to 29% kept by less competent therapists), and
Saltzman et al. (1976) found a significant relationship between continuing and patients' ratings of therapist commitment and competence
after the third session.
Studies of therapist personality traits offer mixed results.
The often-examined A-B type offers little to the explanation of the
dropout phenomenon (McNair et al., 1962, 1963).

Reviewers have sug-

gested that therapists must permit dependency (Baekeland & Lundwall,
1975; Meltzoff & Kornreich, 1970).

Caracena (1965) and Winder et al.

(1962) found no significant differences, but these results may be
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attributed to the high acceptance of dependence in their therapist
sample.

When patients expressed direct dependence on them personally

(item 24), therapists did respond differently.

And here the accep-

tance versus avoidance of dependence during the first two sessions was
almost 100% accurate in predicting length of treatment (Winder et al.,
1962).

Conversely, the detached therapist may discourage patients

remaining in treatment.

This may be particularly important to the

traditionally oriented woman who expects to be able to be dependent
on an active male therapist (Heilbrun, 1973).

Kamin and Coughlin

(1963) interviewed patients after the conclusion of treatment.

Most

criticisms from both sexes focused on the quality of the relationship,
specifically, on the perception of therapists as being silent and aloof.
Hiler (1958) failed to find the expected disproportionate attrition of
unproductive patients of passive therapists.

But Saltzman et al.

(1976) found that those who ultimately dropped out before the tenth
session rated their therapists significantly lower on concern, participation, and commitment through the first five sessions.

By the

third session these patients also felt they had experienced less
respect and understanding from their therapist.

Along the same lines,

Lesser (1961) found low therapist empathy related to early termination.
The importance of the counselor's warmth (item 23) is stressed in
Dodd's (1970) review and in Hiler's (1958) report that it removed the
preexisting tendency for the unproductive patient to leave early.
But Freedman et al. (1958) failed to find a main effect for therapist
warmth with their schizophrenic population.

Instead, there was a
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significant interaction in which there were more remainers when a warm
therapist worked with a patient who acknowledged his illness or a
detached therapist was matched with a denier.

This last finding re-

emphasizes the power of the interaction during the session as a determinant of premature termination of treatment.

On the balance, however,

patients will be more likely to continue if their therapists are able
to accept dependency; be active and involved; and offer the facilitative conditions of respect, empathy, and warmth.

It is likely that it

is through these variables that any contribution of therapist experience or competence is expressed.
The importance of interaction is also evident in the predictive
value of therapist liking for the patient (item 25) and interest in
the presenting problem.

Despite the failure of McNair et al. (1963)

to find a significant relationship, the tendency to lose the disliked
patient is stressed by reviewers (Baekeland & Lundwall, 1975; Garfield,
1978; and Meltzoff & Kornreich, 1970) and empirically supported by
Caracena (1965) and Strickland and Crowne (1963).
fect is mutual.

Moreover, the ef-

Kamin and Coughlin (1963) found that 70% of patients

with positive feelings toward their therapist rated themselves as
improved after treatment, compared to 0% improvement for those who
disliked the counselor.

Interest in the patient's problem was found

to relate to longer continuation in research by McNair et al. (1963).
Similarly, Garfield et al. (1963) found willingenss to accept the
patient into therapy associated with the patient's length of treatment.
A good deal of outcome research has focused on the match of

llO
the patient and therapist in terms of personality or background.

The

field is complex, with researchers variously championing the value of
similarity, complementarity, or positing a curvilinear relationship
between degree of therapeutic success and similarity (Parloff et al.,
1978).

A powerful argument can be made that pairs from a similar back-

ground will have the advantage in ease of communication, shared values,
and common expectancies.

McNair et al. (1962) adopt such an approach

in suggesting type B therapists, those with interests in skilled labor
and technical occupations, may have more in common with the predominantly lower class client seen at a Veterans Administration Clinic.
In the absence of contradicting evidence, this review accepts the
contention that similarity in background (item 28) encourages perseverance in treatment (Baekeland & Lundwall, 1975; Meltzoff & Kornreich,
1970).

Mendelsohn (1966) compared staff and clients on the Meyers

Briggs Type Indicator to assess the importance of similarity in cognitive style.

The relevance of the results is attenuated since the

study used students reporting for one to six sessions of educational
or vocational counseling.

It is questionable whether such results can

be generalized to the psychopathological veterans considered in the
present study.

But Mendelsohn found cognitive dissimilarity led to

early termination, while the similar pairs were variable in duration of
treatment.

He concluded that "similarity is something of a necessary

condition for continuation but it is certainly not a sufficient condition as well" (p. 231).
Expectancy match.

A great deal of research has been focused
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on expectancies.

Based on the model of placebo effects in medicine,

it has been argued that therapeutic results depend on the mobilization of the client's hopes more than on specific techniques (Frank,
1968).

Investigations have included attempts to manipulate patient

expectancies.

So true experiments have been done, in addition to the

naturalistic studies relied upon so exclusively in the studies reviewed to this point.

To avoid a common confusion, expectancy for

improvement, which includes prognosis, will be distinguished from
match of role expectations, which is a variant on the similarity
issue addressed above.
Expectations for improvement is a translation of Frank's
measure of hope.

It may be operationalized as a single global measure

(as in therapists' prognostic rating), as a questionnaire, or as the
difference between current and anticipated self-descriptions.

Scores

on one of these measures are crosstabulated with an outcome measure.
Wilkins (1973) has criticized the frequent use of global ratings of
improvement or self-report, because of the possibility of self-serving
bias.

Martin and his associates (Martin, Moore, Stern & McNairy, 1977;

Martin, Stern, Moore, & Lindsey, 1977), administering the MMPI at
intake and discharge as a measure of change, were able to demonstrate
significant correlations of improvement with expectation as rated by
therapists and by patients undergoing their first course of inpatient
treatment.

From both perspectives, expectation was more highly cor-

related with the initial MMPI than the one at discharge.

If expec-

tancies were causative, the opposite would be expected, namely, there
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should be more impact on the final measure of adjustment.

Martin

et al. concluded that both patients and therapists are able to read
preexisting clues in making their judgments about probably outcomes.
Expectations are predictions.
Outpatients may be less successful in predicting outcome, or
at least their expectations are not clearly related to likelihood of
continuing in psychotherapy.

Heine and Trosman (1960) found no dif-

ference in expectations for improvement among those terminating before
or after the fifth session.

Garfield et al. (1963) found role and

outcome expectancies unrelated to length of stay or change.

Goldstein

(1960) found duration of treatment and subjective ratings of change
were unrelated to initial expectations for improvement of 15 students
treated at a university clinic.
Therapist expectations for improvement may be more important.
Goldstein's (1960) therapists' predictions were significantly related
to duration of treatment and degree of improvement.

Sherry (1977)

examined 71 patient/therapist pairs at a Veterans Administration clinic and found that a negative prognosis was more likely for those who
eventually terminated.

But Garfield et al. (1963) cautioned against

assuming a simple main effect for therapist outcome expectations.
Match of expectations is important.

A disproportionate number of ter-

minators were found to have therapists expecting more change than anticipated by the patient.

Such cases may well be examples of disagree-

ment about therapeutic goals rather than failed therapy (Baekeland &
Lundwall, 1975).
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A number of studies examine the importance of expectancy match
in regard to treatment goals, duration, and roles (item 29 of Figure 1).
Most report them to be important.

Heine and Trosman (1960) found

significantly more remainers if patients and therapists agreed on
treatment aims (symptom relief through medication and information or
behavior change through talk and advice).

However, Gliedman, Stone,

Frank, Nash, and Imber (1957) found terminators only slightly and nonsignificantly more discrepant with conventional treatment goals than
were continuers.

Sandler (1975) and Sherry (1977) found that degree

of agreement in predictions of duration was significantly related to
the likelihood of continuing in treatment.
Congruence in role expectations is significantly related to
remaining in therapy according to reports by Gulas (1974), Heine and
Trosman (1960), Overall and Aronson (1963), Rapaport (1976), Sandler
(1975), and Straker et al. (1967).
found.

Some dissenting reports have been

Garfield et al. (1963) found judges ratings of congruence

unrelated to therapy duration.

Sherry (1977) obtained mixed results.

Terminators were more discrepant in regard to the types of techniques
used.

But remainers were less likely to agree about expectations for

therapist detachment.

Horenstein and Houston (1976) argue that too

much similarity may be counterproductive, as it minimizes the need to
change.
crepant.

They found a quadratic trend.

Remainers were moderately dis-

Those that were extremely congruent, like those patients who

had inaccurate expectations, were more likely to terminate during the
course of a three session orientation group.

114
Expectancy disconfirmation is a part of all therapy.

Gliedman

et al (1957) found that 71% of the dropouts and 63% of the continuers
had goals for therapy that were at variance with those conventionally
associated with insight oriented psychotherapy.

Overall and Aronson

(1963) found that their model patient found the treatment to be less
active, supportive, and medically oriented than expected.

Such dis-

crepancies were especially characteristic in the treatment of lower
class patients and may be the basis of the social class effects discussed previously (Garfield, 1978; Heitler, 1976; Malzer, 1980).
Some of the more recent studies reviewed (Rapaport, 1976; Sherry,
1976) comment that even lower class patients have more accurate expectations than expected.

It may be that pop psychologies and the

greater visibility of the helping professions during the last decade
have contributed to a greater public awareness of the therapy process.
If a course of therapy continues, role expectancies converge (Gulas,
1974; Sandler, 1975).

The critical issue is not the fact of discrepant

expectations but the way in which they are managed.

Either differences

of great magnitude or therapist insensitivity to their existence is
likely to result in a brief and unsatisfactory course of treatment.
Direct education has been used to correct mistaken assumptions.
Hoehn-Saric, Frank, Imber, Nash, Stone, and Battle (1964) used a role
induction interview to explain expected behaviors, realistic outcomes
and when they should become apparent, and the nature and handling of
superficial resistance.

Using a true experimental design, with thera-

pists blind to the manipulation, patients given the education were
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rated significantly better than controls on a variety of process and
outcome variables.

Relevant to the current study is the observation

that experimental subjects attended an average of two more sessions
during the four months of treatment evaluated.

Later research by

Sloane, Cristal, Pepernick, and Stapler (1970) clarified that it is
the role socialization rather than hope induction that accounts for
improvement.

Heitler's (1976) review stresses that reduced attrition

is a consequence of such efforts.
Wilkins (1973) criticized the research of expectancies and
questioned the spate of hopeful reports it has generated.

Signifi-

cant results were attributed to reliance on global measures subject
to demand characteristics.

While this contention may be applicable

to some, it is clearly not an explanation for all of the results reviewed.

And these results have been remarkably consistent in showing

that common role expectations (including estimates of duration and,
possibly, of goals) are crucial for developing a sustained therapeutic
relationship.

Wilkins is correct, however, when he points out that

expectancies are hypothetical mediating variables without direct or
observable causal impact on length of treatment.

People do not quit

therapy becuase their understanding of the patient role is wrong.
They quit because they feel frustrated with the lack of desired change.
Expectancy is a summary label for a range of correlated beliefs and
behaviors.

But this name is preferable to other summary labels current

in the field, particularly social class, because it implies something
that is dynamic.

Where social class evokes a sense of immutability
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that can only be accommodated (perhaps by offering less ambitious
forms of therapy), expectancies can be modified and altered.

Direct

education becomes feasible, whether formally through therapy socialization training or informally during the discussions in an intake interview.

The concept of expectancies is useful because of its explana-

tory power and because of the activist stance it offers for the clinician.
Other factors.

While patient and therapist characteristics

and the interaction between them are of central importance in determining continuation in treatment, the therapy operates within a wider
clinic and community context.

This context has been barely considered

despite its evident importance.

The general cultural attitude toward

mental health and the patient role influence the likelihood of seeking
out and persisting in treatment.

As the mediator of these values, the

family clearly plays an important role.

Dengrove and Kutash (1950)

in an impressionistic report suggest the lack of family support, particularly the expectation to "handle things on your own", is important.
Freeman (1961) interviewed family members shortly after the return of
a psychiatric inpatient.

He found that those with low levels of in-

telligence and education were less positive about the treatment offered
or the possibility of recovery, more likely to blame the expatient, and
less likely to conceptualize the illness in the psychological terms that
support further treatment.

These attitudes are similar to those typi-

cal of lower class patie·ilts so often cited as the reasons for premature
termination.

Most discouraging is Freeman's conclusion that these
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beliefs are not easily changed.

Frank et al. (1957) obtained retro-

spective ratings from patients in which dropouts, compared with remainers, said there were less advantages in continued treatment, less
support, and more opposition from relatives.

The theoretical impor-

tance of the family context and the limited empirical support available
ratify Baekeland and Lundwall's (1975) call for more study of this
area.
The clinic environment, whether in terms of physical facilities
or policy, also deserve more study.

Feldman, Lorr, and Russell (1958)

report that large VA clinics keep patients longer.

Dengrove and Kutash

(1950) list short sessions, therapist absenses, changes in treatment
personnel, pretherapy hurdles, and doubts about confidentiality among
the factors that discourage patients.

The limited research available

minimizes the importance of session length (Lorr et al., 1958) or
frequency (Lorr et al., 1962).

Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) sug-

gest that retention rates will increase if waiting lists are shortened,
significant others are involved, and a range of therapeutic modalities
are made available.

Bailey et al. (1959) and Dodd (1970) found longer

continuation if patients request and are offered medication, while
Kotkov (1958) found that initial willingness to accept psychotherapy
predicted persistence.

So patients offered their choice of therapy

type remain in treatment.

Although Lorr et al. (1958) found no signi-

ficant differences across modalities, two studies from the John
Hopkins team found higher termination rates among group therapy members.

Many drop out before the first session, suggesting initial
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apprehensions (Frank et al., 1958).

But even those attending a ses-

sion experience more attack and less support than those in individual
therapy (Nash, Frank, Gliedman, Imber, & Stone, 1957).

Although the

termination rate may be higher from groups, "in many respects the
psychological characteristics of the group therapy dropout parallel
those of the dropout from individual psychotherapy" (Baekeland &
Lundwall, 1975).

For example, Yalom (1966) identified features such as

intimacy problems, lack of insight and psychological sophistication,
and lower socioeconomic status and education as characteristic of terminators from groups.

To summarize, the type of service offered, and

its match to patient preferences, are important variables.

But there

is no need to look for separate profiles of terminators from different
modalities.
One last contextual issue to be considered is the contribution
of so-called "reality factors".

Therapy becomes impossible if it

interferes with critical work or family tasks, if transportation obstacles cannot be managed, or, most clearly, if the patient moves out
of the area.
class clients.

Such difficulties are commonplace, especially among lower
Garfield (1963) found 6 of 11 dropouts cited reality

factors, as did at least 6 of 37 interviewed by Brandt (1964), 6 of
21 inpatients leaving against medical advice (Scheer & Barton, 1974),
and 5 of 35 group therapy droupouts interviewed by Yalom (1966).
Such cases should not be included with the terminators in research
attempting to identify psychological patterns of the patient or therapist effecting length of treatment.

Yet a majority of the studies
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reviewed failed to specify how such cases are handled.
methodological problem.

This is a

The current research project will exclude

from consideration, among either terminator or remainer groups, those
who quit therapy because of reality factors or are referred for treatment elsewhere.
This concludes the review of research on extrapatient factors
involved in premature termination from psychotherapy.

With the signif-

icant exception of research on patient expectancies, it is even more
sketchy and unsystematized than that on patient factors.
conclusions must be presented cautiously.

Accordingly,

Among the therapist vari-

ables contributing to early dropout are a lack of similarity or familiarity with the patient's background; low competence, as evident in
an inability to tolerate dependence, a detached or passive stance, and
low levels of facilitative conditions; dislike of the patient or disinterest in the presenting problem; and an inability to bridge discrepent expectations about the therapy process and outcome.

A summary

of all factors judged to have been empirically substantiated is presented in Figure 2.
Self-consciousness and the treatment dropout phenomenon.
It is clear that there has been no direct examination of self-consciousness levels of terminators as compared to remainers.

Theoreti-

cally, terminators would be expected to have extreme scores on the
Self-Consciousness scale:

high ratings corresponding to flight from

therapy because of the anxiety elicited, low scores signifying lack of
requisite skills and motivation to use insight oriented therapy.

In
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Patient Factors:
Low socioeconomic status
Low intelligence
Lack of verbal skills
Lack of cooperation
Somatic presentation
Low anxiety or low depression
No previous therapy
Counterdependence, inability to tolerate intimate
relationships
History of failure to complete projects
Therapist Factors:
Low competence
Inability to tolerate dependence
Detached and passive
Low levels of respect, warmth, and empathy
Dislike for patient
Disinterest in presenting problems
Interaction Factors:
Dissimilar background or cognitive style
Unresolved dissimilar role expectations
Contextual Factors:
Lack of family support
Group therapy
Failure to provide desired treatment modality
Other reality factors
Figure 2.

Summary of variables associated with premature
termination from psychotherapy.
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the absense of direct measurement, the task is to reevaluate variables
that may be conceptually related to self-consciousness.
The patient characteristics reviewed relate termination to the
lack of requisite self-monitoring skills.
parallel to SC is psychological mindedness.

The closest conceptual
Whether this is opera-

tionalized as the lack of verbal skills or as focus on somatic interpretations of the presenting problem, the likely terminator is portrayed as one who is unused to examining behaviors or affective states and
comparing them to internal standards.

The observation that low levels

of anxiety or depression are typical of terminators also suggests low
levels of self-consciousness.

It appears that the dropout enters

therapy without the habit of self-monitoring, and, presumably, without
the skills to handle it productively.
The demands of therapy, with the heavy emphasis on self-scrutiny, then propel the patient into an area for which he or she is ill
prepared.

If high levels of self-consciousness lead to premature ter-

mination from therapy, as extrapolated from the findings that objective
self-awareness (OSA) is avoided, then features of the therapist and
context contributing to dropping out should be those likely to force
self-consciousness on the patient.

This seems to be the case with at

least some of the variables found to predict premature termination.
Group therapy produces more dropouts.

It also should dramatically

heighten social self-consciousness, and attendent anxiety.

That this

seems to be the case is evident in patient descriptions of experiencing
the group as threatening and attacking.
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The therapist's role, from the perspective of self-awareness
theory, is to carefully manage the patient's self-monitoring so that
internal standards can be accessed, to motivate desired behavior
change, while debilitating anxiety is avoided.
task, the therapist brings a number of tools.

To this sensitive
The active or directive

therapist can distract the patient from excessive self-scrutiny.

The

supportive and empathic therapist can, in effect, desensitize the person through the offering of facilitative conditions so that problematic
areas of the patient's life can be explored without too much selfcriticism.

Warmth, respect, and interest all communicate an acceptance

that the patient can use as a model.

Empathy indicates that an ex-

perience is understandable to another, while the nonjudgmental tone
serves as a cue that self-chastisement is unnecessary.

So therapist

characteristics would be expected to be important mediators of length
of stay.

The silent or detached therapist is easily perceived as the

judgmental other, heightening both self-scrutiny and anxiety, and so
placing the therapist in the role of the passive accomplice in flight
from treatment.

In contrast, the competent therapist helps to manage

self-consciousness by alternating among support, the implicit protection of encouraging dependence, the desensitization offered in communicating warmth and empathy, the modeling of expressions of attraction or interest in internal experiencing, and the distraction from or
restructuring of internal standards that go with being directive.

To

use these skills with the deftness required for a successful outcome,
the therapist must be very attuned to the patient's experience.

Dis-
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similarity in expectation, background, or cognitive style contribute
to premature termination because they block the "third ear" and so
render inoperative the array of tools for managing self-consciousness.
Self-awareness theory, as applied to the early stages of therapy, would suggest that a patient will leave because of insufficient
anxiety to motivate change or because of excessive anxiety resulting
from an immoderate dose of self-scrutiny.

Most of the patient charac-

teristics delineated as correlates of premature termination in Figure
2 are hypothetically associated with the absense of self-scrutiny.
Most of the therapist and interaction factors relate to excessive selfconsciousness developing in the patient.

In this sense, OSA theory can

draw together a number of disparate and seemingly unrelated sources of
flight from therapy.

The theory has the unique advantage of being able

to explain both sources of early termination cited by Saltzman et al.
(1976):

lack of anxiety after the first session and dissatisfaction

with the therapy relationship during the third to fifth visits.
Personality Typology
This research tests specific applications of self-awareness
theory to two areas of clinical psychology.
to the first of them:
therapy.

The last section relates

the prediction of premature termination from

This section will address the second, which is the distinction

among personality types in the level and handling of self-awareness.
A psychodynamic personality typology.

The prevailing diag-

nostic nomenclature is inadequate for the purposes of this research.
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The number of categories, even when restricted to functional disorders
of adults, totaled a prohibitive 82 under DSMII and has risen with
DSMIII (American Psychiatric Association, 1968, 1980).

Distinctions

between these diagnoses are notoriously unreliable (Spitzer & Fleiss,
1974).

Even when syndromes are discriminable, they may obscure rather

than highlight important personality differences:

"Although all the

individuals described as having the same mental disorder show at
least the defining features of the disorder, they may well differ in
other important ways that may affect clinical management and outcome
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 6).

This is especially

true in diagnosing disorders of habit; a person may be classified
because of behavior in a restricted area without reference to overall
personality style and adaptation.

These drawbacks more than offset

the advantage of using the clinician's language system.
A condensed and revised typology was developed for this study.
It collapses a number of the dimensions that lead to the extensive
and confusing scope of DSMII.

First of all, it focuses on the pa-

tient's pervasive personality style or life style.

Circumscribed

behavior patterns (e.g., substance misuse or paraphilia) are not
regarded as a substantial enough sampling of the individual's manner
of relating to the world.

Second, it collapses the DSMII distinctions

between psychoticism, neuroticism, and personality disorders.

Research

suggests that degree of pathology is better represented on a continuum
than as discrete categories (Eysenck, 1960; Luborsky, 1962).

Clinical

distinctions are also based on degree of anxiety and affective tone.
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While fine discriminations in these two dimensions account for many
of the diagnoses (in DSMII there were, for instance, five diagnoses
in which depression is a defining element), they are seen as being
symptomatic and more or less transient rather than basic to the patient's personality.
When these dimensions are collapsed, the residual categories
are personality types which function much like the Axis II diagnoses
of DSMIII.

That is, they describe the basic and sustained styles

which give rise to and yet persist beyond the symptoms that lead patients to seek treatment.

In this sense they resemble, and borrow

from, typologies developed in psychoanalytic theory.

The styles are

described in terms of characteristic defenses, likely symptoms or
complaints, typical manner of relating, and quality of the transference.
There is empirical as well as theoretical support for such a
manner of conceptualizing core personality differences.

Miller and

Magaro (1977) successfully used cluster analysis to identify four
distinct types.

As with this research, they defined their types as

applicable across the entire spectrum of adjustment, and they defined
personality style in terms of "a specific combination of psychological
defenses, cognitive and affective styles, belief and value systems,
moral development, etc." (p. 460).

Profiles were developed for hys-

teric, compulsive, depressive, and character disorder types.

These

were used to predict performance on a variety of brief personality
measures (Rotter's Locus of Control Scale, Byrne's Repression-Sen-
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sitization Scale, etc.).

The experimental hypotheses for each group

specified which tests should be associated and the direction of deviation from test means.

Protocols were then factor analyzed, with re-

sults evaluated in terms of the number of predictions verified.

When

a sample of 107 Introductory Psychology students were used, the hysterical and character disorder types were validated.
compulsive and depressive styles overlapped.

However, the

A replication with 130

juniors and seniors with different majors, found increased discrimination between types.
tions were verified.

Five clusters emerged and 18 of 23 scale predicHysterical (seven of eight predictions) and

character disorder types (four of five predictions) were crossvalidated.

The depressive cluster conformed to expectations (five of six

scale predictions) and explained the most variance.

However, the sec-

ond most important cluster represented an overlapping of hysterical
and depressive features.

The compulsive style was only "moderately

supported", with two of four scale predictions confirmed.

Scales

loading for the four predicted types are listed in Figure 3.
Miller and Magaro's (1977) findings offer general support for
the validity of a brief typology and do much to clarify its content.
Character disorder and hysterical types will be included in the current
research scale.

Depression will not be.

Despite its important contri-

bution to the variance, Miller and Magaro's results support my conviction that depression overlaps too many other clinical conditions to
be considered a meaningfully discriminable personality style.
The five personality types and descriptions, as given to
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Hysteric:
Empirically: altruistic, repressor, field dependent,
extraverted, lowa neuroticism, low dogmatism, high sensation
seeking;
Descriptively: reliance on repression, global cognitive and
affective style, suggestible, naive, dependent.
Character Disorder:
Empirically: high sensation seeking, Machievellian,
extraverted, low altruism;
Descriptively: egocentric, manipulative, highly developed
social skills, lack of affect.
Depressive:
Empirically: low sensation seeking, sensitizer, field
dependent, introverted, high neuroticism;
Descriptively: cognitively rigid, lacks personal self-worth,
obedient to authority, reduced satisfactions, prejudice
toward outgroups.
Compulsive:
Empirically:
Note.

field independent, introverted.

From Miller and Magaro (1977).

aThe adjectives "low" and "high" indicate a score deviating more
than .5 standard deviations from the grand mean.
Figure 3.

Characteristics of different personality styles.
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clinicians, are listed in Figure 4.

They were developed with the in-

tent of including the major personality styles while still preserving
the economy of the scale and the clarity of distinction between styles.
The choice of styles, and their description is influenced by
psychoanalytic theorizing.

The distinction between obsessive and hys-

terical styles, for instance, was made early on by Freud in his attempts
to explain patients presenting with ideational versus physical symptoms
(Freedman, Kaplan, & Sadock, 1972).
draws on the tripartite model.

At the first level, the scale

With the consolidation of the superego,

a second regulatory mechanism is available to assist the ego in the
regulation of drives.

Defects in superego development will lead to a

personality distinct from those attributable to problems in ego development.

The sociopathic category is intended to represent those prob-

lems derived from the failure of the superego to operate effectively.
Drives are acted out instead of being blocked from discharge (Pervin,
1970).

The references to substance abuse and conflict with authority

capture this inability to delay impulse gratification.

The likelihood

of external compulsion to enter treatment is further testament to the
absense of self-regulation.

The sociopathic category is essentially

equivalent to Miller and Magaro's (1977) empirically validated Character Disorder type.

Because it is traced to superego defects it is

conceptually and clinically distinct from other typologies which describe different styles of ego functioning.
One crucial aspect of ego functioning is management of defense
mechanisms.

Because individuals develop habitual defensive styles, the
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Hysterical: overuse of repression; likely presents with somatic
concerns or the feeling of being used in personal relationships; exhibitionistic, dramatic; relates so that the
therapist has a sense of engagement with the patient despite
a focus on external events.
Paranoid: projection prominent; presents with concerns about
being isolated or deliberately abused by other people;
relates vaguely and guardedly; therapist feels a strong pull
to confirm the patient's perspective or else be confronted
with the patient's underlying anger.
Obsessive: isolation and intellectualization prominent; problems
related to feared loss of control or, if loss of control has
been experienced, feelings of depression, anger, and guilt;
high expectations for personal productivity and morality;
insight into thoughts and motives without affect; patient is
controlling, and the interview may become so wordy as to
become boring.
Passive: schizoid and avoidant; may present with multiple fears
and feelings of helplessness; inward focus on fantasy;
history suggests lack of social skills and contacts;
therapist may still feel detached after the interview; include:
passive dependent, passive aggressive, and narcissistic characters.
Sociopathic: history of acting out tensions; mlnlmlzes problems,
and likely attends the interview because of pressure from
family, courts, or other outside source; may be problems
with alcohol or drugs; appears socially skilled and comfortable, and yet the contact remains superficial and the
relationship feels tenuous.
Figure 4.

Personality types and descriptions.
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analysis of primary defenses is an important aspect of dynamicallyoriented assessment (Dewald, 1971), and a convenient means of distinguishing personality styles.

Again, hysterical and obsessive

styles are easiest to separate.

Repression limits access to conscious-

ness of problematic contents, resulting in the apparently naive and
global cognitive style of the hysteric.

In contrast, the ideational

defenses of the obsessive split off the affective component
permitting verbal awareness of the content

(Doyle, 1968).

while
There-

sult is a characteristically detached insight, with emotions restricted
or appearing convulsively (Kennedy, 1977).
these defensive styles is internal:
affect versus cognition.

The tension in both of

conscious versus unconscious,

This contrasts with the remaining character

styles, in which the conflict is between self and other, or, more
accurately, between internal representations of the self and the external object.

This is clearest in paranoids, whose "capacity for

delusions represents a confusion in their sense of identity between
what is part of their personality and what is separate from it"
(Kennedy, 1977, p. 302).

To some degree all use of projection and

introjection harkens back to their developmental precursors, the confusion of the self-boundary that occurs prior to the cognitive differentiation of self and other (Gedo & Goldberg, 1973).

In combina-

tion with underlying anger, this explains why the paranoid's world is
experienced as dangerous.

To the passive type, for whom the world is

also experienced as threatening, the defense is characteristically
avoidance.

This may include withdrawal into a dependent relationship,
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if available.

The upshot is a retrenchment that leaves the narcis-

sistic character with impoverished object relations or restricts the
accessible world of the phobic.
There is a development flavor to much of the preceding description of defensive styles.

It is not accidental.

Defenses become

available in a developmental sequence (Fisher & Greenberg, 1977;
Gedo & Goldberg, 1973).

Repression, isolation, projection, and with-

drawal are successively more primary and primitive (DeWald, 1971).
Indeed, each of the personality styles can be presented as representative of a step in the developmental sequence posited by psychoanalytic theorists.

This will be done in the succeeding paragraph.

But a clarification is required first.

Because of the strong etio-

logical focus of analytic theorizing, most psychic phenomena are
related to development events.

This includes degree of psychopathology.

Freud explained progressively more severe disturbance through reference to earlier developmental arrest or regression to more primitive
stages.

The implication would be that typologies representing earlier

psychosexual stages would also include more disturbed patients.
this would be an oversimplification.

But

Experiences at later develop-

mental stages may result in the secondary automony of certain core ego
functions (Gedo & Goldberg, 1973).

Even a regression from the oedipal

to the oral stage may not lead to as much evident pathology as developmental arrest at, say, the phallic stage.

So while the linking of

personality type to developmental level may help elucidate the primary
defense, the likely presenting problem, and the basic interpersonal
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stance, it does not define the degree of psychopathology.

Type re-

mains independent of degree of disturbance.
Each of the four types of ego-functioning can be roughly
identified with a different developmental stage.
most clearly linked with oral characteristics.

Passive types are
As hypothesized by

Abraham and empirically confirmed since oral traits are most pertinent
to the dimensions of dependent/independent, passive/active, and close
to others/distant from others (Fisher & Greenberg, 1977).

The passive

and avoidant emphasis of the typology, with its phobic and pessimistic
stance, captures the likely response to oral frustration.

At this

stage, the possibilities of interaction is limited to the excessive
dependence of self-object union or to the absense of contact of the
autistically self-preoccupied.

In the passive character these quali-

ties are apparent in the therapist's sense of detachment or in the
dependent pull underlying the passive dependent or passive-aggressive
style of relating (Freedman, Kaplan, & Sadock, 1972).

The paranoid

type is associated with frustration of oral-aggressive drives.

The

lasting insecurity and ambivalence about trusting relationships is
evident in the patient's guarded style and suspicions of others.

The

underlying rage communicated in therapy is an attempt to avoid dependence as well as an expression of aggressive drives (Kennedy, 1977).
The obsessive has traditionally been associated with the anal period
(Fisher & Greenberg, 1977).

A central and continuing theme of the

anal character is the tension between defiance and the feared loss of
love if the rage surfaces (MacKinnon & Michels, 1971).

So the rigid
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moral standards, the feared loss of control, the isolation of emotion,
and the controlling style of relating can be seen as sequellae to the
attempt to control anger and obstinance (Kennedy, 1977).

The link

between the phallic stage and the hysterical style is evident in that
the exhibitionism and demand for attention of the hysteric closely
parallels the child's assertiveness and beginning sexual identity
awareness during the phallic period (Pervin, 1970).
The analogy between four of the personality types and the psychosexual stages has three purposes.

First, it should accent the

central issues and relationship styles of each style.

Second, it

indicates the distinctness of each type, and so justifies their inclusion in the typology.

Third, and finally, it is intended to con-

vey the sense that this list of character types is reasonably comprehensive.

While there might be some quibbling about descriptive phrases

for one or another specific type, the descriptions are generally conventional and noncontroversial.

The disagreement that might be antic-

ipated relates more to the number and choice of character types.

This

study has attempted to make use of basic psychodynamic categories and
to justify their use by indicating how they collectively cover the
range of personality types suggested by the tripartite and genetic
models from psychoanalysis.

The presence of empirical evidence of

the importance of at least two of the categories adds further support
for the assumed validity of the scales.
Personality type and level of self-awareness.

Among the

characteristics that differ across personality types, the level and
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means of handling objective self-awareness can be expected to vary.
While I know of no studies within abnormal psychology or self-awareness research that bear directly on this issue, there is some indirect
experimental work and good theoretical grounds for expecting differences.
Eysenk (1960) has attempted to redefine conventional diagnostic categories in terms of his factor analytic schema.

In the course

of doing so, he presents replicated and consistent findings that
neurotic groups, at least, vary along the dimension of introversionextraversion.

Obsessives are highly introverted, or attuned to their

internal, subjective world.
posite, extraverted pole.

Hysterics and psychopaths are on the opObsessives can be expected to be the most

self-conscious of the three groups overall.

At the subscale level,

obsessives would have the higher scores on private self-consciousness (PR-SC), because of their attention to at least their internal
ideational status.

But hysterics and psychopaths, with the extra-

verts' greater general social skills, may well have higher scores on
public self-consciousness (PU-SC).
Table 9 summarizes the expected rankings of the five personality types on the Self-Consciousness scale.

In deriving these hypoth-

eses, the empirical evidence discussed above is supplemented by expectations based on the typical defenses and interpersonal style of
each group.
overall.

Passive types are expected to be the most self-conscious

Their self-preoccupation should be evident in high scores on

PR-SC, while their social anxiety (SA-SC) is expected to be highest
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Table 9
Expected Rank Order of Personality Types
on the Self-Consciousness Scale
Self-consciousness subscale
Personality type

Private

Public

Total selfSocial Anxiety consciousness

Passive

1

2

1

1

Obsessive

1

2

2

2

Hysterical

2

1

3

3

Sociopathic

3

1

3

4

Paranoid

3

3

3

5

Note. The group mean will be expected to differ significantly from
that of any group with a different number. An identical ranking has
been given whenever there is no basis for assuming significant differences.
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since their phobic/avoidant style entails experiencing anxiety
regularly and consciously.

Passive types are regarded as being

intermediate in their sensitivity to the social impact; less of their
self-image is involved with impression management than would be the
case for hysterics and sociopaths.

Obsessives will be highly self-

aware, as evident in their capacity to report internal events.

However,

the isolation of affect should limit their cognizance of the anxiety
that arises from their self-scrutiny.
Hysterics are renowned

for their naivete.

Despite their

ability to express superficial emotionality, there is an absense of
appreciation of internal states and motivation that will lower their
subscale scores on PR-SC.

Even the characteristic daydreaming centers

on recognition in an interpersonal context.

Accordingly, their highest

ranking will come in the area of public self-consciousness, which
emphasizes appearance and social impression.

The hysteric tends to

experience less anxiety than other personality types (MacKinnon &
Michels, 1971).

The fluid defenses, the reliance on repression, and

quick ventilation through emotional expression all are expected to
contribute to lower scores on SA-SC.

As a consequence,hysterics should

have lower overall Self-Consciousness scores than passive types or
obsessives.

A somewhat similar profile should apply for sociopaths.

They will have their highest subscale ranking on public self-consciousness, since sensitivity to the impact of their interpersonal style is
basic to obtaining their gratifications through other people.

But

this external, goal-oriented focus will curtail internal attention and
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lead to low scores on PR-SC.
atic.

Their response on the SA-SC is problem-

Conventionally, sociopaths are regarded as unable to experience

guilt or anxiety.

But this has been interpretted differently:

They exhibit little if any anxiety, but this is a result, according
to some, of their low tolerance for anxiety. Many of the dynamic
mechanisms employed by the antisocial personality react very early
to fend off, defend against, or snuff out the slightest bit of
anxiety • • • . What seems like an indifferent exterior may be the
outer evidence of a massive psychological effort to hold anxiety
at bay. (Kennedy, 1977, pp. 283-284)
Presumably, the quick denial of anxiety will prevent their reporting
concerns about social evaluation on the SC scale.

Combined with low

scores on private self-consciousness, they should be ranked low on the
scale as a whole.
The lowest SC scores, overall and on each subscale, are expected from the paranoid patient.

His whole dynamics force a vigilant

focus on what is happening "out there" that must severely limit attention to internal ideation and affect.

Even the scale measuring anxiety

in social settings, a characteristic experience for the paranoid, will
have a low score because the items are phrased in the first person.
The paranoid sees the world in terms of "they do" rather than "I feel".
Related to this personality style is the guarded response to all requests for information, including the research questionnaire.

The pa-

tient's response bias will compound his phenomenological lack of selfconsciousness and lead to very low SC scores.

So the paranoid is hy-

pothesized to be lowest overall and not significantly higher than any
other group on any subscale.
In the absense of previous experimentation in this area, the
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hypothesized relationship between personality type and level of selfconsciousness must be regarded as tentative.

This is particularly

true in regard to predictions of subscale rankings.

At the most con-

servative, the total SC mean for the passive and obsessives would be
expected to be significantly higher than that from the other three
types.

Additionally, the personality types will have identifiably

different levels of self-consciousness.

This assumes, as this chapter

has argued, that the five styles can be reliably classified, are meaningfully distinct from one another, and that self-awareness is an important contributer to their distinctiveness.

The detailed hypotheses

provide a predictive standard in terms of which to evaluate the viability of these assumptions.
Summary of Hypotheses
This research constitutes an introductory exploration of the
clinical implications of self-focused attention.

Different aspects

evaluate the relationship of self-consciousness to degree of pathology,
premature termination from therapy, and personality type.

For the sake

of clarity, results will be presented separately for each of three
experiments.

The specific hypotheses are presented below:

Experiment 1:
1.

Self-Consciousness Levels of Psychiatric Patients:

Response to self-focused attention is less differentiated
among patients than in the standardization samples.

The

three SC subscales will be more highly correlated than
among normals.
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2.

Patients are more self-conscious, or experience more disruption than do normals in response to self-focused attention.

Social Anxiety (SA-SC) will have a higher mean than

previously reported.

Total SC scores will vary signifi-

cantly from that found among normal samples.
3.

There will be greater variability in subscale and total
SC scores among patients.

4.

The SC scale will be valid as an index of propensity for
self-focused attention among clinical populations.

It

will be generally independent of degree of pathology.
There will be minimal common variance between the SelfConsciousness scale and the Ego Strength scale (ES).
5.

Pathology is related to specific facets of self-consciousness.

Private self-consciousness and ES will be positively

correlated.
Experiment 2:

But, SA-SC and ES will be inversely related.

Self-Consciousness and Premature Termination from

Psychotherapy:
1.

Excessively high levels of self-consciousness lead to
flight from therapy.

Patients dropping out of treatment

between sessions one and five will be overrepresented
among the top SC scorers.
2.

Patients drop out or fail to begin treatment because
they lack sufficient insight or anxiety to motivate change.
Dropouts and treatment decliners will be overrepresented
among those scoring lowest on SC.
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3.

There will be a curvilinear (inverted U) relationship
between total SC and the proportion of patients continuing in therapy for six or more sessions.

4.

SC means will be significantly different for continuers,
terminators, and those who decline to begin treatment.

5.

Group therapy provides excessive stimulus to awareness of
the social self and so will be intolerable to those dispositionally sensitive to their public presentation.
Terminators will be higher in PU-SC than those who continue
in group therapy.

6.

Patients with previous therapy will have developed selfconsciousness management skills.

Those returning for a

repeat course of treatment will be less likely to drop out.
7.

Self-consciousness is an important determinant of premature termination.

A discriminant function separating

remainers from terminators will include SC scores.
8.

Since therapists contribute a variety of anxiety management techniques during the beginning of therapy, SC will
be significantly related to ratings of therapist experience.

Experiment 3:
1.

Self-Consciousness and Personality Type:

Different personality types vary in the level and handling
of self-consciousness.

Obsessive and Passive types will

be greater than Hysterics and Sociopaths, who, in turn,
will exceed Paranoid patients in mean SC.
2.

These differences result from predictions of differentiated
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elevation on subscales.

On PR-SC, Obsessives will be

significantly higher than Hysterics and Sociopaths.
opposite results are expected for PU-SC.

The

Passive patients

should exceed others on SA-SC.
3.

Each personality type will have a distinctive profile
across the three SC subscales.

The average value of an

item will vary from one subscale to another.
paths, PU-SC should be greater than PR-SC.

For SocioFor Passive

types, PR-SC and SA-SC will be approximately equal and
greater than PU-SC.
to exceed SA-SC.

For Obsessives, PR-SC is predicted

While for Hysterics,PU-SC should be

greater than either PR-SC or SA-SC.

No specific subscale

profile is predicted for Paranoid patients.

METHOD

Subjects
The research was conducted at a large, urban, Veterans Administration Hospital between May, 1979 and July, 1980.

All subjects were

male veterans, with the rare exception of those who were still in service.

As the setting is metropolitan and the treatment is free of

charge, subjects were diverse in terms of ethnicity and economic background.

The sample was bimodally distributed by age, with Vietnam era

and World War II veterans predominating.
study:

94 inpatients and 136 outpatients.

Two groups were used in this
The characteristics of

these groups will be described, and data will be presented on how representative they are of their respective populations.
The 94 inpatients were tested near the end of their hospitalization.

The treatment philosophy of the facility stresses short-

term stays sufficient to stabilize the veteran.

Those in need of

chronic or custodial care were generally excluded.

Participants were

identified by nursing staff as likely candidates for referral to the
Mental Hygiene Clinic.

During the research period, 43.1% of those

eligible to participate did so.

The main constraint on including sub-

jects was the restricted availability of the researcher to only one or
two set sessions per week.

Only those veterans available during the
142
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group testing sessions participated.

A minority of patients invited

refused to participate or turned in unusable records (14.5%).

But

the presence of the researcher permitted collecting responses even
from those unable to read or attend to the materials.

1

Because it is

relatively inclusive, the sample is probably representative of the
population.

But because of the initial selection by nursing staff,

it is possible that cooperative patients and those with clearcut
discharge plans are overrepresented.
The initial sample consisted of 106 cases.
trition resulted from:

Experimental at-

four patients withdrawing consent during

testing, one failing to sign the consent form, two failing to turn in
all test forms, two records having random responses, eliminating two
records from patients retested on successive admissions, and eliminating the record of the one female patient.
The inpatient sample was selected as probable referrals to the
outpatient mental hygiene clinic.

Of the 94 subjects, 77 had intake

appointments scheduled, 50 were seen, and 29 began treatment.
those seen were rated by the intake interviewer.

Ten of

In the main, the

group sampled does represent potential outpatient clinic clients.

Al-

though less likely to be diagnosed as schizophrenic or neurotic than
veterans included in the outpatient sample, they were comparable in

1

Sessions were held on Monday and Thursday afternoons between
May and July, 1979. From August, 1979 through July, 1980
testing was done on Thursday mornings.
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global diagnosis (which included psychotic, neurotic, personality disorder, organic brain syndrome, and others as categories) and in personality type.

They were comparable in such other group descriptors

as age, incidence of service connected disability, and in the distance
between their residence and the clinic.

Although the ten inpatients

receiving intake ratings are too few for sensitive statistical comparisons, no gross differences were evident in their prognosis or in
their motivation for treatment.

It seems justifiable to combine in-

patient and outpatient samples in evaluating the clinical impact of
self-focused attention.
However, as a group, inpatients were handled differently when
they entered treatment at the Mental Hygiene Clinic.

To begin with,

they were more likely to have had previous contact with the clinic.
Of the inpatients, 45% had previous referrals and 20% had had treatment
there.

For outpatients, the respective indices of familiarity with the

clinic drop to 23% and 12%.

Perhaps because of this prior contact,

inpatients were seen marginally sooner for intake (9.6 days after referral as opposed to 14.3 days), had significantly fewer evaluation
sessions (1.2 versus 1.7), and accordingly began therapy significantly
sooner (17.1 versus 26.7 days).

Because of the potential importance

of these variables in determining length of stay in treatment, the
distinction between inpatients and outpatients will be pursued in the
phase of the research pertaining to premature termination from psychotherapy.

Despite these differences in the way in which they were pro-

cessed at the clinic, the two samples were similar demographically.
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The 135 outpatients were sampled from those seen for intake
at the Mental Hygiene Clinic.
three subgroups.

These patients can be divided into

For 113, the scale was administered at the time of

the intake interview, and was accompanied by an Intake Rating Scale.
An additional 12 completed the form at intake but were not rated by a

therapist.

The remaining 11 completed the Self-Consciousness scale

while awaiting a screening session with a staff psychiatrist.
they returned at a later date for intake interviews.

As such,

Each man had

previous contact with the hospital and was referred through the Admitting Office, a general medical floor or clinic, or Inpatient Psychiatry.

Participants included both recurrent and first time users.

sampled constituted 17.1% of those having intake appointments.

Those
Because

the research documents were self-administered, the sample was potentially unrepresentative of those entering the clinic.

Those whose

insufficient education or extensive psychological impairment prevented
them from completing the materials were excluded, as were those who
neglected to return the forms to the receptionist, and those few (16
total) who refused consent.

The most impaired and negativistic were

likely underrepresented in this sample.
cases were excluded.

Materials from 12 additional

These included two females and the ten veterans

previously sampled as inpatients.

According to the specific hypothesis

being evaluated, other cases were excluded.

Such, for instance, was

the case in the premature termination study for cases closed during the
first five sessions because of hospitalization or mutually agreed upon
cessation of treatment.

In addition, incomplete records were available
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for some cases.

Figure 5 shows how the sample was composed for each

phase of the research.

Reading vertically, one can see the number of

subjects having each combination of research materials.
The 116 outpatients whose records were used in the personality
type study had each been rated by their intake interviewer on a series
of questions related to diagnosis and suitability for treatment.

In-

terviewers had also rated 96 other cases who did not complete the
Self-Consciousness scale.

A comparison between these two groups per-

mits an assessment of the degree to which research subjects are representative of the outpatient population.

Participants were not statis-

tically different from the 96 rated patients in diagnosis, global
diagnosis, prognosis, motivation for treatment, referral, or recommended therapy.

The two groups did differ in their expressed reaction

to recommended treatment,

x2 (2)=11.54,

.E_ (

.01, with those who completed

the SC scale disproportionately represented among those neutral in
their response.

This finding runs contrary to what would be expected

if participants were unrepresentatively compliant or enthusiastic.

The

evidence suggests that those sampled are representative of the psychiatric outpatients attending the VA clinic.
Inpatients are demographically and clinically similar to
outpatient participants, who, in turn, are not significantly different
than a sample of outpatient nonparticipants.

This network of rela-

tionships suggests that the sampling procedures were at least grossly
successful in creating a representative sample.

The demographic pro-

file of the combined inpatient and outpatient groups is presented in
Table 10.

The modal veteran is middle aged, self-referred, and not

Type of data available
Self-Consciousness scale

X

Ego Strength and Self-Consciousness
(Inpatients)

X

X

X

Personality type and Self-Consciousness

Figure 5.

X

X

Termination and Self-Consciousness

Total n with each combination of data

Total n for each
phase of the research

Combinations

40

6

230

X

94

X

X

133

X

X

X

116

4

77

6

X

X

X

X
X

24

X

X

29

44

X

Number of subjects participating in each of the component studies.
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Table 10
Demographic and Clinical Management Characteristics
of Research Participants
Category

Percent of sample

Degree of service connected disability (n=132)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
80%
100%

86.4
3.8
.8
2.3
.8
3.0
.8
.8
1.5

Global diagnosis (~=198)
Psychotic
Neurotic
Personality disorder
Organic brain syndrome
Other

33.5
31.6
13.1
1.9
19.9

Rated prognosis
Poor
Guarded
Fair
Good
Excellent

(~=193)

Rated motivation for treatment
Poor
Fair
Good
Excellent

9.3
21.8
34.2
33.7
1.0
(~=194)

Patient reaction to recommended treatment
Negative
No reaction or neutral
Positive

17.5
38.7
38.7
5.2
(~=207)

6.3
19.3
74.4
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Table 10 (Continued)
Category

Percent of sample

Disposition at registration (n=108)
Accepted for:
Individual therapy
Group therapy
Family therapy
Hypnotherapy
Medication only
Referred
Discharged without referral

38.9
20.4
19.4
3.7
7.4
8.3
1.9

Previous therapy at the Mental Hygiene Clinic (~=140)
None, never referred
None, previously referred
All episodes terminated within five sessions
One or more episodes with at least six sessions

68.7
16.4
1.5
13.4

Referral source (n=198)
Admitting Clinic
Inpatient Psychiatry
Inpatient General Medicine
Outpatient General Medicine

61.1
22.7
7.6
8.6

Sessions before beginning therapy
One
Two
Three
Four

(~=90)

52.2
38.9
6.7
2.2

Category
Days between referral and scheduled intake

Average
(~=139)

Days between referral and beginning treatment
Age

(~=134)

(~=87)

16.94 days
32.36 days
40.72 years
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service-connected.

Despite considerable variability in diagnosis,

his prognosis is moderately favorable.

His first contact with the

clinic is approached with a neutral attitude (evident in midscale modes
on motivation) but an acceptant

(74% positive) reaction to the recom-

mendation of individual therapy.
Materials
Copies of the materials used in the research are located in
Appendix A.

Primary among them is the Self-Consciousness scale

(Fenigstein et al., 1975).

All inpatient and outpatient participants

completed this 23-item survey, which was modified for this study.
The changes were minor, consisting of definitions or synonyms of words
found in pretesting to be too sophisticated for some veterans.

Com-

prehension was enhanced because of these parenthetical additions.
None of the original scale was deleted.

Because the changes were clar-

ifications rather than alterations, the scale used is felt to be fully
comparable to the original.

The other standardized test used was

Barron's (1953) Ego Strength scale.

All inpatients completed this

protocol as a free-standing instrument, apart from the rest of the

MMPI.
Two additional forms were especially designed for this study.
The premature termination research necessitated a review of each participants medical record and the clinic appointment calendar.

Data

recorded from this review included such potential covariants of length
of stay as age, degree of service connected disability, referral source

I5I

to the Mental Hygiene Clinic, elapsed time between referral and initial appointment, time between referral and beginning treatment, number of appointments prior to initiating therapy, number of sessions
attended, type of treatment provided, and discharge status.

As

in-

dicated in Figure 5, this data was completed for I33 cases.

Addi-

tional information on variables related to termination and to personality type was collected from intake interviewers with the "Intake
Rating Scale".

This protocol (available in Appendix A) included DSM-II

diagnosis, recommended disposition and modality of treatment, a rating
of the patient's reaction to the suggested treatment, and therapist
ratings of patient prognosis and motivation for treatment.

The in-

take interviewer also used this scale to identify the veteran's
personality type, using the definitions provided in Figure 4.

The

combination of forms administered tapped the therapist, patient, and
the objective/archival information sources.
Reliability of personality type.

Because the third experiment

is so dependent on the adequacy of the personality type ratings, a
special reliability study was done for this item.

Over the course of

five weeks, therapists of the Mental Hygiene Clinic used the typology
to rate each patient attending the Diagnostic Staffing group.
manner II therapists rated 20 patients.

In this

Despite the name, the purpose

of the group is to decide on the clinical management of problematic
cases.

Beyond asking the patient for a brief perspective on the nature

of his problem and the services desired, there is no attempt to solicit
diagnostic information or to make a decision as to probable diagnosis.
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Nor is there discussion between staff as to classification.

The

interviews are short and, since done in a group context, intentionally
superficial.

So judgments of personality type were abstractions based

on manner of relating in the group setting rather than inferences supported by a review of the symptoms.

Lastly, to the extent that the

cases which are difficult to manage are also likely to present diagnostic dilemmas, these cases are unrepresentatively difficult to classify.
As such, the reliability estimate obtained approximates the minimum
range of reliability available with the scale.
Of a possible 220 ratings of the 20 patients by 11 therapists,
159 (or 72.3%) were made.

(See Appendix B for raw scores and tables

presenting the degree of inter-rater agreement for each case and type).
Of the 20 cases, three were modally rated hysterical, four paranoid,
four obsessive, five passive, and four sociopathic.
examined inter-rater consistency in two ways:

The first analysis

as percent agreement

with the modal diagnosis and as percent agreement as to the appropriateness of a given typology for the case.

The latter statistic ex-

presses findings on a relatively less challenging task, since it is
often easier to decide which types are inapplicable than to choose a
specific diagnosis.

However, since the task involved five choices per

patient (decisions as to the suitability of each of the five scales)
a larger pool of observations was available and a more refined estimate
of agreement could be made.

Table 11 presents these statistics as a

summary for the total sample and for each personality type separately.
The average agreement with the modal diagnosis is 68.6%.

But
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Table 11
Agreement between Clinicians
in Classifying Personality Types

Percent agreement
with modal type

Percent agreement about
appropriateness of
each type

Hysterical

65.2

89.3

Paranoid

66.7

89.3

Obsessive

57.7

86.2

Passive

63.6

84.9

Sociopathic

87.9

91.2

Total sample

68.6

88.2

Personality type
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there is considerable variation in the accuracy with which different
types are identified.

Most readily recognized were the sociopathic

patients, about whom clinicians agreed 87.9% of the time.

Sur-

prisingly, the most difficult discrimination was of the obsessive type,
for which there was only 57.7% agreement.

Apparently the features of

this style of relating are less flagrant than others.
ticed them, but considered them secondary.

Clinicians no-

If a secondary rating was

accepted in evaluating percent agreement, and such ratings were permitted in the instructions for the rating scale, then the consistency
in identifying the obsessive style rose to a more robust 73.1%.

When

asked to judge the applicability of each type for a given patient, the
percent agreement rose, as anticipated, into the upper SO's.

Such

findings are comparable to what have been reported in other studies
of diagnostic consistency (Kreitman, 1961; McGuire, 1973; Zubin, 1967).
In view of the criticisms of diagnostic accuracy, this is, however, not
entirely reassuring.
A more rigorous test of reliability is Cohen's Kappa, which
corrects for chance agreement (Cohen, 1960).

The weighted average

Kappa was calculated by combining the reliabilities obtained in pairwise comparisons.

The resulting reliability estimate is .374 for pri-

mary types, and .473 if secondary types are included.
are disappointingly low.

These levels

Although therapists agreed at better than

chance levels, there was little consensus about type.

While the

Diagnostic Staffing group provides considerably less information about
the patient than would be obtained in the intake interview, the low
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reliability will weaken the research.

Effects attributable to per-

sonality types will be diluted because of errors in classification.
Any of the hypothesized effects that do appear, despite the flaws in
the scale, are likely to be quite robust.
Procedures
Experiment 1.

The purposes of the first phase of the research

were to gather normative data on self-consciousness among psychiatric
patients and to assess the validity of the Self-Consciousness scale
(SC) for this population.

For this study, all inpatient and outpatient

records were used, providing a total sample of 230 cases.

For those

veterans arriving at the Mental Hygiene Clinic, the scale was administered before the beginning of therapy.

The typical intake pro-

cess includes a brief screening by a psychiatrist, usually occurring
on the same visit as a diagnostic assessment by clinic therapists.
The patient may be asked to return for a group interview at a staff
meeting, if there is some question as to the appropriate treatment
recommendation, or he may be directly assigned to begin therapy.

A

full range of dynamically-oriented individual, group, and family therapy options are offered by staff and students with degrees in psychology, social work, or nursing.

Veterans are seldom followed for medica-

tion only.
Research materials were administered at the earliest point of
contact possible.

The procedure followed at the outset had the pa-

tient complete the Self-Consciousness scale under the supervision of
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the intake interviewer, which permitted prompt response to the patient's questions and the opportunity for a clinical decision to cancel a patient's participation should the protocol or accompanying consent (see Appendix A) appear disturbing to the subject.

The scale was

administered before or after the intake interview proper at the discretion of the therapist.

In those instances when a patient's psy-

chiatric screening occurred on a different day than the intake interview, the scale was handed out by the receptionist and completed while
the patient waited for the psychiatrist.

After the first month of

data collection it became clear that participation in the research was
seldom stressful to the veteran but often an imposition on the therapist.

The procedure was altered so that the scale was always self-

administered.

The research documents were handed out by the recep-

tionist on the patient's arrival and completed in the waiting room
prior to the intake interview.

Completed forms were given to the

therapist or to the receptionist.
During the course of this study, patients filled out the SC
scale under any of three conditions:

before the session, at the begin-

ning of the intake session, or at the end of the interview.

An item

on the Intake Rating Scale identified the patient in terms of which
procedure was followed.

For the 102 outpatients for whom data was

available on this variable, there were no significant differences in
total SC or on any subscale as a function of the time the questionnaire was completed.

Similarly, the variation over the 10 months of

the data collection was neither consistent nor significant.
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The procedure differed for inpatients.

Their greater acces-

sibility permitted group testing under the supervision of the researcher.

The day prior to the research session, head nurses from

each of the four inpatient units were asked to identify all patients
who were likely to be discharged in the coming week, who would have
referrals for outpatient therapy at the Mental Hygiene Clinic, and
whose mental status was sufficiently clear that they could tolerate
participation in the study.

Each identified patient was subsequently

asked to participate by the researcher, who assembled the subjects in
a quiet room off the unit and administered the measures.
groups ranged in size from one to eight veterans.

Testing

Introductory com-

ments were minimized so that the principal explanation of the study
was found in the consent form, which was identical to the one used
with outpatient subjects.

During testing, the researcher provided

minimal responses to patient's questions or concerns and remained
otherwise occupied with reading.
structure was provided.

For occassional subjects, greater

In three instances the items were read and

responses recorded by the experimenter.

In addition to the Self-Con-

sciousness scale, inpatients were also administered the Barron Ego
Strength scale.

The scales were counterbalanced in order of presenta-

tion to control for order effects.
The order of presentation did effect SC scores.

Table 12 pre-

sents subscale means as a function of order of presentation and shows
a significant impact on Private Self-Consciousness.

Apparently, con-

vening the group and presenting instructions elicited more attentiveness

Table 12
Self-Consciousness Scale Scores
when Administered Before or After the Ego Strength Scale
Mean self-consciousness
Order of presentation

N

Private

Public

Social Anxiety

Total

Self-Consciousness
Scale first

47

25.55*

19.81

11.56

56.98

Self-Consciousness
Scale second

47

22.83*

19.95

12.04

55.26

*.E. < . OS, when means are compared.
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to internal states than did the items from the ES scale.

However, the

impact on the total score was minor and nonsignificant.

It is not felt

to invalidate comparisons with the outpatient group or other samples.
Means, variances, and subscale correlations were calculated
for the outpatient and inpatient samples separately.
reexamined the internal structure of the scale.

A factor analysis

For inpatients addi-

tional correlations were obtained to analyze the relationship of Ego
Strength to the Self-Consciousness scale and its subscales.
Experiment 2.

Self-consciousness was evaluated as a con-

tributer to premature termination from therapy.

Again, the outpatient

sample was supplemented by that portion of the inpatient sample who
did, in fact, have post-discharge intakes at the Mental Hygiene Clinic.
Scores on the Self-Consciousness scales were obtained using the procedure described in Experiment 1.

In addition, the Intake Rating Scale

was obtained from the diagnostic interviewer for 116 of the veterans
attending an intake session.

If the therapist indicated that the case

disposition was a referral for treatment elsewhere, the subject was
excluded from this phase of the research.

At the time of the archival

review, 133 cases were examined and a determination was made as to the
number of subsequent clinical appointments kept by each participant.
Those who attended six or more sessions were considered to be continuers.

Terminators were defined as those dropping out of treatment

unilaterally or dropped from the clinic rolls for consecutive missed
appointments prior to the sixth session.
A subcategory of the terminators included those failing to
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return after intake or staffing and those inpatients failing to attend
even the scheduled intake.

This subsample, occasionally identified as

'decliners' or 'refusers' in the literature, was compared to other dropouts in terms of self-consciousness levels.

While no differences were

expected, based on the dominant findings in published reports, a planned
comparison evaluated the significance of any differences between these
subgroups.

2
A series of X analyses and ANOVAs were completed to eval-

uate the role of self-consciousness in the unilateral termination of
psychotherapy.
Self-consciousness is not the only variable likely related to
perseverance in treatment.

Variables drawn from the archival review

and from the Intake Rating Scale were also evaluated as alternative
explanations of the differences between decliners, other terminators,
and continuers.
analysis.

With SC scores, they were included in a discriminant

This procedure makes it possible to evaluate the relative

importance of self-consciousness as a determinant of premature termination.
Experiment 3.

The third phase of this research examines self-

consciousness as a function of personality type.

In this study the

data was obtained for 116 outpatient subjects and included their SC
scores and the clinician's rating of diagnosis and personality types
on the Intake Rating Scale.

A series of planned comparisons permitted

evaluation of hypothesized profile differences within and across personality types.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results from each experiment will be presented and briefly
discussed in the order outlined in the Methods.

This section will

conclude with a more general discussion of the implications of this
research for self-awareness theory and for the clinical handling of
self-consciousness.
Self-Consciousness Levels of Psychiatric Patients
Comparison of patient groups.

The means, standard deviations,

and subscale intercorrelations of the Self-Consciousness scale (SC)
were calculated for the patient samples separately, and are presented
in Tables 13 through 15, respectively.

A series of ANOVAs examined

the significance of the differences between means.

Because the "Other

Outpatient" sample - those not otherwise evaluated beyond completing
the SC questionnaire - are neither hypothetically nor empirically discrepant from the remaining outpatients, they are incorporated into one
group for the purposes of the following inter-sample comparisons.
Private Self-Consciousness (PR-SC), K(2,226)=4.544,
the total SC scores, K(2,226)=3.945,
cantly.

~<

~(

.05, and for

.05, the groups varied signifi-

For Public Self-Consciousness (PU-SC), K(2,226)=2.025,

and for Social Anxiety (SA-SC), K(2,226)=2.165,
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For

~=.117,

~=.134,

there is a non-

Table 13
Mean Self-Consciousness Scale Scores for Patient Groups
Mean self-consciousness
Groups

N

Private

Public

Social anxiety

Total

Inpatients

94

24.191

19.883

11.798

56.117

Outpatients

113

24.053

18.920

12.478

55.690

Screenings

11

30.000

21.545

15.545

67.091

Other outpatients

12

24.000

18.833

11.917

54.750

230

24.391

19.435

12.317

56.361

All patients

Table 14
Standard Deviations of Self-Consciousness Scale Scores for Patient Groups
Self-consciousness scale standard deviations
Groups

N

Private

Public

Social anxiety

Inpatients

94

6.569

4.817

6.035

12.793

Outpatients

113

6.138

5.304

5.177

12.847

Screenings

11

7.707

6.962

7. 725

20.384

Other outpatients

12

4.991

4.428

5.791

11.331

230

6.429

5.166

5. 723

13.320

All patients

Total

Table 15
Intercorrelations of Self-Consciousness Subscale Scores for Patient Groups
Self-consciousness subscale correlations
Private and
public

Private and
social anxiety

Public and
social anxiety

Groups

N

Inpatients

94

.458**

.168

.343**

Outpatients

113

.415**

.263*

.524**

Screenings

11

• 718*

.759*

.749 *

Other outpatients

12

• 728*

.025

.326

230

.469**

.264**

.455**

All patients
*p <.01
**E.< .001
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significant but similar pattern in which the higher scores of those
seen for psychiatric screening stand out against the essentially similar scores of the inpatient and outpatient samples.
The interpretation of these differences rests on an appreciation of the hospital procedures.

Inpatients were evaluated toward the

end of their residence, and outpatients completed the self-rating an
average of 14.3 days after being referred for treatment.

In contrast,

screenings are done on two weekday mornings when Mental Hygiene Clinic
psychiatrists evaluate veterans applying for treatment at the Admitting
Clinic, the central intake unit for the Medical Center.

Veterans com-

pleting the questionnaire prior to screening are making their first
contact with the system.

They are likely in crisis, at the point of

maximum discomfort which precipates seeking help.

But this is not a

total explanation, as it is the private self-awareness rather than the
anxiety subscale which is the most elevated relative to comparison
groups.

Additionally, the self-report device is used as an instrument

to further the patients project of getting prompt treatment.

This is

not the same as faking bad--the scores are more elevated but in the
same direction as is typical.

But the high SC scores do express a

self-preoccupation and heightened attentiveness to internal states
preparatory to the patient's first attempt to explain his condition
to an expert.

What is important in understanding the scale, regardless

of whether crisis or the necessity of self-presentation is invoked in
explaining the elevated SC scores of screening patients, is that it
appears to measure the patients' states in addition to enduring
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dispositions.
It might be countered that those seen for screening are different dispositionally from other patients coming to the Mental Hygiene
Clinic.

But the available data counters that view.

the clinic via Admitting are common (16.9%
sample).

Patients coming to

of the current outpatient

It is not plausible to assume that those seeking treatment

on the two days when screening takes place at the clinic are different
from those arriving at admitting on the remaining days.

When those

seen first at screening are compared with others referred from the
Admitting Clinic, there are no significant differences in age, diagnosis, personality type, prognosis, motivation, distance traveled to
the clinic, or history of prior treatment at the Mental Hygiene Clinic.
While a greater proportion of those seen for screening have service
connected disabilities (28.6% versus 5.0%), the difference is not
2
statistically significant, X (1)=1.763, £> .10.

More to the point,

when those originally seen for screening complete the SC questionnaire
at the time of their intake interview they do not differ from other
Admitting Clinic referrals in total or subscale scores.

It is not

dispositional differences that account for the significant elevation
of the scores from screening patients.

With the obvious rival inter-

pretations rejected, the role of situational factors is more persuasive
as an interpretation.

The finding for screening patients is reinferred

by the previously discussed effects of test order for inpatients.

At

least for psychiatric patients, the Self-Consciousness scale seems to
be sensitive to transient variations in self-focused attention as well
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as to the intended characterologically based self-awareness.
Self-Consciousness scale scores of patients compared with normative samples.

Table 16 allows comparison of the SC scores for the

combined groups in the present study with those obtained in previous
research.

The first hypothesis was that self-consciousness would be a

more unitary dimension for patients than for undergraduates.

This

would be evident in higher intercorrelations among subscales.

The

data supports such a conclusion.

Where normative samples find signifi-

cant correlations between PR-SC and PU-SC, and occasionally between
PU-SC and SA-SC, the present sample finds all three coefficients of
sufficient magnitude to be statistically significant.

Psychiatric

patients tend, more than normals, to link self-focused attention and
anxiety.

However, this is a matter of degree.

The common variance

ranges between 6.9% (for PR-SC and SA-SC) and 22.0% (for PR-SC and
PU-SC).

The scales remain substantially independent.

Practically,

then, introspection may be encouraged during the course of therapy
without automatically triggering disruptive anxiety.
is

mediated by the degree of crisis.

This observation

As Table 15 shows clearly,

intercorrelations are highest for those seen for screening.
SC and SA-SC have a common variance in excess of 57.6%.
tients, this figure drops to 2.8%.

Here PR-

For inpa-

Turner's (Note 2) data also shows

pathological samples with intercorrelation elevated only modestly above
the levels found in college students.

In conclusion, patients show a

great deal of variation and yet, on the whole, respond to self-focused
attention in a more unitary manner than has been found for normal sub-

Table 16
q~lf-Consciousn~ss

Scale Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrel&tions for Patients and Normals
Self-Consciousness scale
Heans

Ref~rence

Stanclartl Dev:J.atlons

Intercorrelations

and

Private
anti
social
anxiety

Public
and
social
anxiety

.47**

.26**

.45 '~*

P~:ivate

population
studied
Private PubHc
Present res.-arch,
LjO pc>t f.ents

Social
anxiety

Total

Private Public

Social
anxiety Total

and
public

21,. 39

19.4]

12.32

56.36

6.43

5.17

5.72

24.0

18.8

13.6

56.4

5.3

4.5

5.5

.39**

.lJ

.10

22.1

18.5

13.3

53.9

7.4

6.7

4.9

.46**

.t7

.7.5

13.32

-~--------

Turner.
!,

(Note 2).

7 neurollcs

~I
·-·---

psychot icR

----·- · - - - - -

Fe>n:lgste.~n,

·---- ---------

Scheier.

& tluss (1975),

25.9

18.9

12.5

57.3

5.0

4.0

4.1

9.2

179 nm.le und~rgraduates
152 undergraduates
Carver & Glass (1976), 25.4
iO'j tr;>J.c under-

19.5

ll.S

56.5

h.7

4.2

3.8

8.0

.26**

-.06

.33**

-.05

-.02

grathiates

Turner. Scheier,
C;,rver, & Ickes
0978),
1395

. 31 **

.11• **

·----------*p (.05

**.r

.21**

undergra()u~tes

<.ot

1-'

0\

00
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jects.
Contrary to expectation, however, patients do not show greater
self-consciousness or self-evaluative anxiety than previous normal
samples.

Hypothesis 2 stated the SA-SC scores would be higher and SC

total scores would vary significantly from those previously reported.
Neither expectation is supported by the data gathered.

Subscale and

total scores are remarkably consistent with previously obtained results from normal subjects.

This conclusion is reinforced, in that

it replicates Turner's finding that patients generate unremarkable
scores.

It is further supported by a more microscopic analysis which

reveals no significant variance, !(3,114)=1.157, £> .30, among any of
the diagnostic groupings (psychotics, neurotics, personality disorders,
or others).

If prognosis is used as an index of severity of illness,

then the absense of any relationship with self-consciousness, !(4,103)
=.103,

~>

.90, further suggests that self-consciousness levels do not

vary as a function of intensity of psychopathology.

Theories that sug-

gest that psychopathology or behavior in therapy can be broadly explained in terms of either excesses of deficits in the skills of selfmonitoring receive no support from this research.
Again, this observation should not be overgeneralized.

Pa-

tients are a diverse group, and level of self-focused attention may be
a valid issue in individual cases, though not in general.

Consistent

with Hypothesis 3, this data does show greater variability in subscale
and total SC scores than has been reported for normal samples.

Table

14 shows that the standard deviations are higher than those obtained
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previously.

In comparison with the samples from Fenigstein et al.

(1975) and Carver and Glass (1976), tests for homogeneity of variance
for the total SC and subscale scores are always significant beyond
~

=.01.

The fact that Turner also observed a comparably increased

level of variance, lends further support to the conclusion that differences observed are more than error of estimate.

(Tests of homo-

geneity of variance show nonsignificant differences between the current sample and those surveyed by Turner, with the exception of PR-SC
for neurotics and PU-SC for psychotics, both different at the .05
level.)

Patients are more variable than normal college students,

whether because of greater heterogeneity in age and life position or
as a function of their psychopathology.

Among the implications of this

conclusion is a methodological one, it will be more difficult to obtain
statistically reliable differences among means when comparing patient
groups.

For the practice of psychotherapy, the implication is that

each case must be assessed individually to determine whether selfconsciousness contributes to the clinical picture.

While it does not

do so for the patient population generally, in individual cases selfconsciousness and its resulting anxiety may require special attention
and special handling during the course of treatment.
To explore the basis of this greater variability among patients, the effect on SC scores of a variety of covariates was examined.
As previously mentioned, neither global diagnosis nor prognosis contributed to level of SC.

Whether or not the veteran has a service connected

disability because of his illness, perhaps another indirect measure of
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the degree of pathology, is unrelated, F(1,130)=1.532,
is minimally correlated,

~(133)=-.08, ~>

.30.

~>

.20.

Age

Other covariates more

pertinent to clinic treatment of the veteran will be discussed in the
section of predicting premature termination, but it is clear that none
of these variables which describe characteristics of the subject contribute appreciably to the level or variability of self-consciousness.
In the absense of published materials setting the norms for
psychopathological groups, the first goal of this research has been to
evaluate hypotheses predicting performance of the SC scale among patients.

Contrary to expectations, the group as a whole was very sim-

ilar to normal samples in total and subscale scores.

Even the social

anxiety scale, the measure of the degree to which scrutiny sets off
disruptive self-evaluation, was not significantly different for patients than normals.

In line with expectations, however, SC scores

showed greater variability for the current sample, suggesting that
self-consciousness may be of importance in individual cases.

This is

particularly relevant in light of the confirmation of the hypothesis
that SC subscales would be more highly intercorrelated than previously
reported.

The patient's response to self-directed attention shows less

independence between self-monitoring and anxiety than has been reported for normals.

Introspection or observation by another may lead

reflexively to self-evaluation.
Factor structure of the Self-Consciousness scale.

Because

the SC scale is being applied to a new population, it is appropriate
to reexamine the internal structure of the scale.

To this end, an
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intercorrelation matrix was generated and a factor analysis completed.
The average item correlates with the unadjusted total score between
.4 and .6.

All are positively related, as expected.

However, four of

the 23 items have a correlation coefficient value less than .25.
items are numbers 3, 9, 12, and 22 (see Appendix A).

The first three

of these are the items scored in a reverse direction (e.g., 3:
erally I'm not very aware of myself.").

These

"Gen-

The attempt to create a scale

balanced for the acquiescence response set has failed for this sample.
Unlike the normative sample, in which no item was endorsed in one
direction by more than 85% of the group, three items were highly skewed.
Items 6 (13.5%), 13 (14.4%), and 21 (8.3%) were almost never rejected
(as being either "extremely unlike" or "somewhat unlike me") by patients.

While the proportion of variance attributable to the response

set is uncertain, it clearly constitutes a threat to the capacity to
make sensitive distinctions and represents a major flaw in the scale.
Future research should assess the degree to which the SC scale is confounded with acquiescence.
A principal factor analysis was done, with Kaiser normalization and varimax rotation, using the standard SPSS algorhythm (Nie,
Hull, Jenkins, Skinbrenner, & Bent, 1975).

The communality was re-

stricted on some items, most notably on numbers 2 and 17, from the PUSC subscale.

Nevertheless, seven factors were selected which had

eigenvalues greater than one and which cumulatively accounted for
58.1% of the variance.

Of these, the two most important accounted for

31.7% of the variance initially and retained eigenvalues in excess of
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one after iteration.

While the entire seven factor matrix is pre-

sented in Appendix C, the following comments will concentrate on the
two most important, which are duplicated in Table 17.
The factor structure obtained from patients fails to replicate
that reported by Fenigstein et al. (1975).

The expected three factors,

corresponding to the subscales, are not evident.

The SA-SC subscale

is essentially reincarnated, in more robust form, as Factor I.
five most highly loaded items are from SA-SC.

The

The only subscale item

missing is 12, one of the items scored in the negative direction.

Of

lesser importance, but still significantly correlated at the .001 level
is one item from PR-SC and two from PU-SC.

With operative words such

as "worry" and "concerned", they reinforce the interpretation of Factor
I as tapping a dimension related to anxiety and a disruptive fear of
judgment.

Although Factor II pulls two items from SA-SC and four from

PU-SC, PR-SC is the most frequently (five items) and most importantly
represented subscale.

The PR-SC items included emphasize congitive

rather than affective self-awareness.

Factor II may be described as

a generalized introspective style in combination with a concern about
personal motives and impact on others.

The elements of anxiety are

subdued, as are most references to emotionality.

The factor emphasizes

intellectualization and cognitive controls.
The PR-SC and PU-SC subscales, respectively, accounting for the
greatest variance in previous reports, collapse into a secondary factor
for this sample.

They appear as essentially independent dimensions

only among the minor factors.

In Factor III, five of seven items

Table 17
Communalities and Factor Matrix for the Self-Cansciousness Scale

ltem loadings
Suuscale

Variable

Communality

Factor

Factor 2

-·--------------------------------------

PR-SC
Si\-SC

f 'm always tryir,g to figure myself out
I'm concerned about my styl'! of doing things
Generally I'm not very aware of myself
lt takes me ti•ne to overcome my shyness in new situations
1 reflect (or think carefully) about myself -'1 lot
I'm concerned about the way I present myself (cr come across to others)
I'm often the subject: {or center) of my own fantasies
I have trouble working when someone ls watching me
I never scrutinize myself (ol: examine or look at my8elf closely)
r ~;et cmharrasse.l very ensi!.y
1'111 self-conscl.ous about the way T look
l don't find lt hnrd to talk to strange..--s
1 'm generally attentive to (or aware of) my inner feelJ.ngs
I. usually worry about making a good impressicr.
I'm constantly examJninr, my motives (or looking at my reasons for acting as I do)
I feel anxious when I speak in front of a grou~
One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror
1 sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself
I '•• con.:erned about what other p?.ot'le t!>ink of me
I'm alert to changes in MY mood
I'm usually awnre of my appearan<:e
r 'm aware of the way my mind works ~hen I work through a problem
Large groups mnke me nerv0us

l~_t_c.

The Self-Consciousness subscales are Abbrevinted PR-SC for private, PU-SC for public, and SA-SC for social anxiety.

PR-SC
PU-SC
PR--:JC
SA-SS
f'R-SC~

PU-·SC

I'R-·3C

SJ\-SC
I'R-SC
SI\-SC
l'li-·SC

Si\-SC
PP.<'C
Pl!-SC
l'R-<>C

SJ\-SC

ru-se
I'R-SC

l'U-SC

f"{-sr
PU-SC

*~" .001

.627
.192

'125
• 171

.406

-.113

.852
.438
. 284
• 334
.464
.290
·'•88
.528
.259
.321
.538
.451

.218
• 11•1
.413
.429
.400
.343
• 35'•
.63)

.643*
.186

.112
.268*
.606*
.060
.526*
• I 53
.100
.104
.303*
. 151
.391*
.139
. 1.85
.3il*
.025
-.099
-.095
.7Jv*

• 709*
.353*

-.027
• 234 *
. )45*
.ld(l*
• 275*
• 16'•
.OWJ

.n1*
. 121
.027
• 11, l
. 325*
• 591*
. 182
.lSR
.25)*
. J38*
• O!,z

-.026
• Ol, t
. 116
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loading, and the most highly correlated items among
SC.

them~are

from PU-

Likewise, Factor IV is dominated by a single subscale, in this

case Private Self-Consciousness.

But these are of lesser importance.

The important finding of this analysis is that SA-SC emerges essentially
intact as the dominant feature of self-consciousness among a psychopathological population.

The importance of this subscale is to be

highlighted throughout this research.

Moreover, its emergence as the

central factor underscores the difference between patients and students:

anxiety is the central feature of self-consciousness for those

seeking psychotherapy.
Self-consciousness and ego strength.

For the 94 inpatients

completing the Ego Strength Scale (ES), the mean was 39.71 and the
standard deviation 7.91.

Table 18 shows the correlation of ES with

the subscale and total scores from the Self-Consciousness scale.
The generalizability of previous findings about the SC scale would be
enhanced if SC was minimally related to degree of psychopathology.
If the scale performed the same with schizophrenics as with normal
students, one could be more confident in predicting avoidance of added
stimuli to self-scrutiny in the clinical population.

But, as already

encountered with the factor analysis, it is clear that the SC scale is
not treated in the same manner by patients as by normals.
cant correlations with ES confirm this finding.

The signifi-

Those who are most

severely disturbed (low ES) are some 17 points higher in self-consciousness than those with the mildest pathology.

Alternatively, those with

the highest SC scores admit to greater anxiety and symptomatology.
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Table 18
Correlations for the Ego Strength Scale
with the Self-Consciousness Scale
Self-consciousness scales
Private

Public

Social anxiety

Total

Correlation

-.109

-.169

-.569

-.390

Probability

.149

.052

.001

.001

Note.

N=94.
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Although each variable retains considerable independence from the
other, with a common variance of 15.2%, the ES is a major contributor
to total self-consciousness.

This is contrary to the expectation ex-

pressed in Hypothesis 4.
Because the two scales are more related than expected overall,
the subscales also are correlated with ES in a manner other than
hypothesized.

Private self-consciousness was expected to have a direct

relationship with ES, on the assumption that it embodied the cognitive
skills of introspection that would be more intact in the less disturbed
patient.
ship.

Instead, Table 18 shows a nonsignificant, inverse relation-

Public self-consciousness, for which no correlation was pre-

dicted, proves to be negatively correlated to a marginally significant
degree.

It is apparent that the generalized introspective style

(Factor II, above) is, if anything, more typical of the most pathological rather than the most intact elements of this sample.

The

social anxiety subscale relates to ES in the direction hypothesized,
but to a much greater degree than anticipated.

Almost a third of the

variance of SA-SC (32.4%) can be traced to the psychopathology dimension captured in the ES scale.

While PR and PU-SC may share minimal

linear relationship with ES, it is clear that social anxiety--which
proves to be the central dimension of self-consciousness for patients-takes on different meaning and increasing importance as the level of
ES drops.

Table 19 summarizes the intercorrelation of SC subscales at

four different levels of ES.

It shows that the association of anxiety

and public self-consciousness increases as ego resilience decreases.

Table 19
Intercorrelations of the Self-Consciousness Subscales for Patients
at Different Levels on the Ego Strength Scale
Intercorrelations of self-consciousness subscales
Level of the Ego Strength Scale

N

More than one SD below the mean

13

0

Less than one SD below the mean

28

.170

Less than one SD above the mean

36

More than one SD above the mean

17

*.E. <. 05
**.E.< .01

Private with
public
726**

Private with
social anxiety
.359

Public with
social anxiety
.695**

-.049

.363*

.479**

.078

.284*

.651**

.319

.188

179
Other relationships are less clear.

But, like those seen for screen-

ings, the most disturbed of the participants show the least independence among the component subscales.

Anxiety pervades self-awareness.

To summarize the findings up to this point:
1)

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the Self-Consciousness sub-

scales are less distinct and independent for psychopathological samples
than for normal students.

This is particularly true for those pa-

tients--those attending screening appointments in this study--who are
exposed to situations which serve as special stimuli to self-awareness.
2)

Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the mean levels of self-con-

sciousness are quite consistent between therapy patients and normals.
Even the anxiety scale scores were not elevated in this sample.

How-

ever, the SA-SC subscale does take on special importance in a clinical
population since it lies at the core of the dominant factor of the
SC scale.

The PR-SC and PU-SC subscales are neither so important nor

so independent as reported for the normative sample.
3)

Patients are moderately more variable in their SC scores

than are normals, as stated in Hypothesis 3.

For this reason, self-

consciousness levels of an individual patient may comprise an important treatment issue, even though patients as a group show selfconsciousness levels no greater or lower than normals.
4)
lated.

Contrary to Hypothesis 4, ES and SC are importantly re-

Self-consciousness takes on a different meaning for subgroups

within the patient population.

Not only is SA-SC an increasingly

important dimension, but self-evaluation levels increase--as does
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general self-consciousness--among the more seriously disturbed.
Hypothesis 5 is supported in part:
and inversely related.

SA-SC and ES are significantly

Contrary to expectation, and consistent with

its diminished role among patients, PR-SC is neither positively nor
significantly correlated with the Ego Strength Scale.
Self-Consciousness and Premature Termination from Psychotherapy
A central hypothesis of this dissertation is that self-consciousness levels can be used to predict premature termination from
psychotherapy.

This expectation is derived by analogy from self-

awareness theory, where research shows subjects experiencing cognitive
dissonance avoid stimuli to objective self-awareness.

It is also

based on an analysis of causes of premature termination, which concluded
that an absense of self-monitoring skills (i.e., insufficient selfconsciousness) leads to dropping out because of a lack of motivation,
while excessive anxiety and self-consciousness results from an insufficiently structured therapeutic relationship and also results in
unilateral and early termination.

Thus, an inverted U relationship

was expected between self-consciousness (SC) and the percentage of
patients dropping out of psychotherapy (Broen & Storms, 1961; Wine,
1971).

The following discussion will present data by which to evaluate

the central hypothesis.
The following section will be structured in four separate, but
related sections.

First will be a discussion of the direct relationship

of SC scores to the number of sessions attended.

Second will be an
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examination of potential indirect effects in which other variables
relating to length of stay are examined for their association with
self-consciousness.

Third, a discriminant analysis will assess the

importance of SC scores relative to other variables in the prediction
of premature termination.

Fourth, data on other variables suggested

in the literature as being related to perseverance in treatment will
be reviewed.
Self-consciousness and continuation in treatment.

Clinic rec-

ords of subjects completing the SC scale were reviewed and the number
of sessions recorded.

All veterans who attended six or more sessions

were defined as continuers.

Those who never began treatment comprised

another comparison group, referred to in this report as treatment
decliners.

Table 20 presents the mean levels of SC for patients falling

into the respective groups by length of stay.

Since the literature is

inconsistent in discriminating decliners from terminators, the groups
are presented separately and combined.

Because the number of termina-

tors is rather small, the data is pooled as well as presented on a session by session basis.

Yet, in none of these groupings is there any

deviation of note from the grand mean.
21) are all nonsignificant.

The relevant ANOVAs (see Table

Even when SC scores are examined in terms

of the sample specific factor structure, there is no evidence of relationship with perseverance in treatment; Factor 1:
.80, Factor 2:

!(2,137)=.045, £> .90.

The absense of differences in

means suggests the absense of gross differences.
responds to the hypothesis.

!(2,137)=.146, £>

But it only partially

The prediction was that terminators would

Table 20
Self-Consciousness Levels of Decliners, Terminators, and Continuers

Mean self-consciousness scores
Group

Sessions

Decliners

0

53

24.54

Terminators

1

9

2

Terminators
Decliners and
terminators
Continuers

Private

Social anxiety

Total

19.27

12.36

56.30

22.55

20.33

12.78

55.66

3

24.00

22.00

13.00

59.00

3

6

30.00

21.83

13.83

65.66

4

2

20.50

17.50

12.50

50.50

5

1

22.00

9.00

12.00

43.00

1,2,3,4,5

21

24.66

20.19

13.05

57.90

0-5

74

24.58

19.53

12.55

56.75

6 or more

59

24.67

19.51

12.39

57.27

N

Public

1-'

00
N

Table 21
ANOVAs for Self-Consciousness Levels of Decliners, Terminators, and Continuers

! (and associated z) for Self-Consciousness Scale scores
Contrasts

df

0,1,2,3,4,5,6+

6,126

1.046(.399)a

1.239(.291)

.076(.998)

.840(.542)

1,2,3,4,5,6+

5,74

1.314(.267)

1. J88 (. 239)

• 078 (. 995)

.952(.453)

0-5 vs. 6+

1,131

.008 (. 931)

.000(.983)

.030(.863)

.055(.814)

0 vs. 1-5 vs. 6+

2,130

.006(.994)

.263(.769)

.134 (. 87 5)

.150(.861)

1-5 vs. 6+

1,81

.008 (. 929)

.087(.769)

.002(.960)

.017(.898)

Private

aThe format of all entries is I(~).

Public

Social anxiety

Total
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include veterans with extremely low as well as extremely high SC
scores.

These subgroups could well cancel one another out in a statis-

tic which pools their means.
A Chi-square analysis provides the appropriate test of the
distribution of terminators across levels of SC.

Each SC score was

recoded into intervals of one standard deviation.

The expectation,

then, is that terminators would be overrepresented in the extreme intervals.

In Table 22, a summary of the distribution on total SC, it

is apparent that those terminating after three sessions roughly conform
to the hypothesis.
time do.

However, none of those staying other lengths of

There is no statistically significant difference between

decliners, terminators, and continuers in distribution across SC,
2
X (18)=16.65, £>.SO.

Nor are differences significant when length of

stay is plotted against distribution on PR-SC,

x2 (18)=27.60,

2
2
PU-SC, X (18)=22.64, £>.20, or SA-SC, X (18)=15.09, £>.60.

p > .05,
Termina-

tors are not different than continuers or decliners in their distribution on SC scores.

When decliners are excluded, the relationship be-

tween SC and perseverance in treatment still fails to approach significance.
tion.

Moreover, none of the groups varies much from a normal distribuTerminators have no more extreme scorers and continuers are not

concentrated near the mean.

Figure 6 presents the percentage of people

remaining in treatment at each level of total SC.
of the hypothesized inverted U relationship.

There is no evidence

Quite clearly there is no

direct association between the degree of self-consciousness and perseverance in treatment.

Hypotheses 1 through 4 are not supported.

Table 22
Total Self-C<msciousness Score Intervals by Length of Stay
----·---------------·-----~

Number of sessions attended
Dec liners
Total score on the
~elf-Consciousness

Terminators

Continuers

·--·---

scale

0

2

r,

3

5

6 o1.· more

-----

rcrcent in
each interval

--------

Hore than one SD
below the mean

15.8%

10.0%

0.0%

28.6%

0.0%

50.0%

11.9%

14.3

Lc>io!S thau one SD
below the mean

33.37.

40.0%

)3.37.

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

39.0%

35.0

Less than one SD
above the mean

36.8%

qQ.O%

66.7%

28.6%

0.0%

50.07.

33.9%

35.7

Hore than rme SD
abovf~~ the mean

14. o~;

10.0:'(

0.0%

42.n.

0.0%

0.0%

15.3%

i 5.0

57

10

3

7

z

2

Total N
Note.

Percents arc tabulated vertically, that is, within session.

59

..
0

1-lI
I I

0

!

i

w
0

'

~ g ---t---1---1---+!

-~

71.1\ - /Woraqc
Percent
Continuing

L_

g
...

.;J

0:::0
0 11)

v

to

"c:o
'1)11'

....

.j.)

<U

p.

0

"-'"l'

0

-1-'

.:;

., p,

1!0

u

<II
p.

0

"'
0

·'

o·---J
Intcrv>~l

47

52

57

62

67

l

3

4

8

77

82

87

92

9"/

202

107

10

5

18

7

7

4

l

tvteans

Cases per
Interval 1

1.4

Percent Contir,uc.r!3 Among Patients in St1ccessive IntcrvnJ.s on Total-SC.
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Indirect effects of Self-Consciousness scores on premature termination.

Even in the absense of a direct effect, SC scores may in-

fluence continuation in therapy by virtue of their common association
with other variables.

Clinic records and the Intake Rating Scale pro-

vided information on a number of potential covariants of length of
stay.

However, none of these variables successfully discriminated con-

tinuers from terminators.
included:

Client variables not significantly related

age, !_(2,131)=1.191, .e_> .30; presence of disability,

=.22, E.> .80; and rated prognosis,

x 2 (8)=12.99, E.> .10.

x2 (2)

Source of

referral was used as an index of the presenting problem since it refleets the patients attempt to identify the nature of his problem as
physical or psychological.

2
It was unrelated, X (16)=14.37,

.E_>

.50.

Prior perseverance in treatment at the clinic was employed as a rough
measure of the extent to which the patient was therapy-wise, that is,
skilled in the execution of the patient's role.
2

criminate, X (6)=10.13, .E.> .10.

It failed to dis-

One variable, motivation for treat-

ment, did discriminate those who failed to begin therapy,
E.~

• 05.

x2 (6)=15.05,

Those rated as poorly motivated dropped out without a single

session (72.2% versus 26.4% for the sample as a whole) while those
identified as excellently motivated usually continued for at least six
sessions (66.7% compared to 52.9% for the entire sample).

But, even

motivation failed to discriminate between terminators and continuers,
2
X (3) = 1. 4 7 , E. ). • 50 •

Therapists do play a role in length of treatment.

A comparison

of the seven therapists treating more than five research subjects each
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x2 (6)=

(59 patients in all) showed a significant therapist effect,
13.48,

~ ~.05.

But this could not be attributed to student or staff

2
status, x (2)=.10,

~}.90;

clinical experience,

2
discipline, x (3)=2.10,

x2 (1)=.001,

~).50;

years of

p > .90; or even to the patients reac2

tion to their recommendations for treatment, X (4)=.76,

~}.90.

Con-

sistency in treatment was unrelated, whether measured as the same ther2
apist throughout treatment, x (1)=1.60,

pist who conducted the intake interview,

~>.20, or as the same thera-

x2 (1)=1.28, ~>

.20.

I t made

no difference whether or not the actual treatment provided matched that
2

initially recommended by the therapist, X (2)=2. 62, .E_) .10, or even
2
what modality of treatment was involved, x (6)=3.35, .E_).70.

Even the

number of visits to the clinic prior to the inception of treatment
failed to discriminate continuers, terminators, and those who failed
to ever begin treatment,

x2 (4)=1.52,

E._>

It will be recalled that

.80.

inpatients and outpatients varied in time between referral and either
intake or beginning of treatment.

Yet, these variables also were not

demonstrably related to length of stay:
E._)

for intake, f(l,80)=.000,

.90, and for time before beginning therapy, f(1,80)=.381, ~>.50.

The practical consideration of distance of the clinic from the patient's
residence proved nonsignificant, f(1,80)=.328,

E._}

.50.

None of the readily available predictors of patient, therapist,
or contextual factors in premature termination succeeded in discriminating between groups in a meaningful way.

The differences in percent-

age retained among different therapists indicates that there is some
variance to be accounted for.

It remains a challenge for more finely
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focused research.

For the purposes of this project, it is sufficient

to note that it is futile to look for an indirect path by which SC
scores effect length of treatment when a direct association cannot be
found between the target and the many other variables hypothetically
associated with it.

For the record, Table 23 reports the association

of self-consciousness to the purported covariates of perseverance in
therapy.
Discriminant analyses.

A discriminant analysis optimizes what-

ever power each of a set of variables has to distinguish criterion
groups.

Despite the absense of significant univariate relationships,

the following set of variables was used to generate discriminant functions:

days between referral and intake appointment (intake); rated

prognosis; rated motivation; the patient's reactions to the recommended
treatment, on a scale from 1 (negative) to 3 (positive); patient age;
degree of disability; distance of residence from the clinic; and PRSC, PU-SC, SA-SC, SA-SC or, in a separate analysis, total SC.
When the analysis included those declining treatment, this
group was the one most effectively distinguished.

Using capacity to

minimize Wilk's Lambda (and hence to maximize the MANOVA between
groups) as inclusion criterion, prognosis, distance, intake, and SA-SC
were selected.

Of the two discriminant functions the larger accounts

for 95.41% of the explained variance, and separates decliners from
terminators and continuers to a statistically significant degree,
Lambda=.691,

x2 (8)=25.358,

£=.014.

The second function seeks to iden-

tify terminators but is less powerful and nonsignificant, Lambda=.980,

Table 23
Association of Self-Consciousness Scores with Covariatcs of Premature Termination

Self-Consciousness scales
Variable

Private

Public

Social anxiety

Total

Patient variables

------------------ ----------------------------

>.10
>.10

Global dingnosis

x2(l.2)=9.44,£.) .60

Personality type

x2(12)=7 .zo.£> .so

x 2 (12)=17 .01 ,_p_
x 2 (l2)=18.02,p_

Prognosis

f_(4,l03)=.842,r_> .50

!_(l•' 103) =. 758,£_.,.. 50

Percent disability

x2 (3)"'. 79,p >.au
x2 (9)=6. 32 •£ >. 70

x2(3),.9.36,_p_<

!_(3, 130)=.488,£_ ') .60

Referral source
Prior therapy

x 2 (12)=10. 77 •P.. >.so

x2 (l2)=l3.40,£>. JO

.os
!:_(4,103)=. 721,E_) .so
x2 (3)=4.73,p_'>.lO

x2(12)=18.67,E_< .to
£(1;,103}=.103,2_>.90
x 2 (3)=2.2l,_p.> .so

x2{9)=8.tt8,_p_> .40

x 2 (9)=8.14,_p__?.50

x2 (9)=3. 70,_p_ > .90

_!<:(3,130)=.963,_£ ">.40

x_(3,130)=1.560,E_ > .20

£{3,130)=1 .021,£_> .10

.os

x2(12)=22. 9l,p_ <

-----------------Therapist and interaction variables

Experience
Discipline

x2(3)=3.24,_p_/ .30
X2 (9)=t2.06,_p_'>.20

x2 (3)=3.99,£).21)

x2 (3)=4.42,£"> .20

x2(3)=7. 73,£ < .10

x2 (9)=4.03,_p_ ).90

x2 {9)=7.13,£).60

X2 ( 9) =6. 7 1, .2.) . 60

x2 (3) =5. 68,p_

!_(3, 104)=.151 ,_2.

>. 10
>. 90

_!'_(3, 10'•)=1. 34 ,P._). :!0

f{3,114)=.838,E_) .40

!_(3, 114)=.027 ·E.). 90

Student or staff status

x2(3)=2.94,_p_> .40

x2 o>=3.20,_p_ >.3o

Hotivation

f_(3,104)=1.32,_£) .20

_!'_(3, 104)=1.69,£_) .10

Patte,tt reaction to recommended
treatment

!_(2,114)=.438,£_> .60

_!'_(2,114)=.388,p_

>.60

x2(3)=6.82,r_ <.10

Clinic variables

·---·--------------------------------------------------------------------Actual t hernpy modality deli.vered
SC~ml'

lhernplst throur,hout tre.,tment

Sessi•ms before the start
<>[ tre<Jtment

x 2 (12)=l3. 27 ·E.). 30
x2cn~r.97 .£.>.so

x 2 (6)~s. 7l.p) .40

------------

. x 2 oz)=ll.20,_p__>.so
x 2 (3)=4.37,p_).20
x2(6)=4.18,p_> .60

x2(12)=11.58,E_ "> .40

x2(lz)~lf•• 6t,_r:'> .20

XL ( 3) = 2 • 80 , £_) ·'• 0

x 2 (J)='•.6!l,p) .10

x2(6)=9.63,_r: > .10

x2(6)~5.6l,p ),t,o
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2

X (3)=1. 36 7, .E.> .10.

In combination, the two equations achieve 70%

accuracy in identifying decliners (who have the higher scores based
on the first set discriminant function coefficients replicated in
Table 24).

But terminators match their predicted group only 36.8%

of the time, and continuers are correctly placed 36.2% of the time.
The overall accuracy is 44.19%, less than 59.6% that would have resulted from predicting that all cases are continuers.

If total SC is

used instead of subscale scores, it is not included in the discriminant
function.

The accuracy of prediction remains best for decliners and

an inadequate 48.84% overall.
When the discrimination was exclusively between terminators
and continuers, two additional variables were added:

the experience

of the therapist and the number of days between referral and the beginning of treatment.
sented in Table 25.

The resulting analysis included the variables preTerminators had a group mean of -.69007, while

continuers averaged .24772.

This difference is not significant, Lambda

2
=.849, x (5)=7.93, .E_> .10, and the resulting function is 61.84% accurate.

With 55 continuers of 78 cases, a uniform prediction of con-

tinuation would have been more effective, achieving 70.5% accuracy.
Table 25 also shows the variables selected when total SC replaces subscales in the analysis.
tion.

Total SC is included in the discriminant func-

But once again the function is nonsignificant statistically,
2

Lambda=.83612, X (5)=8.860, .E_>.10, and unreliable practically, classifying cases with only 66.3% accuracy.
As indicated in Hypothesis 7, self-consciousness is included
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Table 24
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients for
Continuers, Terminators, and Decliners

Variable

Coefficients with function 1

Coefficients with function 2

Intake

.580

-.161

Distance

.708

-.196

-.658

-.737

.384

-.653

Prognosis
Social anxiety

Table 25
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients for Continuers and Terminators

With Self-Consciousness subscales
Variable

Coefficient

With Total Self-Consciousness
Variable

Coefficient

Intake

-.554

Intake

-.846

Begin therapy

-.518

Pretherapy sessions

-.599

Age

.682

Age

.794

Distance

-.605

Distance

-.577

Social anxiety

-.617

Total selfconsciousness

-.415
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in the discriminant function for three of the four analyses.
contribute in the prediction of continuation in treatment.
contribution is in the context of a failing cause.

It does
But the

The set of vari-

ables on which information has been collected are inadequate to reliably classify cases.

This is surprising, in that at least some of

the variables have been shown to be related to premature termination,
albeit in the inconsistent fashion that typifies research in the area.
Patient age and prognosis, and therapist experience have been significantly associated in previous work.

A number of variables included

here related to the context of treatment, clinic policy and procedures.
As such they tap a less researched area.

Their importance is less

clearly established, although the recurrent presence in the discriminant functions of variables such as days before intake, days before
beginning therapy, number of visits before treatment, and distance
between residence and clinic makes it clear that that context is as
worthy of future research as are the more traditional patient, therapist, and interaction variables.
In the absense of a pattern of significant findings, it is
difficult to interpret the relative importance of self-consciousness or
to explain the absense of the hypothesized link between self-evaluative
anxiety and flight from therapy.

A clear possibility is that the hy-

pothesis is wrong, that anxiety is not a determining variable in length
of stay, or, more specifically, that high levels of self-evaluative
anxiety may increase reliance on the therapist for support and counteract a tendency to avoid therapy.

People enter treatment because
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they are in pain in their daily life.

They may be quite willing to

tolerate whatever additional discomfort arises during the course of
therapy because of sustained self-scrutiny.

But the obtained results

do not lead to this conclusion, they just fail to rule it out.
Two alternative explanations can be briefly suggested.

If

self-consciousness is a determining variable in perseverance in treatment, it is the operative degree of affect aroused that is critical,
not just the level of self-focused attention.

In measuring degree of

self-consciousness, this research is tapping a precursor of the end
state of interest.

Level of self-consciousness may be a necessary but

not a sufficient condition for disruptive anxiety.

Indeed, the factor

structure which shows SA-SC to be separate from the other subscales
suggests this.

The impact of level of self-consciousness is mediated

by a related but untapped variable:
attention.

skill in handling self-focused

Highly self-conscious people may have related abilities to

laugh at themselves, to maintain a meditative distance between the observed and observing self, or to react with permissive acceptance to
their own qualities.

Any of these abilities, among many others, may

permit high levels of self-observation without undesirable sequellae.
Or, as Wicklund (1975) suggests, the person may like significant
features of the self observed.

The remarkable human capacity to re-

interpret events and their meaning is central to our extensive efforts
to preserve self-esteem.
devaluation.

Self-evaluation need not lead to self-

While patients may be generally less happy than others,

they nonetheless are motivated to justify and preserve the value of

196

their character (Rogers, 1961; Sullivan, 1954).

Their skills in

managing self-consciousness may be the critical element in determining
their capacity to adapt to the requirements of verbal therapy, and it
is an index of these skills that is missing from the present research.
A second, and somewhat related, explanation of the nonsignificant
results also is available.

It is not only the patient's skills at

managing self-consciousness that matters.

Therapists also vary in

the degree to which they consciously or unconsciously control the tone
and intensity of the patient's self-exploration.

A highly self-con-

scious patient, lacking skills to handle that self-scrutiny, might
still do well if paired with a therapist whose permissiveness, warmth,
patience, or ironic perspective on human failings helped to insulate
the patient from excessive self-evaluation.

As stated in the review,

the thrust of the research on premature termination has shifted to
interaction variables.

To examine self-consciousness as a quality of

the patient alone is somewhat anachronistic.

It is justified in this

first attempt to examine the impact of the variable.

But a more sophis-

ticated investigation, with a higher probability of significant results, would consider the interaction of patient, therapist, and context in measuring the operative level of self-consciousness.
Other hypotheses about premature termination.

In line with

the skills approach to self-consciousness described above, it was
hypothesized that previous exposure to psychotherapy would provide the
patient with an education about handling self-exploration in psycho-
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therapy, and so reduce the rate of premature termination.

Of the 134

cases available, 92 had no previous referrals, 22 had failed to begin
treatment on all previous contacts with the Mental Hygiene Clinic, 18
had previously completed a course of six or more sessions, and only
two had dropped out during the early sessions.

So, the sample is too

small for comparing former terminators and continuers specifically.
The only apparent variations from expected frequencies are the continuation of previous patterns among those failing prior referrals

(68.2% again failed, as opposed to a sample mean of 40.3%) and those
continuing (55.6% remained after 6 sessions, compared to 41.8% samplewide).

But these differences did not translate into significant Chi-

square valued.

When the 24 cases terminating between sessions one and

five were contrasted with those continuing, no difference in prior

2
experience was evident, x (3)=1.28, .E_).70.

The best test of Hypothe-

sis 6 sets two levels of experience by pooling former terminators with
continuers, and decliners with those never previously referred.

But

again, there is no evident relationship with the length of the current
2

course of therapy, X (2)=1.71, .E_).30.

The one test that might in-

timate the importance of self-consciousness management skills, or at
least of previous therapy experience at the clinic, fails to find any
differences in the current course as a function of previous treatment
experience.
Hypothesis 8 specifies that therapist skills and experience
will be related to length of treatment.

As mentioned previously,

there is an effect attributable to therapists, since this does affect
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the number of sessions attended.

But the available indices of skill-

fulness are not significantly associated with perseverance in treatment.

Neither therapist discipline,

x2 (3)=2.09, ~>.50,

2

student versus

2

>

staff status, x (2)=.104, £).90, nor experience, x (16)=16.03, £

.40, appeared to contribute.

No support was provided for the potential

explanation of self-consciousness management in the interaction of patient and therapist.

An additional expectation (Hypothesis 5) was that the effects
of public self-consciousness, specifically, would be more pronounced
among those receiving group therapy.

It is in this modality that at-

tention to the social aspects of this self is maximized.

Of the 21

patients referred for group treatment, 4 failed to begin, 5 dropped
out, and 12 remained through the initial 6 sessions.

The two cases

quitting after the first session were 4.52 higher than the sample mean
of 18.48 on the PU-SC subscale.

But the other terminators were below

The ANOVA was nonsignificant overall, F(4,16)=.524,

average.

~>

.70.

There is no evidence of a special linkage between PU-SC and perseverance
in treatment of those assigned to group therapy.
To recapitulate, there was little support for any of the hypotheses linking premature termination to self-consciousness.

Terminators

were not overrepresented among those highest or lowest in SC scores.
The expected inverted U relationship between percent remaining and
location in the SC distribution failed to appear.

Nor did the inclu-

sion of decliners as an additional comparison group clarify the relationship.

No differences in means were observed.

While decliners
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proved easiest of the three groups to discriminate, and SC scores
contributed to that discriminant function, little accuracy was achieved
in classifying patients as decliners, terminators, or discriminators.
None of the variables examined as potential covariates of premature termination showed significant differences between groups.

Similarly,

there was no support for the special relationships hypothesized between
patient's previous clinic contact and perseverance, therapist discipline or experience and sessions attended, or PU-SC levels and the
behavior of group therapy participants.
Personality Type and Self-Consciousness Levels
The analysis of five personality styles (see pp. 125-133) led to
predictions of different self-consciousness levels and subscale patterns for each type.

This chapter will review findings which relate

scores from the Self-Consciousness scale (SC) to ratings of typology
obtained from the intake interviewer.

Methodological issues arising

from both scales must, however, be mentioned first.
Methodological issues.

As discussed at the beginning of this

section, psychiatric patients failed to respond to the logical negative included in three items from the SC scale intended to counterbalance the acquiescent response set.

As such the items had reduced

means and low correlations with the total scale score.

These items

are not evenly distributed across the subscales; two are from PR-SC
and one from SA-SC.
for the average item.

These scales have correspondingly diminished means
This presents a problem for evaluating the hy-

200
pothesis that certain types will have differential elevation of subscale averages.

Additional statistical manipulation was required to

correct this problem.

Each subscale average was adjusted (for PR-SC,

PU-SC, and SA-SC, respectively by .0122, -.3324, and .3101) to equate
it with the grand mean for all SC items over the 116 cases involved.
Despite this adjustment based on pooled results, subscale means for
each personality type remain free to vary.

Within type comparisons

of subscale averages become meaningful since no scale retains a builtin elevation samplewide.
The second methodological issue pertains to the reliability of
clinicians' use of the typology scale.

With K=.374, for the reliabil-

ity study, there is a likelihood that many differences will be obscured
by error variance.

This will be a particular problem for obsessive

and passive types, who proved to be the most difficult to classify.
In reality, discrepancies will be more robust than indicated by differences in means or by significance tests.
Self-concsiousness levels for five global personality types.
At the conclusion of the review, it was argued that types are independent of degree of pathology.

They are not, however, independent

of global diagnosis, which must be considered a flawed index of intensity of disturbance.
diagnosis.

Table 26 presents the data relating type to

A Chi-Square analysis shows the two variables to be signif-

icantly related,

x 2 (16)=99.06, E< .001.

Accordingly, SC levels will

be evaluated separately for each variable.

Table 27 summarizes the

scale and subscale means used in these analyses.

None of the com-

Table 26
Global Diagnosis and Personality Type
Personality type

Diagnosis
Psychotic

Neurotic

N

Personality
disorder

OBS

Other

Hysteric

3

6

4

1

9

23

Paranoid

35

3

3

0

5

46

Obsessive

10

30

3

3

17

63

Passive

16

20

6

0

8

50

3

3

10

0

1

17

67

62

26

4

40
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Sociopath
N

N
0
t-'
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Table 27
Self-Consciousness Scale Means (with ANOVAs)
as a Function of Diagnosis and Personality Type
Self-Consciousness subscales
Diagnosis

N

Private

Public

Social Anxiety

Total

Global diagnosis
Psychotic

38

23.74

18.81

12.42

55.50

Neurotic

35

24.43

18.14

12.14

54.66

Personality
disorder

18

23.56

21.94

14.66

60.17

OBS and other

27

22.93

18.59

11.77

53.30

.322,.E_) .80 2.325,£. < .10 1.27l,.E_> .20 1.157,.E_>.30

E_(3,114)

Personality type
Hysteric

11

23.28

17.91

10.73

51.91

Paranoid

25

24.32

17.84

11.96

54.92

Obsessive

44

24.39

19.38

11.64

55.36

Passive

23

22.96

18.87

14.79

56.61

Sociopath

14

24.65

22.21

14.22

61.72

E_(4' 112)

.303,.E_>.80 1.892,.E_>.10 2.275,.E_(.10 1.104,.E_>.30
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parisons are statistically significant.

When public self-conscious-

ness (PU-SC) is examined as a function of diagnosis, the higher scores
of those with personality disorders result in a marginally significant difference.

While this is consistent with the extraverted pro-

file from Miller and Magaro's (1977) findings and is in the direction hypothesized, in the context of multiple tests, the probability
of chance variation of this degree is too high to regard this as
validating expectations.

Similarly, the findings on SC as a function

of personality type fall short of statistically reliable differences.
The elevated Social Anxiety (SA-SC) scales for the passive, but not
sociopathic, patients was anticipated from the literature review.
But the differences among the five groups is insufficient to be
clinically or statistically meaningful.

Because somewhat different

factors were found for this psychopathological sample than for the
norm group, ANOVAS were also computed for the two major factors as
a function of personality type.

Although the sociopathic and passive

types were above the mean on the anxiety factor, it proved nonsignificant, !_(4,112)=1.725, .£.> .10.

On the introspection factor, pas-

sive types were the on:Ly divergent group, obtaining lower scores.
But, again, the total variability was nonsignificant, !_(4,112)=2.007,

.£. > .05.
Instructions did permit clinicians to rate a secondary type
if this was felt to be necessary.

While the matrix in Table 27 used

only primary types, the function may have been confounded by the
inclusion of mixed or unclear diagnoses.

A series of ANOVAS was also
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computed for those patients described in terms of only one type.
(See Table 28).

Neither the relative ranking nor the magnitude of

the differences were much effected.
To check the possibility that significant differences in the
general distribution were disguised by the presence of extreme scores,
a Chi-Square was computed for each SC scale after it had been recomputed into frequency intervals of one standard deviation each.

For

private self-consciousness (PR-SC), the data were unremarkable and

2
analysis was nonsignificant, x (12)=7.20,
sciousness was also nonsignificant,

~> .80.

Public self-con-

x 2 (12)=18.02, ~ ).10.

Hysterics

and sociopaths, the smallest sample groups, were not represented in
all sectors of the distribution.

Sociopaths were consistently high

scorers, with none more than a standard deviation below the mean and
35.7% in the highest interval.

Hysterics, who might also be expected

to be elevated in PU-SC, were overrepresented in the interval immediately above the mean but also had a disproportional number of
extremely low scores.

Paranoids, expected to be consistently low, did

have a preponderance of low scorers but also had the widest scatter.
Obsessives and passive types were, as hypothesized, intermediate.
Frequency Distributions for the remaining Self-Consciousness
scales are presented in Tables 29 and 30.

As expected, hysterics and

obsessives were low or moderate in anxiety.
above mean but had a restricted variability.

Passive types were usually
In contrast, paranoids

were below average in total but were overrepresented at the extremes.
Sociopaths were likewise highly variable, but typically above the mean.

Table 28
Self-Consciousness Scale Means (with ANOVAs) as a Function of Unmixed Personality Type
Self-Consciousness subscales
Personality type

N

Private

Hysteric

8

23.12

Paranoid

22

Obsessive

Social anxiety

Total

18.37

10.25

51.75

25.41

18.23

12.04

56.59

40

24.40

19.70

11.57

55.62

Passive

20

22.75

18.65

14.80

56.20

Sociopath

12

25.75

22.50

13.67

62.67

.767, .E_ >.50

1. 66 3' .E_ > . 10

1.832, .E_>.10

1.051, .E_ > .30

!_(4,97)

Public

N

0

Ul

Table 29
Distribution of Social Anxiety Scores by Personality Type
Intervals
Personality type

N

More than one SD
below the mean

Less than one SD
below the mean

Less than one SD
above the mean

More than one SD
above the mean

Hysteric

11

18.2%

54.5%

18.2%

9.1%

Paranoid

25

24.0%

24.0%

36.0%

16.0%

Obsessive

44

11.4%

45.5%

34.1%

9.1%

Passive

23

0.0%

21.7%

69.6%

8.7%

Sociopath

14

14.3%

7.1%

57.1%

21.4%

N

0

"'

Table 30
Distribution of Total Self-Consciousness Scale Scores by Personality Type
Intervals

Personality type

N

More than one SD
below the mean

Less than one SD
below the mean

Less than one SD
above the mean

More than one SD
above the mean

Hysteric

11

9.1%

63.6%

27.3%

0.0%

Paranoid

25

24.0%

28.0%

20.0%

28.0%

Obsessive

44

18.2%

36.4%

38.6%

6.8%

Passive

23

8.7%

43.5%

39.1%

8.7%

Sociopath

14

7.1%

21.4%

42.9%

28.6%

N

0
-...J
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The variability of the last two groups probably contributed to the
failure of the ANOVA described above.

In significance testing, based

on distribution, personality style did relate to anxiety levels,
2

X (12)=22.91,

~(.05.

Table 30 shows a somewhat similar distribution

for total Self-Consciousness scale scores, but without the above mean
congregation of passive style scorers.

With only the sociopathic

types disproportionately high, the degree of association is only
marginal,

x2 (12)=18.67,

£_(.10.

The data provides some tenuous support for the hypothesized
link between personality style and self-consciousness.

It is most

consistently, and least surprisingly, encountered in support of an
association between passive and character disorder types and anxiety
in response to self-focused attention.

It is interesting to note

this commonality between two groups whose symptomology is so divergent.
These findings support an interpretation of the sociopath's perapatetic
search for social interaction, stimulation, and excitement as an attempt to use constant activity as a cover by means of which to avoid
self-evaluation.

Anxiety is much more evident in passive types, as

their methods of escape into states of subjective self-awareness are
more limited.

But, for both groups, avoidance of a tendency toward

critical self-evaluation seems central.
The data in support of such an interpretation is, however,
neither robust nor consistently apparent across significance tests.
Two factors seem to contribute to this inconsistency.

The reliability

of the type rating scale, while adequate, is sufficiently low that
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misclassifications seem certain to increase error variance.

The

consistency with which sociopaths were distributed in SC scores
(Tables 29 and 30) is partially attributable to the relative reliability of this subscale.

The other subscales are not so well served.

In addition, the variability that characterizes patients reduces the
power of those statistical tests based on a regression model.

As

described previously, patients are more variable than college students.
The power of ANOVA and t-tests is correspondingly diminished.
Comparisons between specific personality types.

Specific

predictions were made regarding the rank order of the types.

On the

total SC score, obsessives and passive types were predicted to be
similar, as indeed they are, and higher than hysterics and sociopaths.
Likewise, obsessives were hypothesized to exceed hysterics and sociopaths on PR-SC, but to have a lower mean on PU-SC.

These planned

comparisons are rendered inappropriate because of the dissimilarity
of the scale scores of hysterics, lowest overall, and sociopaths,
who proved the highest.

Apparently, the primarily nonpsychotic hys-

terics in this sample were well enough defended that self-consciousness of any type was minimized.
social anxiety were low.

Public self-consciousness as well as

This is in keeping with the description of

hysterics in terms of their characteristic naivete and la belle indifference.

Of the comparisons specified in Hypotheses 1 and 2, only

that between combined obsessive and passive groups with paranoids remains feasible.

In this case, the difference is as expected, with

paranoids scoring lower, but it falls short of statistical significance,
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!_(90)=-.29, p> .70.
Table 31 summarizes expected ranks (duplicated from p. 135)
and contrasts them with those obtained.

A series of pairwise com-

parisons, based on these hypothesized rankings were also completed.
Significant differences between types were found for the Social
Anxiety Subscale (SA-SC).
=3.08,

.E_

< .01,

Passive types exceeded both hysterics, !_(32)

and obsessives, !_(65)=2.86, .£ < .01, and were marginally

greater than paranoid patients, !_(46)=1.88, .E_=.066.

Rankings of other

subtypes did not entirely conform with expectations.

Obsessives, ex-

pected to be second highest in SA-SC, were not statistically different
than hysterics or paranoids.
scales.

Instead, sociopaths had the elevated

Although t-tests failed to show significant differences, the

Mann-Whitney U-test revealed that sociopaths significantly exceeded
obsessives, U =2.017,
-z
43.5, n =11,
1

.!!_

2

=14,

E._ (

.05, and marginally exceeded hysterics, !!_=

..E.< .10

in Social Anxiety.

This represents the

only instance in the set of pairwise comparisons for which nonparametric tests showed greater sensitivity than !_-tests.

Despite the

partially unexpected ranking of the sociopaths, the essential feature
of the hypothesis for the SA-SC subscale was confirmed in that passive
types proved the most anxious.
With the major exception of the rank of hysterics, hypothesized
relationships were also observed for the Public Self-Consciousness (PUSC) subscale.
sives,

Sociopaths obtained marginally higher scores than obses-

~(56)=1.80,

r_=.078, and exceeded passive types, !_(35)=2.28, r_=

.029, and paranoids !_(37)=2.46, _£=.019, to a statistically reliable

Table 31
Expected and Observed Rankings of Personality Types on Self-Consciousness Scores
Self-Consciousness scales
Expected

Personality type

Private

Public

Observed

Social
anxiety

Total

Private

Public

So.oial
anxiety

Total

Hysteric

3

1

3

3

4

4

5

5

Paranoid

5

5

3

5

3

5

3

4

Obsessive

1

3

2

2

2

2

4

3

Passive

1

3

1

1

5

3

1

2

Sociopath

3

1

3

3

1

1

2

1
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degree.

Contrary to expectations, hysterics were ranked second lowest

on PU-SC and varied significantly from sociopaths,

~(23)=2.67,

z=.014.

Parametric and nonparametric tests revealed no statistically reliable
differences between personality types on private self-consciousness
(PR-SC).
score.

The other trends toward significance occurred on the total
Sociopaths were marginally higher than obsessives,

1.76, z=.083, and significantly higher than hysterics,
z=.030, on total scores.

~(56)=

~(23)=2.31,

While sociopaths were the "unknown quantity",

as revealed in the qualifying comments in the discussion of their
anxiety level, their highest rank on both total SC and PR-SC is inconsistent with what was predicted.

Neither was the consistently low

score of hysterics hypothesized.

While rationales for the observed

results have been provided, results from both groups may be anomalous,
a happenstance due to the relatively small sample size.

It is this

combination of small groups and high standard deviations that accounts
for the dearth of significant differences.

The means do differ.

In

the case of SA-SC particularly, they vary much in the manner that was
predicted, confirming the observations from the previous section.

Like-

wise, on PU-SC, the sociopaths achieved the highest rank in the manner
predicted.

But the mutual validation of the subscale and the distinc-

tion between types is marred by the unexpected low scores from the
hysterics.

Both PU-SC and PR-SC, less distinct and central for patho-

logical groups than for normals, show scant evidence of being related
to personality style.

For PR-SC especially, the results suggest little

relevance to diagnosis and offer no support for the hypothetical link
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of introspection and personality types.
Subscale item averages and personality types.

In the attempt

to demonstrate a link between personality style and management of selffocused attention, comparisons are possible within, as well as across
personality types.

Hypothesis 3 specified an expected pattern of

scores over the three subscales for each type.

Table 32 replicates

those predictions, showing the expected rank order of the average subscale item.

Tests against these hypotheses would prove misleading if

unrefined subscale item averages were used.
PU-SC item was highest.

For all types the average

Except for passive types the average of the

second greatest magnitude was PR-SC.

Differences in the relative

elevation of subscale averages across types are obscured by the uniform
elevation of the PU-SC items.

As previously discussed, a correction

was made to eliminate subscale elevation sample-wide prior to further
analysis.
The observed rank for the revised item averages are presented
in Table 32.

Table 33 includes the means.

is there a significant difference.

Only for the passive types

The average from the SA subscale

is significantly higher than that from PR-SC,
PU-SC,

~(28)=3.02, ~~.01.

level of anxiety.

~(23)=3.25,

£<.01, or

This is consistent with the expected high

Contrary to expectation, the passive types reported

little attention to internal experience.

A marginally significant

difference was observed among sociopaths, for whom PU-SC exceeded PRSC items,

~(14)=2.06,

£=.06, as expected.

For the other personality

types, differences are insufficient to interpret reliably.

Hysterics

Table 32
Expected and Observed Subscale Ranks for Each Personality Type
Self-Consciousness subscales
Expected
Personality type
Hysteric

Private
2

Public
1

Observed
Social anxiety

Private

2

1

2

3

1

3

2

1

2

3

3

2

1*

3

1

2

Paranoid
Obsessive

1

2

Passive

1

2

Sociopath

2

1

1

* Significantly greater than lower ranking subscale averages,£ <.01~

Public Social anxiety
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Table 33
Self-Consciousness Subscale Item Means for Personality Types
Self-Consciousness subscale
Personality type

Private

Public

Social anxiety

Hysteric

2.34

2. 24

2.10

Paranoid

2.44

2.22

2.30

Obsessive

2.45

2.45

2.25

Passive

2.31

2.37

2. 77

Sociopath

2.48

2.85

2.68
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failed to peak on public self-awareness as expected.

For obsessives

the difference between PR-SC and PU-SC items, expected to be significant, failed to appear.

In fact, when mixed types are excluded, the

remaining 40 obsessives are minimally higher on Public Self-Consciousness (mean item value of 2.47) than on Private Self-Consciousness
(2.44).

In all other respects, the exclusion of mixed types affected

neither ranks or significance levels.

In view of the results from

the factor analysis, the distinction between PR-SC and PU-SC is academic.
Factors.

Table 34 compares the means of the Introspection and Anxiety
As the former corresponds more closely with PR-SC, although

with PU-SC elements, and the later is highly related to SA-SC, a
comparison is possible using the hypothesized rankings as recapitulated
in the above review section.

Excluding the paranoids, for whom no

relative rankings were suggested, and the sociopaths, for whom the
anxiety level was problematic, the relative level of the two factor
scores is in the direction expected.
Comparisons among subscales offer some support for the hypothesized link between self-consciousness and personality style.

Pre-

dicted differences were found in which the anxiety scale was elevated
among passive types.

A marginal distinction between public and private

self-consciousness was found for sociopaths.

But, as with the preced-

ing sections of analysis, the results are neither so consistent with
hypothesis nor so robust as might be hoped.

The distinctions between

personality types may have been too gross for sensitive testing.
Further research might profitably use more thoroughly validated in-
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Table 34
Self-Consciousness Scale Factor Score Means for Personality Types

Personality type

Anxiety factor

Introspection factor

Hysteric

-.41

.osa

Paranoid

-.15

.o2a

Obsessive

-.02

.04a

Passive

.1sa

-.44

Sociopath

.41a

.08

aHigher ranking factor score.
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struments such as the Millon Multiaxial Clinical Inventory (Millon,
1977) or more intensive diagnostic assessments prior to rating personality style.

Such steps would likely increase the frequency of

statistically significant results.

But, with the possible exception

of the social anxiety in the absense of introspection that typifies
passive types, the current research suggests that any distinctions
that are eventually made will have more theoretical than applied implications.

Self-consciousness is not so closely linked to any

specific diagnostic group or personality type as to be of particular
use in assessment or to automatically present an issue to be addressed
in psychotherapy.
Discussion
Implications for self-awareness theory.

The results of this

research provide additional information with which to evaluate the
Self-Consciousness scale (SC) and self-awareness theory.
tial problems with the SC scale have been identified:

Two poten-

the lack of

control of the acquiescence response set, and the impact of transient
emotional states on a presumably dispositional measure.
issue was directly tested, further research is needed.

Since neither
The SC scale

has three items for which the maximum self-consciousness scores requires a negative answer.

These items were among the four with the

lowest correlation with the total score, and none of these was importantly loaded on the two major factors.

It may be that patients

failed to understand the double negative required or a pervasive

219
response set may be in operation.

While there was no measure of the

influence of acquiescence, the low degree of association between the
three contrary items included to control it and the rest of the scale
suggests that it is considerable.
fewer than 15% of the sample.

Three other items were rejected by

This extreme skewness also undermines

the sensitivity of the scale and may be taken as further evidence of
an artifactual response set.

The SC scale would perform better if

revised to be better balanced for acquiescence.
The 12 patients completing the scale immediately prior to
their screening appointments were significantly higher in SC than other
comparison groups.

In the absense of any apparent differences from

other outpatients seen at the clinic, the most plausible explanation
is that the common feature in their situation, the imminent screening
appointment, acted as a powerful manipulation increasing self-focused
attention.

The validation research of the scale has demonstrated that

the scale taps a dispositional tendency comparable in effect to stimuli
increasing objective self-awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Fenigstein,
1979; Scheier & Carver, 1977).

But perhaps, as is suggested in this

study and in the results reported by Buss and Scheier (1976), the
dispositional and situational elements of self-attention are independent and additive.

Further research is indicated on this topic.

To

the extent that the scale proves sensitive to state variables, the
generalizability of its results decrease and the sensitivity of comparisons--at least in studies such as this, in which the influence of
state variables accumulates as error variance--is proportionally de-
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creased.
Some findings with normal subjects fail to generalize to a
clinical population.

The increased correlation between SA-SC and the

remaining subscales is not the point.

In fact, the anxiety factor, al-

though more central for patients, is quite similar to that obtained
from students.

The important difference is the disappearance of dis-

tinct public and private aspects of self-awareness.

For a clinical

population, these two subscales merge featurelessly into a secondary
factor.

This research suggests that little confidence be placed on

the meaning of subscale scores.

A two factor model of self-conscious-

ness--which is entirely adequate for Duval and Wicklund's (1972)
formulations--may be more appropriate.

In the absense of further con-

firmation, it is suggested that little importance be attached to the
PR-SC and PU-SC scores, at least for clinical populations.

This finding

counters the trend in the research literature which treats the publicprivate dichotomy as the fundamental contribution of self-consciousness
research.

Buss (1980) reports a range of experiments on normal sub-

jects in which the two dimensions have behavioral consequences which
are either independent or opposing.

He presents this research as:

evidence demonstrating how different the two self-consciousness traits are, despite their moderate positive correlation.
People who. reflect about their psychological "insides" are very
different from people who are concerned about themselves as social
objects. (p. 61)
Because the distinct behavioral implications of PR-SC and PU-SC have
been replicated with normals, the current research does not challenge
those findings.

In fact, the absense of the distinction should be
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replicated in future research.

But the present results indicate that,

for a clinical population at least, introspective behavior is too undifferentiated for the dichotomy to be applicable to the population as
a whole.

A question for future researchers is whether it is the psy-

chiatric patient or the college student that is a more representative
group on which to build a model of self-consciousness.
This does not imply that the results of the current research are
entirely discontinuous with previous studies.
scale, specifically, generalizes quite well.

The social anxiety subThe consistency in mean

scores across samples, very different in life situations, suggests the
broad applicability of the central dimension.
of SA-SC items was retained.
dation for the subscale.

The internal consistency

This research provided some needed vali-

It makes sense that anxiety accounts for a

greater proportion of the explained variance among patients than
normals.

The significant and important inverse relationship with the

Ego Strength scale was hypothesized and is consistent with clinical
wisdom.

The SA-SC appears to be a valid index of anxiety about evalua-

tion in a social context.
This research also supports a central tenant of self-awareness
theory in clarifying the relationship of self-consciousness and anxiety.
Although never discussed in those terms specifically, the self-denigration, the heightened acitvity and conformity, and the attempted escape
into subjective self-awareness all suggest that objective self-awareness is a major source of anxiety.

Yet, paradoxically, people regular-

ly and willingly maintain this state of consciousness.

Self-denigra-

222
tion cannot be an automatic consequence.

The factor structure of the

SC scale, for both normal and pathological samples, includes anxiety
as one dimension among others.

For patients, this aspect is more

pronounced and self-consciousness is more likely to be expressed as
anxiety.

But neither patients nor normals need inevitably respond

with evaluation.

A non-affective response of self-observation, whether

or not it is differentiated into public and private components, is also
available.

Wicklund (1975b) acknowledges that objective self-awareness

may be acceptable or even enjoyable when behavior exceeds stands.

Re-

search with the SC scale suggests that a non-evaluative self-awareness
is also normative.

The implication is clear that some intervention

may shift the internal structure of self-consciousness to lessen the
role of anxiety.

With patients, for whom anxiety takes on a more cen-

tral role, this is a particularly relevant project.
Implications for future research and clinical applications.
Two clinical issues were examined in this study, incidence of premature
termination and classification of personality type.

Despite the ex-

pectation of significant association, self-consciousness had minimal
practical impact on either variable.

The attempt to understand this

leads to several methodologicql issues and suggestions for future research.

Greater differences between types are probable if the type of

rating scale was made more reliable or replaced with a more thoroughly
validated scale.

A replication with larger samples, especially of

hysterics and sociopaths, would be of interest.

In this study, signif-

icant differences were found on the SA-SC in comparison with passive
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patients and sociopaths, and on PU-SC and total SC with sociopaths.
More statistically reliable differences may be anticipated in replication studies.

The absolute lack of significant findings in the pre-

diction of termination suggests that self-consciousness levels are not
related.

If the central assumption, that dropping out represents

flight from excessive anxiety, has any value, then it refers to state
anxiety aroused during the course of treatment.

Rather than using a

primarliy dispositional measure prior to therapy it would be profitable
to examine variables more directly linked to the nature of interaction
in treatment.

These would include indices of patient skill in handling

anxiety and therapist skills in modulating self-consciousness.

How

self-awareness is handled appears more critical than level of selfconsciousness.
The findings in the present study suggest no particular modifications in the practice of psychotherapy.

If anything, they offer the

reassurance that the degree of self-consciousness on the part of the
patient is unlikely to be associated with diagnosis or flight from
therapy.

More disturbed patients may be expected to display heightened

anxiety as part of a generally excessive self-consciousness.

Passive

types should display social anxiety in the absense of evidence of much
introspection.

But patients as a group differ little from normals in

self-consciousness levels.

What differences do appear are not demon-

strably important in the process of therapy.
The findings relevant to clinical practice are, then, essentially negative.

This is generally reassuring in that hypothetical
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aversive consequences are not rE2gularly or inevitably associated with
the very basic therapeutic proct2ss of insight.
ness is functionally associated

While self-conscious-

with concern about social evaluation,

there is no evidence that this Elnxiety assumes a major role in the
clinical setting.

SUMMARY

The Self-Consciousness scale (SC) was administered to 230
veterans referred for outpatient psychotherapy.

In the absense of

previous published reports on the use of this scale with a clinical
population, this study was in part a generalization study.

It checked

the external validity of results obtained from the college students
sampled to date.

Means from patients varied little from those pre-

viously reported.

There is no evidence that gross level of self-

consciousness, for the total score or subscales, differs for patients
or varies across age, education, social class background, or any of
the other variables on which veterans are discrepant from students.
However, definite limits to the generalizability of previous findings
were encountered.

Patients are significantly more variable in their

scores than students.
related.

The subscale scores are also more highly cor-

The response to self-focused attention, with three identifi-

ably different components for students, was less differentiated for
veterans.

A factor analysis reveals only two major factors, with so-

cial anxiety assuming a more central role.
assumption of self-awarenes-s theory:

This reaffirms a central

that self-consciousness is easily

transformed into aversive self-evaluation.

But it also indicates that

caution should be exercised in applying the SC scale to non-student
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populations.

The total score, primarily as a result of the Social

Anxiety subscale, is significantly and inversely related to the Ego
Strength scale.

The more pathological the sample, the higher the SC

scores that may be expected.

Those who admit to symptoms also report

a dispositional tendency to examine themselves and to be made anxious
by this evaluation.
Self-consciousness was hypothesized to relate to perseverance
in treatment.

Highly self-evaluative patients were expected to flee

the extremely focused attention engendered by therapy.
found for this hypothesis.

No support was

Neither self-consciousness nor the other

patient, therapist, or contextual features examined successfully differentiated those terminating unilaterally within five sessions from
those continuing in verbal therapy.

While the Social Anxiety (SA-SC)

subscale or the total SC score alternately contributed to discriminant
functions, these functions were nonsignificant and unsuccessful in
classifying continuers and terminators at better than chance levels.
It appears that the relationship of patient and therapist may be a
more powerful determinant of perseverance in treatment than is the
patient's dispositional tendency toward self-scrutiny.
Different levels of self-consciousness were expected to characterize different personality types from among the patient sample.
The tests of this hypothesis generated mixed results.

An ANOVA re-

vealed no significant difference in total self-consciousness among
hysterics, paranoids, obsessives, passive types, and sociopaths.

But

pairwise comparisons did indicate that sociopaths had relatively more
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elevated scores, significantly so when contrasted with hysterics.
Contrary to expectation, obsessives achieved the second highest, rather
than the highest, mean score on private self-consciousness (PR-SC) and
hysterics were next to lowest on public self-consciousness (PU-SC) when
expected to be among the top two.

As hypothesized, sociopaths were the

highest of the personality styles on PU-SC and passive types had the
highest mean for SA-SC, to a statistically reliable degree for two of
the four comparisons.

With the exception of hysterics, each type also

had the hypothesized peak subscale score.

In the face of the general

variability of patient scores and the less than optimal reliability of
the personality rating task, these results lend modest support to the
hypothesized link between personality style and self-consciousness levels.

The degree of association obtained is, however, insufficient to

be of practical use in diagnosis or anticipating issues in therapy.
The self-consciousness generated in psychotherapy is related
to self-evaluation.

But the association is neither so consistent nor

so strong as to constitute a threat to treatment in the typical case.
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Following is a list of statements about personal and social behavior. Please read each statement,
thinking about how true for you each statement is. If the statement is "extremely unlike" you,
then circle the number- "1" next to that statement. If it is "somewhat unlike" you, then circle the
number "2''. If you are uncertain or undecided, circle "3"; if the statement is "somewhat like"
you, circle "4"; and circle "5" for those statements that are "extremely like" you. Take as
much time as you like on each question. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers.
What matters is how you are, or how you see yourself to be. Please complete the questionnaire
before leaving. When finished, turn it in to the secretary or the staff member that gave it to you.

1
Extremely
Unlike Me

2
Somewhat
Unlike Me

3
Undecided
or Unsure

4
Somewhat
Like Me

Extremely
Like Me

1

2

3

4

5

2. I'm concerned about my style
of doing things

1

2

3

3. Generally I'm not very aware
of myself

1

2

3

4

5

4.

1

2

3

4

5

4

5

1.

I'm always trying to figure
myself out

It takes me time to overcome my

5

5

shyness in new situations
5.

I ret1ect (or think carefully) about
myself a lot

1

2

3

6.

I'm concerned about the way I
present myself (or come across
to others)

1

2

3

Extremely
Unlike :Yle

Somewhat
Unlike ~le

Undecided
or Unsure

Somewhat
Like :Yie

Extremely

7. I'm often the subject (or center)
of my own fantasies

1

2

3

4

5

s.

I have trouble working when
someone is watching me

1

2

3

9.

I never scrutinize myself (or
examine or look at myself
closely)

1

3

10. I get embarrassed very easily

1

2

11. I'm self-conscious about the way

1

2

I look

Continue on the next page.

5

Like Me

5

4

5

5

3
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1
Extremely
Unlike Me

3
TJndecided
or Unsure

4

5

Somewhat
Unlike Me

Somewhat
Like Me

Extremely
Like Me

12. I don't find it hard to t:llk. to
str:mgers

1

2

3

4

5

13. I'm generally attentive to (or
aware of) my inner_feelings

1

2

3

4

5

14. I usually worry about makin!$
a good impression

1

2

3

4

5

15. I'm constantly examining my
motives (or looking at my
reasons for acting as I do)

1

2

3

4

5

16. I feel anxious when I speak in

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Extremely
Unlike Me

Somewhat
Unlike Me

Undecided
or Unsure

Somewhat
Like iVIe

Extremely
Like Me

1

2

3

4

5

19. I'm concerned about what other
people think of me

1

2

3

4

5

20. I'm alert to changes in my mood

1

2

3

4

5

21. I'm usually aware of my appearance

1

2

3

4

5

22. I'm aware of the way my mind works 1
- when I work through a problem

2

3

4

5

23. Large groups make me nervous

2

3

4

5

2

front of a group
17. One of the last things I do before

I 1e ave my house is look in the
mi.F!'or

18. I sometimes have the feeling

that I'm off somewhere watching
myself

1

You may be contacted by telephone for a brief, follow up interview about your reactions to
your treatment at Hines. If there are times of the day or days of the week that are
particularly convenient, please indicate them below:
days _________________________
times - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Thank you for your cooperation
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This inventory consists of numbered statements. Read each statement and
decide whether it is true as applied to you or false as applied to you.
If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE, as applied to you, place a check mark V)
in the column marked True. If a statement is FALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE, as
applied to you, place a ckeck mark in the column marked false. If a statement does

not apply to you or if it is something that you don't know about, make no mark.
Remember t~ give YOUR OWN opinion of yourself. Do not leave any blank spaces
if you can avoid it. Blacken only one response for each statement. Erase completely
any answer you wish ;o change. Remember, try to make~ answer to each
statement.

1.

I have a good appetite.

2.

I have diarrhea once a month or more.

3.

At times I have fits of laughing and crying that I
cannot control.

4.

I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.

5.

I have had very peculiar and strange experiences.

6.

I have a cough most of the time.

7.

I seldom worry about my health.

8.

My sleep is fitful and disturbed.

9.

When I am with people I am bothered by hearing
very queer things.

10.

I am in just as good physical health as most of my
friends.

11.

Everything is turning out just like the prophets in the
Bible said it would.

12.

Parts of my body often have feelings like burning,
tingling, crawling, or like "going to sleep."

13.

I am easily downed in an argument.

1-L

I do many things that I regret afterwards (I regret
things more or more often than others seem to).

15.

I go to church almost every week.

· 16.
17.

I have met problems so full of possibilities that I
have been unable to make up my mind about them.
Some people are so bossy that I feel like doing the opposite of what they request, even though I know they
are right.
Continue on the other side.

True

False

True

False

2S3

18.

I like collecting flowers or growing house plants.

19.

I like to cook.

20.

During the past few years I have been well most of
the time.

21.

I have never had a fainting spell.

22.

When I get bored I like to stir up some excitement.

23.

My hands have tiot become clumsy or awkward.

24.

I feel weak all over much of the. time.

25.

I have no difficulty in keeping my balance in walking.

26.

I like to flirt.

27.

I believe my sins are unpardonable.

28.

I frequently find myself worrying about something.

29.

I like science.

30.

I like to talk about sex.

31.

I get mad easily and then get over it soon.

32.

I brood a great deal.

33.

I dream frequently about things that are best kept to
myself.

34.

My way of doing things is apt to be misunderstood
by others.

35.

I have had blank spells in which my activities were
interrupted and I did not know what was going on
around me.

36.

I can be friendly with people who do things which
I consider wrong.

37.

If I were an artist I would like to draw flowers.

38.

When I leave home I do not worry about whether
the door is locked and the windows closed.

39.

At times I hear so well it bothers me.

40.

I often cross the street in order not to meet someone
I see.

H.

I have strange and peculiar thoughts.
Continue on the next page.

True

False

True

False
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True

False

True

False

42. Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons I love.

43. Sometimes some unimportant thought will run through
my mind and bother me for days.
44. I am not afraid of fire.

45. I do not like to see women smoke.
46. When someo.ne says silly or ignorant things about
something I know about, I try to set him right.
47. I feel unable to tell anyone all about myself.
48. My plans have frequently seemed so full of difficulties
that I have had to give them up.
49. I would certainly enjoy beating a crook at his own game.

50. I have had some very unusual religious experiences.
51. One or more members of my family is very nervous.

52. I am attracted by members of the opposite sex.
53. The man who had most to do with me when I was a
child {such as my father, stepfather, etc.) was very
strict with me.
54. Christ performed miracles such as changing water

into wine.

55. I pray several times each week.
56. I feel sympathetic towards people who tend to hang on
to their griefs and troubles.
57. I am afraid of finding myself in a closet or small
closed space.
58. Dirt frightens or disgusts me.
59. I think Lincoln was greater than Washington.
60. In my home we have always had the ordinary necessities
(such as enough food, clothing, etc.).
61. I am made nervous by certain animals.
62. My skin seems to be unusually sensitive to touch.
63. I feel tired a good deal of the time.
64. I never attend a sexy show if I can avoid it.
Continue on the next page.
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True
65. If I were an artist I would like to draw children.
66. I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.
67. I have often been frightened in the middle of the night.
68. I very much like horseback riding.

Thank you for your cooperation.

False
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Patient's Name - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dare _______________________________

Refused

Referred to MHC from - - - - - - - - - -

Preresred

Before

Afrer

Diagnostic Impression and Manifestations-------------------

Personality Organization (mark '1' next to the most appropriare description; place "2"
next to the secondary care gory, if needed)
Hysrerical: overuse of repression; likely presents with somatic concerns or
the feeling of being used in personal relationships; exhibitionistic, dramatic;
relares so that the therapist has a sense of engagement with the patient
despire a focus on external events.
Paranoid: projection prominent; presents with concerns about being isolated
or deliberarely abused by other people; relares vaguely and guardedly;
therapist feels a strong pull to confirm the patient's perspective or else
be confronred with the patient's underlying anger.
Obsessive: isolation and inrellectualization prominent; problems relared to
feared loss of control or, if loss of control has been experienced, feelings
of depression, anger, and guilt; high expectations for personal productivity
or morality; insight into thoughts and motives without affect; patient is
controlling, and the inrerview may be so wordy as to become boring.
Passive: schizoid and avoidant; may present with multiple fears and feelings
of helplessness; inward focus on fantasy; history suggests lack of social
skills and contacts; therapist may still feel detached afrer the inrerview;
include: passive dependent, passive aggressive, and narcissistic characters.
Sociopathic: history of acting out rensions; minimizes problems, and likely
attends the inrerview because of pressure from family, courts, or other
outside source; may be problems with alcohol or drugs; appears socially
skilled and comfortable, and yet the contact remains superficial and the
relationship feels tenuous.
Prognosis (choose among: excellent, good, fair, guarded, p o o r ) - - - - - - - - - Patient's Motivation for Tr:eatment (excellent, good, fair, p o o r ) - - - - - - - - - Treatment Modality

Individual Therapy
Group Therapy (individual or couples)
lV1arital or Family Therapy
Hypnotherapy
lVIedication (exclusively)
Discharge: with referral elsewhere
Discharde: no treatment desired
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____

Recommendation
(rank order those
considered)

Patient's Preference
(mark"+", lf0", or "-"
for those recommended)
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Checkliat for Intake Interviewers

Dorothy and Dagmar will administer the questionnaire
to all patients who have nor. been given the scale as
inpatients or on screening.
Ask all intakes to turn the questionnuire in at the
beginning of your interview.
They may have already completed the questionnaire
and turned it in at the receptionists desk.
If the'y have not finished it, remind them to complete
it before leaving the clinic. They can turn the form
in to Dorothy or Dagmar.
If completed, the form can be turned in to you and
included in the intake folder.
Thank the patient for his cooperation on behalf of the
research team.
After the interview, complete the Intake Rating Sheet:
copy from the intake sheet: name, date, referra 1 source,
diagnosis, and prognosis;
rank the relevant personality typologies (remembering
that this is not to indicate degree of pathology, only
personality structure), rate motivation for treatment,
and rank recommendacions (noting the patient's reactions
with+, 0, or -).
Place the

Inta~e

Rating Form in the iutake folder.

Thank you for your continued help.
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Report on - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CLINICAL RECORD

or

Continuation of

s. F.-:-:-:--:----:---:--:---:--:----tYP• ol•••m;n•tion or d•t•)

<Srrik• out on• lin•)

(Sp~cJ!y

(Sifln and date)

INFORl\1ATION ABOUT: FACTORS L~FLUENCING THE DECISION TO BEGIN OR
CONTINUE IN OUTPATIENT TREATI.IENT

The purpose of this research is to better understand what factors a veteran
considers in malting a decision about beginning or continuing in tre stmevt at the
:O.lental Hygiene CUnic. We will be interested 1 n characteristics of the veteran and
in hospital policies that affect this decision. You will be asked a sel·ies of questions
on the following pa:;es about yourself and your experieuces. f.t some time in the
next four months you may receive a follow up telephone call irom a research staff
person, who will ask you some brief questions about your re~ctions to your treatment in the Psychiatry Service at Hines. In addition, the intal;;e worker will
auswer several qut:~stions about your interview.
In this research, our goal is to discover facts about people and programs
so r.hat the !VIental Hygiene Clinic can best meet veteran:;' r1eeds. In this kind of
study, we are less interested in a particular person'3 score on the paper and pencil
questionnaire than in the responses of veterans as a group. So no individttal case
is ever identified. Your test results are stricti:• confidrmtial. While the forms
you complete wi.ll remain in your clinical record during the coursA of the study,
they will not be interpreted by staff. Your reSiJOnses to e1e q~,;astionnaire will not
affect the type of treatment you receive at the ~rental Hygiene Clinic. So the
be~1ifits of this research will help those who come after you, a3 your parth.:it:~ation
will hopefully make it possible for veterans in the future to more efficiently get
the help they desire from the r..Iental Hygiene Clinic.
Our hope is that your participation m this re:;earch will be ::.. comfo1:table
experience for ycu. Many others have filled out the CJUestionnail'e with no problema.
!f you do have questions or concerns about this reseru:ch, you can feel free to
discuss them with a ward psychologist or ;\!ental Hygiene Clinii.: staff member. If you
sustain any physical injury related to your participation in this study you will be
entitled to medical c&e and treatment. Compensation may also be payable under
38 USC 351, or in some circumstances, undel' the Federal Tort Cl'lim~ Act.

(Contin'!Je on :ereu~ !ic!e)
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Report on or
--------------------------------------Continuation of S. F•.-:-:;-;:-~----=-~::-.:---:--:------

CLINICAL RECORD

<Stn'k .. out one/ine) (SpfiCdy rype ol••;,m;tutio" or d•t.•)

(Sitn and dat~)

INFORlV!ATION ABOUT: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION TO BEGIN OR
CONTINUE IN OUTPATIE:t\T TREATMENT

Your participation in this testing project is strictly voluntary. You may
withdraw your consent' at any time by stating tha~ you will not complete t!m
questionnaire. Your decision to participate or not will not affe::t the treatment
that rou wculd normally receive at the Mental Hygiene Clinic now or in the
future. Your veteran's benefits will not be affe·:;ted by yC'ur test results or
your decision to particif)&te or not.
I •.mderstand that this questionnaire is for reseaJ.•ch purposes. I agree
to fill out this form and, perhaps, to have a short telephone interview in the
future. I uncte1·stand that the reults will not affect my curreut treatment at
Hiue~ and thc>t tl:wse results will be kept stl·ictly confidential by the research
staff aad by all other staff at Hines Veterans Administratic::n 1Heclical Centc:·.

FJ'incipal Investigator's Signature

Patient's 'Signature

Responsible Therapist's Signature

\Vitness

Date

Time

Continue on the next page.
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VARIMP...X RC'!'ATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR AU_, FACTORS WITH AN EIGENV .ALUE GREATER THAN ONE
VARIABLE
1
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4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
"PERCENT OF
VARIANCE
INCORPORATED

FACTOR 1

FACTOR 2

F.ACTOR 3

.125
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.275
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.325
.593
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.158
.253

.llO
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.245
.224

,338

.454
.101
.381
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.003

9,79

8,97

.042
--. 026
.041
.116

.118

-.041
.282
660
.047
.036

FACTOR 4
~- .062
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.381
-.005
.265
.139
.036
-.053
.196
-.073
.079
-.221
.525

.508

.011

.195
.151
.194
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-.045
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.545
.382
.549
.llO

.::>31

6.10

6.10

FACTOR 5

FACTOR 6

FACTOR 7

.121
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-.286

.025
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.351
-.548
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-.004
.486
-.160

.280
.083
.207
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.112
-.076
.011

-.149
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.359
.229
-.039
.212
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-o068
-.148
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.2l7

.553
-.008
.267
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• 2.02

4,20

-.017

-.073

-.018
.053
.145

-.025
.054
-.044
.124
.068
-.067
.008
.094
.132
-.019
.089
.069

-.093
-.243
-.104
-.053
.000
-.060
.066
.030
-.042
-.182
.172

3.40
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DSM II DIAGNOSES OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
Code
290.00
291.50
295.00
295.30
295.40
295.60
295.70
295.90
295.99
296.00
296.20
296.30
297.00
298.00
300.00
300.10
300.20
300.40
300.70
301.00
301.10
301.20
301.30
301.40
301.70
301.89
302.80
303.10
303.20
304.80
305.50
307.30
307.40
309.20
309.90
316.00
318.00

Diagnosis
Senile dementia
Alcoholic deterioration
Simple schizophrenia
Paranoid schizophrenia
Acute schizophrenic episode
Residual schizophrenia
Schizo-affective schizophrenia
Chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia
Other schizophrenia
Involutional melancholia
Manic-depressive illness, depressed
Manic-depressive illness, circular
Paranoia
Psychotic depressive reaction
Anxiety neurosis
Hysterical neurosis
Phobic neurosis
Depressive neurosis
Hypochondriacal neurosis
Paranoid personality
Cyclothymic personality
Schizoid personality
Explosive personality
Obsessive compulsive personality
Antisocial personality
Borderline personality
Sexual deviation
Habitual excessive drinking
Alcohol addiction
Other drug dependence
Gastro-intestinal psychophysiologic disorder
Adjustment reaction to adult life
Adjustment reaction to late life
Non-psychotic organic brain syndrome due to trauma
Non-psychotic organic brain syndrome due to
other physical condition
Marital maladjustment
No mental disorder

Frequency
1
1
1
31
7
2
3
3
2
5
1
11
2
1
20
1
3
43
1
2
1
2
5
1
1
1
1
1
7
1
2
25
9
1
4
1
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FORMAT OF RAW DATA
Card

Columns

1

1- 3

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

4
6-28
30-31
33-34
36-37
39-41
43

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

1- 3
4
6- 8
9-11
12
13
14

2
2
2
2

16-18
18-20
21-23
24

2
2
2

25
26-27
28

2
2
3
3
3
3

29
30-31
1- 3
4
6-11
12

Content
Patient identification number (Inpatients 000-106,
outpatients 300-417, screenings 500-510, other outpatients 600-611, ratings only 700-795)
Card number
Self-Consciousness scale items (on a scale of 1-5)a
Private self-consciousness
Public self-consciousness
Social anxiety
Total self-consciousness score
Data combination available (Self-Consciousness scale
only 1, all instruments 8, etc.)
Patient identification number
Card number
Days between referral and scheduled intake appointment
Days between referral and first therapy appointment
Number of sessions before beginning therapy
Same therapist for treatment as for intake (no 1, yes 2)
Same therapist throughout first six therapy sessions
(no 1, yes 2)
Patient age (as of January 1, 1980)
Distance between residence and clinic
Percent disabilitya
Previous therapy at the clinic (yes, all of 5 or less
sessions 1; never began, although referred 2; never
referred 3; one or more episodes of at least 6 sessions
4)

Sessions attended (6 represents 6 or more sessions)
Therapist
Therapist discipline (psychologist 1, scoial worker 2,
nurse 3, physician 4)
Staff/student status (staff 1, student 2)
Years of experience of the therapist
Patient identification number
Card number
Date of intake (year, month, day)
When the Self-Consciousness scale was completed (before
interview 1, after interview 2, in waiting room prior
to interview 3)

Note. Blanks or zeros are typically considered to be missing data.
aBlanks or nines are considered to be missing data.
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Card

Columns

3

13

3
3

15-19
20

3

21

3
3

22
23

3

24

3

25

3
3
3

26
27
28

4
4
4
4
4
4

1- 3
4
5
6-73
75-76
77

Content
Referral source (Admitting 1, Screening/Admitting 2,
Inpatient Psychiatry Units 3-7, Inpatient General
Medicine 8, Outpatient General Medicine 9)
Diagnosis (DSM II)
Global diagnosis (psychotic 1, neurotic 2, personality
disorder 3, organic brain syndrome 4, other 5)
Personality type (hysteric 1, paranoid 2, obsessive 3,
passive 4, sociopath 5)
Personality type (secondary)
Prognosis (poor 1, guarded 2, fair 3, good 4, excellent 5)
Motivation for treatment (poor 1, fair 2, good 3,
excellent 4)
Recommended modality of treatment (individual therapy 1,
group therapy 2, family therapy 3, hypnotherapy 4,
medication only 5, referral 6, discharge without referral 7, other 8)
Recommended modality of treatment (secondary)
Actual therapy modality delivered
Patient's reaction to the actual modality of therapy
(negative 1, neutral or no response 2, positive 3)
Patient identification number
Card number
Inpatient unit
Ego Strength scale items (evidence of ego strength 1)
Total Ego Strength scale score
Test administered first (Ego Strength scale 1, SelfConsciousness scale 2)
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